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Abstract 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, post-conflict countries have attracted widespread economic 
assistance and policy advice from donor community to support their recoveries from war, to 
rebuild institutional capacities, and to restore their human and social capital. Yet, donor 
responses to post-conflict countries are uneven and some countries have received substantial 
amounts of assistance in the immediate aftermath of the conflict (e.g., Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). In addition, the stark environment of the post-
conflict countries poses challenges to both recipient and donor countries. 
 
This dissertation examines the role of aid in countries recovering from conflict by 
investigating the determinants and the time scale of post-conflict aid and its impact on 
outcomes of economic recovery. In so doing, this dissertation aims to enhance understanding 
of the role of foreign aid in post-conflict environments. It is timely in the context of 
reevaluation of aid effectiveness and increasing concerns about fragile states, whereby post-
conflict countries are especially significant as they are less likely to meet MDGs; and yet, 
post-conflict countries attract aid from the same pool of donor funding, with other non-
conflict countries.  
 
The analysis in this dissertation contributes to the ongoing debate on foreign aid 
effectiveness in three aspects. First, to trace temporal patterns of aid inflows and estimate their 
potential impact on recovery outcomes, I bring together both strands of aid literature: aid 
allocation and aid effectiveness. Second, under the same framework, I examine effectiveness 
issues through different recovery outcomes, such as economic growth, infant mortality, and 
good policy environment. Lastly, I combine cross-country and case study analysis. 
 
The findings of this analysis support the view that aid offsets negative effects of 
conflict on recipient societies. Although the effects of post-conflict aid on growth seem more 
ambiguous, in post-conflict settings, aid is more effective in saving lives, reconstructing 
physical and institutional infrastructure, and adopting good policies. These findings unravel 
the heterogeneous impact of post-conflict aid on different recovery outcomes and suggest the 
importance of generous aid flows during the early years after the conflict; better absorptive 
capacities of aid in later periods may not be attained if a country fails to build its institutions 
and reconstruct its social capital. Consequently, the time-sequencing of aid should be 
governed by multiple goals, if it is to attain an immediate peace dividend. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the role of foreign aid in the recovery process of post-conflict 
countries. The analysis aims to enhance understanding of the patterns of post-conflict aid and 
the effects of foreign aid on growth and recovery in the post-conflict period.  It is timely in the 
context of reevaluation of aid effectiveness and increasing concerns about fragile states, 
whereby post-conflict countries are especially significant as they are less likely to meet 
MDGs. Yet, post-conflict countries attract aid from the same pool of donor funding, with 
other non-conflict countries (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In this setting, there is need for a 
fresh look and a broader understanding of the patterns and the impact of post-conflict aid. 
Foreign aid as a tool for development has remained a subject of intense debate for 
more than five decades. During this time, aid effectiveness has received an uninterrupted 
attention while there seems to be no consensus to whether aid plays a positive role for growth 
and development of the recipient economies. The debate on aid effectiveness has involved a 
wide range of issues, from growth promotion, poverty reduction, meeting of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) targets, to creation of sound institutions and policies (Mavrotas, 
2010). Changes in aid agendas mirror shifts in the perspectives of donors about aid objectives, 
influenced notably by the end of Cold War and post-September 11 events and increased focus 
on human security. The following section provides a background that sets the context in 
which post-conflict aid has received an increased attention and it highlights the importance of 
aid effectiveness analysis and the policy implications for countries recovering from conflict.   
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1.1. Background and Research Problem 
 
Armed conflicts have become increasingly relevant to the development debate.  Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) report that between 1945 and 1999 there were 127 civil conflicts, 25 of which 
were ongoing in 1999. These civil conflicts caused 6.2 million deaths, which is about five 
times higher than the death toll caused by interstate conflicts. Only during the 1990s, they led 
to around 13 million refugees and 38 million displaced persons around the world. By causing 
economic and humanitarian disasters, civil conflicts have become major impediments to the 
development of conflict affected countries. They have taken place in developing countries and 
have disproportionately affected the Sub-Saharan Africa. Peace in these countries has been 
fragile as the estimated risk of reversing into conflict increases at about 40 percent in the first 
years of peace (Bigombe et al., 2000).  
High risk of conflict in the first years of peace is due to the high proliferation of arms, 
shattered human and social capital, as well as poor social and political policies. The risks of 
conflict pertain as well to the sources of the conflict itself, such as natural resource 
management, horizontal and vertical inequalities, or ethnic and religious disparities (del 
Castillo, 2008; Davies, 2008). Consequently, post-conflict recovery has been brought to the 
forefront of development issues and hence the causes and recovery from conflicts have 
spawned considerable academic research (Collier et al., 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; UNU-WIDER Conference, 2004; World Bank Post-Conflict 
Transitions in the WBER, 2008; AERC supplement in Journal of African Economies, 2009). 
The role of aid in countries affected by conflict is controversial as there seems to be no 
consensus whether aid has a stabilizing effect on the risks of conflict.1 Since post-conflict 
environments are prone to new conflicts, the task of sustaining peace is harder than that of 
achieving it. This in turn raises questions regarding the impact of aid in post-conflict societies. 
                                               
1 See for example, Grossman 1992; Arcand and Chauvet 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Duponchel, 2008. 
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The specificities of the post-conflict aid (timing, composition) and the stark post-conflict 
environment where it is disbursed suggest that post-conflict aid affects recovery outcomes 
differently, and as such it is different from conventional aid (Demekas et al., 2002). It has also 
been identified that aid is particularly effective in raising growth in post-conflict situations; 
and this result does not come as a surprise to Collier (2007: 106), who recalls that ‗this is how 
aid got started‘—to rebuild post-WWII Europe.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the development debate and the donor community has 
increased their focus on armed conflicts. In 1997 the World Bank established its Post-Conflict 
Fund (now fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Program) to be able to respond more 
quickly and support effectively the immediate needs of post-conflict countries. Accordingly, 
in 2004, the World Bank assistance to post-conflict countries comprised about 25 percent of 
its total current lending (Flores and Nooruddin, 2008). 
Del Castillo (2008: 40-41) draws attention of the donor community by arguing that 
economic reconstruction in post-conflict countries should not be treated as ‗development as 
usual‘ whereby some important segments such as consolidation of peace and restoration of 
basic services and physical infrastructure are ignored. Drawing on the recent failures in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, del Castillo (2008) warns that ‗pursuing policies that are optimal from an 
economic viewpoint—particularly in terms of financing—can have tragic consequences for 
the political, security, and social transitions.‘ Hence, successful post-conflict recoveries 
should be seen as a ‗development-plus‘ challenge including extra activities on reconstruction 
and peace consolidation.   
At the time when conflicts have become major impediments to development and the 
donor community recognizes the need for a special focus in assisting post-conflict recoveries, 
the debate about the effectiveness of aid seems gloomy. In a study that revisits the past 
evidence on aid effectiveness, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find no systematic effect of aid 
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on growth. This evidence seems to have revived the micro-macro paradox of aid 
effectiveness, where aid might work at micro levels but its effects are diminished on their way 
to macro level. Moyo (2009) provides a strong critique against aid as a tool for development.  
She argues that aid effectiveness is a myth and that aid does not reduce poverty; on the 
contrary it perpetuates underdevelopment in aid-dependent countries. Since millions of 
Africans are poorer today because of aid, Moyo (2009) calls for complete termination of 
development aid to Africa.  Conclusions about aid failure might have future policy 
implications for aid allocation to Africa, which comprises the largest number of conflict 
affected countries.  
According to Fukuda-Parr (2010), the majority of worst-performing countries in terms 
of meeting their MDGs have been affected by conflict directly or indirectly and these 
countries are in greatest need of foreign aid. In light of this debate, it is of crucial importance 
to sharpen the focus on the role of post-conflict aid as a tool for peace recovery and 
development. Since all the developing countries, including those affected by conflict, attract 
aid from the same pool of donor funding (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), investigation of the 
patterns and the determinants that drive aid to post-conflict countries is warranted.   
Against this background, this dissertation examines the role of aid in countries 
recovering from conflict by investigating the determinants and the time scale of foreign aid 
allocation to post-conflict countries and the effects of foreign aid on outcomes of economic 
recovery in the first post-conflict decade. In so doing, this dissertation aims to enhance 
understanding of the role of foreign aid in post-conflict environments. 
1.2. Outline of the dissertation  
 
The effectiveness of foreign aid can be analyzed with respect to such objectives as growth 
promotion, poverty reduction, and welfare improvements.  Foreign aid might be ineffective in 
promoting growth for several reasons originating from both the supply side (aid given for 
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other purposes than growth) and demand side (aid fungibility or crowding out the export 
sector). To date, research on aid effectiveness has not yet adequately addressed the issue of aid 
allocation. This dissertation examines both the determinants of aid allocation and the 
environments where aid is disbursed. In so doing, I investigate the two strands of foreign aid 
research—the allocation and effectiveness of foreign aid—and supplement it with country 
case study.   
The analysis is organized through three interlinked chapters on post-conflict aid 
(Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Chapters 2 and 3 are cross-country studies and Chapter 4 is a country 
case study. Estimations in Chapters 2 and 3  are drawn from two different datasets. The first 
dataset is an extension of Kang and Meernik (2004) and the second one focuses on a sample 
of 75 developing countries, out of which, 40 are affected by major civil conflicts. The 
Appendixes A and K provide lists of conflicts/countries and description about the definition, 
construction, and sources of variables used.   
Specifically, Chapter 2 identifies the determinants of post-conflict aid, the nature of 
allocated aid (timing and amount), and their possible relationship to aid effectiveness. The 
preferred starting point is Kang and Meernik (2004), which employs an event study 
methodology through which the calendar time is transformed into ‗event time‘; that is, the 
time when conflict ended. In this way, donor responses to conflict affected countries can be 
analyzed and compared in pre-conflict as well as post-conflict years.  
 The analysis of Kang and Meernik (2004) is extended in three aspects. First, the 
dataset is expanded through more years and it contains 227 conflict episodes/countries. Thus, 
the series are extended from 1968-2001 to 1968-2007 covering conflicts that started in 1973-
onward and ended up by 2002. Second, this chapter extends to the examination of aid 
determinants on the sub-groups of total aid (multilateral and bilateral aid) and on subsections 
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of armed conflict dataset (interstate and intrastate conflict).  Third, it applies robustness tests 
by adding control variables, removing outliers, and using fixed effects approaches. 
Since the focus of my research is on civil conflicts, in the second step, I examine aid 
allocation on a sample of civil conflicts that have experienced a decade of peace. To do so, I 
construct a four-year panel dataset for 75 developing countries covering the period 1970-2009 
(the second dataset). In this sample, 40 countries experienced civil conflicts of high intensity 
and were war-free 10 years after the conflict ended. The presence of conflict is marked 
through dummy variables as per Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Elbadawi et al. (2008).  To 
trace possible relationships with aid effectiveness, I focus on temporal disbursement of aid 
inflows and rely on fixed effects techniques to take account of the influence of unit effects on 
donors‘ decision-making processes (e.g., historical and colonial ties).   
The main econometric results from the extended analysis are that indicator variables 
on second and third post-conflict years are positive and statistically significant, showing that 
aid comes in large amounts in the second and third year and drops off in subsequent years. 
The presence of military interventions by OECD countries is consistently significant 
suggesting that aid to conflict affected countries flows within a politicized environment and 
thereby follows a selective approach. The results derived from the second datatset suggest that 
aid surges around the postconf1 period (from the second to the fifth year) and after that is not 
statistically significant from other non-conflict countries. The question of proper time scaling 
of aid flows is taken forward in Chapter 3—in the context of aid effectiveness debate.  
Chapter 3 examines the role of aid in the process of post-conflict recovery, also at a 
cross-country level. In this chapter, I first revisit the existing evidence about aid and growth in 
post-conflict contexts, emphasizing the timeframe of aid and growth recovery during the first 
post-conflict decade. The central focus in the existing literature has been on the role of growth 
in post-conflict recovery and on how the time-scaling of aid should follow post-conflict 
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growth patterns. This conclusion has been criticized for overemphasizing the growth objective 
and neglecting other important objectives such as poverty reduction (Addison, 2004).  
In these situations, the impact of post-conflict aid on growth is important; yet another 
important link should be that between aid and social indicators. To this end, the second 
chapter focuses on infant mortality rates as sensitive variables to conflict. Further, infant 
mortality rates are considered as a comprehensive indicator of development since for higher 
chances of infants‘ lives there is need for more than better health services, such as better 
nutrition and health of mother as well as increased access to safe water and sanitation. 
Thereby improvements in infant mortality rates reflect broader changes in socio-economic 
conditions of the country and progress achieved with poverty reduction. Finally, I test the 
effect of aid in improving countries‘ policies and institutions by using the Economic 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRGE). I also use variables that are specific to conflict-
affected countries and control for the presence of International Peacekeeping Missions.  
Although disaggregation of total aid inflows into sectoral flows is important, the 
datasets suffer from several shortcomings, notably the lack of data on aid disbursements 
before 1990 and the discrepancies between the amount of aid commitments and actual aid 
flows. Given these data limitations, I use total aid inflows throughout the analysis. The 
working methodology is based on Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Arndt et al. (2009).  
The key idea for instrumentation in Rajan and Subramanian (2008) is to model the supply of 
aid based on donor-related rather than recipient-specific characteristics. The parameters are 
estimated with the Instrumental Variable (IV) procedure with GMM and LIML options. The 
estimations are drawn from the second dataset. 
The most robust results from Chapter 3 suggest that aid disbursed after attainment of 
peace is effective in reducing physical miseries such as infant mortality, which may have 
favorable long-term effects on growth. The evidence demonstrates a strong positive effect of 
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aid on infant mortality using total aid inflows. There is some evidence that post-conflict aid 
supports higher growth attainment in the second post-conflict period but the results are not 
completely robust. Post-conflict aid also supports the adoption of sound policies and this 
effect is significantly correlated with countries with peacekeeping missions.  
Chapter 4 examines the role played by the donor community in Kosovo during the first 
post-conflict decade (1999-2008). It specifically evaluates the effectiveness of aid in the 
recovery process of post-conflict Kosovo, by looking at the time and sectoral composition of 
aid flows in terms of emergency needs, security issues, and reconstruction efforts. This case 
study sharpens understanding of the issues related to post-conflict aid and its effectiveness in 
a particular post-conflict environment. Large amounts of aid inflows and the distinctive nature 
of post-conflict reconstruction and state building process make Kosovo an insightful case to 
examine the impact of post-conflict aid.  
The methodology is grounded on the theoretical framework provided by Demekas et 
al. (2002), who propose a distinction between humanitarian and reconstruction aid. Although 
lack of time series data renders it difficult to conduct a rigorous econometric analysis, the 
datasets on donor activities in Kosovo allow for disaggregation of the data by sector/year and 
hence making inferences on aid‘s role in terms of three sets of objectives: peace, participation, 
and prosperity. The Kosovo case study provides deeper insights into time sequencing and 
sectoral composition of aid and thus complements the first two chapters that are based on 
cross-country analysis. 
The findings suggest that Kosovo experienced an aid-driven growth decade, but with 
limited and ambiguous effects on employment and poverty. At the same time, the case study 
reinforces some of the conclusions from Chapters 2 and 3: in the first two post-conflict years, 
foreign aid in Kosovo reached very high levels in per capita terms (with 300 euro per capita), 
but declined drastically thereafter. Its geographic position (being in Europe) had an impact on 
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allocation of large scale of financial and technical assistance.  Further, aid in Kosovo have 
been more effective in improving non-income dimensions of poverty such as better housing 
conditions and access to education and safe drinking water—all of them having positive 
effects in improving the quality of life. These results are in line with the findings from the 
third chapter where aid seems to be more effective in improving social outcomes.  
The final Chapter draws conclusions and provides policy recommendations developed 
from the key findings of the previous chapters.   
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2. AID ALLOCATION IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
During the early 1990s, the number of post-WWII civil wars peaked with over a third of 
countries being directly affected by ‗serious societal warfare‘ (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). This 
increase was attributed to the small increase in ethnic conflicts following the Cold War and 
above all to conflict accumulation from previous periods. Following their independence, 
many African countries have been affected directly or indirectly by civil war (Mlambo et al., 
2009).  
Countries affected by conflict have attracted widespread economic assistance and 
policy advice from the international donor community to support their recovery from war and 
rebuild their institutional capacities. Bilateral and multilateral donors have pledged substantial 
funds for the immediate post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994), 
Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999), Afghanistan (2002), Iraq (2003), and Georgia (2008), to 
name a few countries. Both scholars and practitioners have noted that successful 
reconstruction is key to preventing the re-emergence of conflicts in these regions. In 1997, the 
World Bank established its Post-Conflict Fund (now the Fragile and Conflict Affected 
Countries Program) to be able to respond more quickly and support effectively the immediate 
needs of post-conflict countries. Nevertheless, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that due to 
the highly politicized nature of post-conflict situations, there has been considerable variation 
in donor response. Thereby not all countries affected by conflicts have attracted the attention 
of the donor community.  
Against this backdrop, this chapter sets the ground for a thorough analysis of post-
conflict aid effectiveness by first investigating determinants of aid allocation to post-conflict 
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societies. It examines donor decision-making processes by looking at the conflict types, donor 
types, recipient country characteristics, and donor interests. Then, the time frame of allocated 
and disbursed amounts of aid in countries affected by civil conflicts is examined. Demekas et 
al. (2002) argue that post-conflict aid is typically not a constant stream: it can reach high 
levels both in per capita terms and relative to the size of the recipient economy, but then 
declines sharply once the emergency phase—first two to three years—is over. In the same 
vein, Kang and Meernik (2004) suggest that aid levels tend to increase after conflicts but then 
taper out after several years (see Figure 1).  
   Figure 1:  Post-Conflict Aid (per capita in 2000 constant dollars)  
 
 
Source: OECD International Development Statistics, 2009; *RIMS database (Ministry of Finance and 
Economy), 2009.  
 
Another issue related to the distinctiveness of post-conflict aid is its composition, 
where humanitarian and reconstruction components evolve in different amounts and 
directions during the post-conflict period. Demekas et al. (2002) suggest that the findings of 
the conventional aid literature may not apply in post-conflict cases. Thus, there is need for a 
fresh look and a broader understanding of the patterns and the impact of post-conflict aid.     
 
Cyprus 
(1975-1979)
Nicaragua 
(1990-94)
Grenada 
(1984-88)
B&H (1995-99)
Kosovo *
(2000-2005)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1 2 3 4 5
17  
 
2.2. Survey of Aid Allocation Literature 
 
Foreign aid allocation is examined by the donor-side analysis drawing on both economics and 
international relations literature. In general, studies on aid allocation can be categorized in two 
main strands: those seeking to describe aid allocation to donor countries and ‗donor 
performance‘ and a more recent strand that seeks to prescribe how should aid be allocated to 
recipient countries (McGillivray, 2004). There is also the explanatory strand, which follows a 
positive approach in answering to the question ‗why is aid allocated as it is?‘ (White and 
McGillivray, 1995: 164).  These three areas of research are interlinked. This paper describes 
and evaluates the allocation of aid against a set of normative criteria, that is, it combines both 
positive and normative approaches of aid allocation to recipient countries.  
 
2.2.1. Modeling aid allocation 
 
Most of the studies on aid allocation use vectors of variables that comprise recipient need and 
donor interests which serve as determinants of aid flows to developing countries. Formally, 
the models can be written as (McGillivray, 2003):  
)1(210 tiii DIRNA                                                                                            
where iA  is aid to recipient i;  iRN  and iDI are the vectors of recipient needs and donor 
interest; 
0 is a constant; and 1 , 2  are vectors of parameters.  
Studies that modeled aid allocation to the recipient countries date far back to 1970s 
and 1980s. McKinlay and Little (1979) model aid allocation among recipients by 
distinguishing between recipient needs and donor interests. The recipient needs are related to 
humanitarian motives whereas donor interests reflect foreign policy objectives. This means 
that they have estimated the two models separately: one for the recipient need and the other 
for the donor interest. The recipient needs versus donor interests dichotomy is also used by 
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Maizels and Nissanke (1984) who test these two models to examine motivations of bilateral 
and multilateral donors. Their sample covers periods 1969-70 and 1978-80 of around 80 
developing countries. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) first test the recipient needs model 
controlling for income per capita, Physical Quality of Life Index, the growth rate of GNP, and 
current account/GDP. Then, in the second model, they test the donor interest using variables 
such as, arm transfers, dummies for regional interest, stock of private direct investment from 
donor countries, and the number of transnational companies that were operating in the 
recipient country in 1980. Their main findings are that while allocation of bilateral aid is 
dominated by political, economic, and military strategic interests, the recipient needs seem to 
be more important for multilateral aid.  
However, McGillivray (2003) argues that use of the recipient need/donor interest (RN-
DI) model suffers from methodological shortcomings. The problems are related to the 
specification bias in these equations which in turn might lead to biased results (at least for one 
of these equations). Due to this problem, the cold war studies on aid allocation might have 
offered biased results. Hence, McGillivray (2003) suggests that more rigorous econometric 
techniques might lead to the conclusion that developmental criteria have had a larger 
influence on cold war period than has been previously shown.  
More recent studies show that the direction of foreign aid is dictated by commercial 
and political motives of donors much more than economic needs of the recipient. To answer 
the question ‗who gives foreign aid to whom and why‘ Alesina and Dollar (2000) examine a 
sample of 77 recipients of bilateral aid for the period 1970-1994. The following indexes are 
used to test for bilateral aid flows: trade openness, democracy, civil liberties, colonial status, 
share of FDI to GNP, (real PPP) per capita income at the beginning of a period, and 
population size. Their main conclusion is that foreign aid objectives are framed by political 
and strategic motives. More specifically, Alesina and Dollar (2000) portray the differences in 
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behavior among major donors and find considerable differences. While Nordic countries give 
aid to the poorest countries and appear to reward sound policies of the recipient countries, 
France and Japan appear to be allocating aid in favor of former colonies and UN friends with 
no particular response to good policies and the recipients‘ level of income. The United States 
seem to behave in a somewhat similar manner with the Nordics; yet being concerned about 
the UN friends and Middle East allies.  
In his panel dataset, Berthélemy (2006) combines three dimensions: 22 DAC donors 
(i), 137 aid recipients (j), for the years 1980 to 1999 (t). With approximately 36,000 
observations, he claims to have used ‗the largest and the most exhaustive available dataset‘ for 
developing countries during the period under consideration (Berthélemy, 2006:2).  He is 
largely guided by other studies in the aid allocation literature in choosing the explanatory 
variables. His findings suggest that although most donors attach more importance to their 
trading partners (and hence their egoistic behavior) they still take account of the neediest 
recipient countries. Berthélemy (2006) also suggest that, on average, donors seem to give 
more aid to countries with better governance indicators, such as democracy, and absence of 
violent conflicts.  
Feeny and McGillivray (2008) extend the model developed by Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976) which is based on the utility function of decision makers of the donor 
country. They use time series data for ten top recipients of DAC bilateral aid; period under 
consideration is 1968 to 1999. Consequently, in their analysis, no time invariant variables like 
geographic location or colonial past are selected. Feeny and McGillivray (2008) claim that 
application of this model allows them to correct for the assumption that aid flows to 
individual countries are determined independently of those to other countries. In other words, 
this model is considered to account for the joint determination of aid allocation and also for 
different donor behavior among individual aid recipients. Based on their findings, Feeny and 
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McGillivray (2008) conclude that the amount of foreign aid to developing countries is 
determined by both recipient need and donor interest variables and that donors do not behave 
the same among different recipients.   
A normative approach in aid allocation models, seeking to show how aid should be 
allocated among recipients is pursued in the so called prescriptive studies (McGillivray, 2003; 
2004). In these studies, aid allocation according to developmental criteria is derived and then 
is compared to actual aid allocations. McGillivray and White (1994) derive the prescriptive 
allocation of aid through the use of a scaled composite indicator for recipient countries‘ needs, 
scaled composite indicators of countries‘ absorptive capacity, and the size of their 
populations. They claim that their prescriptive allocation is consistent with the so called 
population scale neutrality. The use of these coefficients avoids prescribing all aid to a single 
country that has the greatest weighted sum of need and absorptive capacity.   
Collier and Dollar (2002) compare the present aid allocation with the one that is 
considered to have maximum effect on poverty alleviation. Their prescriptive allocation 
model draws on the earlier work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and is built to maximize the 
number of people lifted out of poverty. Hence, in the efficient allocation model, more aid is 
aimed at countries with severe poverty and sound policies. Collier and Dollar (2002) suggest 
that the poverty efficient allocation of aid doubles the number of people lifted out from 
poverty.  However, they find that in the actual allocation, poorest countries receive much less 
aid than their share of the world‘s poor.  
An alternative procedure to Collier and Dollar‘s proposal is suggested by Cogneau and 
Naudet (2006).  They build a normative aid allocation procedure based on the principle of 
equality of opportunities, an approach based on Romer‘s post-welfarist theories of social 
justice. When compared to current aid allocations, the allocation procedure derived by 
Cogneau and Naudet (2006) prescribes more aid to the poorest countries. However, their 
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suggested allocation takes into account structural advantages to growth—unlike Collier and 
Dollar (2002) that take account of quality of policies.   
 
2.2.2.  Aid allocation in post-conflict situations  
 
One of the categories of factors that are used as criteria for aid allocation is related to 
exogenous shocks and structural vulnerability including post-conflict situations (Guillaumont, 
2008). Literature on post-conflict aid is more recent with handful of empirical studies. Within 
this line of research, it has been argued that aid in post-conflict situations enables faster 
recovery and reduces the risk of new conflict. However, the pattern of response to post-
conflict countries does not seem to reflect systematic analysis. Instead, it might reflect more 
‗political and bureaucratic expediency‘ (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 1137; Collier 2007). 
Notably, Collier (2007: 152) discusses how the peace resolution period—‗high glamour 
years‘—influences the media and politicians and thus affects donor decisions to provide 
money in the first couple of years, but then tapers out too quickly. Therefore, he proposes that 
post-conflict agreements should include guidance on the behavior of donors and international 
security regime, where they should be committed for longer periods of time.  
Chauvet (2003) uses an index of variables of violent, social, and elite instability to 
quantify the impact of socio-political instability on aid allocation. She finds that socio-
political instability influences donor attitudes and that aid levels differ depending on the type 
of instability: while social instability has a negative effect, the influence of violent and elite 
instability is positive. Chauvet (2003) also finds that aid allocation depends on the kind of aid 
received (bilateral versus multilateral) and the characteristics of the recipient country (poverty 
versus oil exports).    
Kang and Meernik (2004) analyze the determinants of foreign aid given by the OECD 
countries to countries involved in conflicts. They test aid flows using two categories of 
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variables: those related to conflict characteristics and those attributed to national 
characteristics of recipient countries. Kang and Meernik (2004) find that both conflict 
characteristics such as external involvement and conflict issue, as well as country 
characteristics such as economic openness, humanitarian need, and regime transition, affect 
aid levels. Further, their findings show that the amount of aid provided to all conflict affected 
nations after the Cold War is smaller, albeit there have been particular nations (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Palestinian Authority, Haiti) that have attracted substantial amounts of aid. 
Finally, Kang and Meernik (2004) show that aid levels tend to increase after conflicts, but 
then begin to dry out after several years. Unlike Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who find that aid 
peaks are achieved in the second and third post-conflict years, Kang and Meernik (2004) 
results indicate that aid peak is achieved in the fourth post-conflict year.  
After having controlled for level of development and donor economic and political 
interests, Balla and Rheinhardt (2008) find that most of the donors give smaller amounts of 
aid to countries containing or being nearby an intense conflict. Balla and Rheinhardt (2008), 
however, contend that aid is conditioned on conflict by bilateral donors; in particular the 
United States allocates large amounts of aid to countries bordering a conflict in both pre-and 
post-Cold War periods. 
In 2009, an entire volume in Journal of African Economies focuses post-conflict 
reconstruction and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mlambo et al. (2009) analyze the 
mechanisms for financing post-conflict recovery and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
After having examined the recent aid trends in ODA to conflict affected countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Mlambo et al. (2009) argue that for a successful financing in post-conflict 
situations, a variety of mechanisms and instruments should be used by the donor community. 
The mechanisms range from creation of common vision among donors, development of  a 
transitional support program or a poverty reduction program, creation of a joint action plan by 
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all collaborating partners, coordination and management through a lead agency, to  a clear 
definition of the financing mechanisms as well as monitoring and tracking of the 
expenditures. Moreover, the authors identify the instruments that should be used by the donor 
community to accomodate flexible and fast-disbursing funds for post-conflict countries. These 
instruments include emergency assistance, budget lines, post-conflict facilities, trust funds, 
cost sharing arrangements, and special financing windows (Mlambo et al., 2009).  
For the present analysis, the model of Kang and Meernik (2004) is the preferred 
starting point because a more complete investigation of determinants of post-conflict aid can 
be conducted if the patterns of donor responses are analyzed and compared in pre-conflict as 
well as post-conflict years. Kang and Meernik (2004) examine the determinants of aid 
allocation for each post-conflict country by covering two periods, before and after the conflict. 
The sample of conflict affected countries used by them covers countries affected by both 
interstate and intrastate armed conflicts: this provides a broader starting point as it enables 
examination of perceived differences in donor response to different types of armed conflicts. 
 Kang and Meernik (2004) are preferred to other empirical studies on aid allocation 
and conflict whose focus goes beyond the scope of this paper. Chauvet (2003) focuses on a 
broader notion of socio-political instability which covers heterogeneous events, such as coup 
d‘état, demonstrations, riots, strikes, and civil wars. Balla and Rheinhardt‘s (2008) analysis 
covers a broader sample including both countries containing and being nearby a conflict.  
Thus, not all of the dimensions of these analyses may be applicable to armed conflicts only. 
             The focus of this dissertation is on civil conflicts for several reasons. First, civil wars 
have become the dominant form of war: out of 19 major armed conflicts listed by Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute in 2003, only two were fought between states.
2
  Second, 
the majority of these conflicts are fought in developing countries, jeopardizing their stability 
                                               
2 http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2004/03 (accessed January 10, 2011). 
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and future development. Third, civil conflicts last longer than inter-state conflicts and are 
considered to be ‘the most devastating type of conflict‘ as the extent of destructive effects on 
the economies and societies of conflict affected countries is greater than in interstate conflicts 
(Elbadawi, 2008: 3). Consequently, the emerging research on causes and consequences of 
conflict, limits its focus on countries involved in civil wars (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; 
Elbawi et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008).  Hence, after having examined the sample of countries 
that have undergone both inter and intrastate conflicts (as done by Kang and Meernik, 2004), I 
continue the analysis on a sample of countries recovering from civil conflicts only (see the 
methodology and data section).  
2.3. Defining the Conflict Sample  
 
The exact number of conflicts and their inclusion in the datasets of armed conflicts depend on 
how we define and operationalize this concept. Most of the lists of armed conflicts are based 
on the datasets compiled by the Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War data, 
1816-1992 (Singer and Small, 1972, 1994; Small and Singer, 1982). Sambanis (2004) argues 
that Correlates of War Project data have been used by many quantitative studies without even 
being questioned, whereas some studies have made only minor changes to it. Thus, the debate 
on how to improve data quality has taken place within the frame of this particular project.  
           Center for the Study of Civil War (Institute of Peace Research in Oslo, PRIO) and 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP (Uppsala University) offers datasets on both internal 
and international armed conflicts and it covers 1946-2008 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
3
 According 
to Gleditsch et al. (2002), conflict is defined as ‗a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.‘4 The separate 
elements of this definition are: use of armed force, 25 battle deaths per year and per dyad in an 
                                               
3 http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict 
4 http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1795428530/Code_book.pd  
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incompatibility, parties involved in conflict, state, and incompatibility concerning governance 
or territory.
5
  
          This project defines four types of conflicts: extrasystemic, interstate, internal, and 
internationalized internal armed conflicts.
6
 Type 1 conflicts belong to extrasystemic wars 
which occur between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory such as colonial 
and imperial wars, which do not fall into the period under analysis. Interstate conflicts are 
those armed conflicts that occur between two or more states and are coded as type 2 conflicts. 
Civil wars are defined as internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts (type 3 and 4).  
Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition group(s) without intervention from other states, whereas internationalized internal 
armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition 
group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.  
        Conflict is also categorized according to the intensity of violence. The intensity variables 
are coded in the ‗minor‘ category with between 25 and 999 battle related deaths in a given 
year and ‘war‘ category with at least 1000 battle related deaths in a given year. The 
cumulative intensity variable takes into account the temporal dimension of the conflict. It is a 
dummy variable that codes whether the conflict since the onset has exceeded 1000 battle 
related deaths: it is coded as one, if conflict has over time exceeded 1000 battle related deaths, 
and zero otherwise.  
          Sambanis (2004) argues that disagreements within the quantitative literature on civil 
war are about the ways in which the onset and termination of wars is coded and this is 
important for deciding when a post-conflict situation arises. To be able to validate coding 
decisions as transparently as possible, Sambanis (2004) suggests robustness tests that use 
different civil war lists. For this purpose, lists of civil wars reported in various studies (Singer 
                                               
5 A dyad consists of two conflicting primary parties.   
6 Available at www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/Codebook_v4-2006b.pdf 
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and Small, 1994; Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2004a; UNDP, 2008) 
are consulted; see Appendix A for a list.  
To define the concept of conflict and to differentiate between different types of 
conflicts, I use UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook (Gledtisch et al., 2002). The 
country is considered as post-conflict after the conflict is coded as inactive and the conflict 
episode has ended.  In the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the end of conflict episodes 
is coded by the EpEnd dummy variable. Specifically, to enter the list, a country should have 
undergone a high intensity conflict and it should be war-free 10 years after the conflict 
episode ended. 
2.4. Defining and Measuring Aid   
 
According to the OECD Glossary (2007), the words ‘aid‘ and ‗assistance‘ refer to flows 
which qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Aid (OA). ODA flows 
encompass an official financing of developing countries by donor government agencies which 
are concessional in character and have a grant element of at least 25 percent.  7 OA flows are 
dedicated to transition countries and are defined as flows that ‗meet conditions of eligibility 
for inclusion in Official Development Assistance (ODA), other than the fact that the recipients 
are on Part II of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of Aid Recipients‘. 
Hence, OA is mainly dedicated to countries of Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, 
which in fact are included in ODA flows.  
Foreign aid is measured by the use of conventional concept of ODA, as introduced and 
compiled by the OECD since the early 1970s. Chang et al. (1998) argue that conventional aid 
measures suffer from methodological shortcomings. To address these shortcomings, they 
propose a new aid measure—Effective Development Assistance (EDA), which uses a new 
valuation approach of aid flows by summing grants and grant equivalents of official loans. 
                                               
7 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary. 
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EDA is somewhat lower than ODA: it excludes technical assistance and it counts only the 
grant element of development loans—regardless of how concessional these loans are. EDA is 
used by Burnside and Dollar (2000); Collier and Dehn (2001), and Dalgaard et al. (2004). 
Yet, the traditional approach (ODA flows) seems to be broadly favored by aid scholars as it 
covers the total amount disbursed by donors—the variable considered by donors and 
influenced by recipient country conditions (Chauvet, 2003). Aid impact on public finance 
seems to be better traced by the net disbursements than grant equivalents (Guillaumont and 
Chauvet, 2001). Moreover, Dalgaard and Hansen (2000: 15) show that difference between 
EDA and ODA ‗seems to be a simple transformation‘ as the correlation between the two 
measures is 0.98 using both standard Pearson correlations and Spearman‘s rank correlations.   
Another important issue concerning aid measurement is use of ODA commitment 
versus ODA disbursements. Commitments are defined by the OECD (2007) as ‗a firm 
obligation expressed in writing‘, whereas disbursements ‗record the actual international 
transfer of financial resources‘.  In the aid allocation literature, ODA commitments are 
commonly used measures (Dudely and Montmarquette, 1976; McGillivray and White, 1993; 
Berthélemy, 2006) as they are considered to be better controlled by donors.  
One of the major shortcomings of relying on OECD databases is lack of detailed 
information on some donor countries/agencies. For example, the OECD databases offer only 
aggregated data on Arab ODA which cannot be disaggregated by individual donor level.
8
 In a 
similar manner, the Arab multilateral aid data comprise aggregated data on four main Arab 
agencies: the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development (AFESD), the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC 
Fund for International Development (OFID). It is rather difficult to remedy this shortcoming 
because data from other sources such as individual Arab institutions are also incomplete—
                                               
8 Until 1992, the Arab aid data covered 7 countries: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates. From 1993, only Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates are found under the 
label of Arab countries (OECD, 2006). 
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with exception of Kuwait (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development); for example, data 
available from Abu Dhabi and Saudi Fund are not disaggregated by aid recipient level.
9
 Arab 
aid is important for the analysis of some post-conflict countries given that non-DAC, notably 
Arab donors, present an important source of their funding. For example the graph below 
shows dramatic increases in bilateral aid from non-DAC countries during and after the civil 
war (1975-1990), as well as during and after the conflict episodes in the last decade in 
Lebanon.
10
  
             Figure 2: ODA evolution in Lebanon (1970-2007) 
 
 
                  Source: OECD International Development Statistics  
                  Note: amounts are in USD million in current prices 
       
Finally, it is worth pointing out the issue of NGO aid which is not covered in the 
OECD database. In the past two decades, NGOs have grown important in the donor 
community. They have become known for better targeting of aid to the neediest. However, 
allocation of aid by NGOs has been rarely examined. The reason for this lies in poor data: 
there are no comprehensive datasets on NGO aid.  Given the lack of accurate data on NGO 
activities, their increasing number, and the level of diversification, scholars have made use of 
subsets of NGO aid and country specific NGOs. Nunnekamp and Thiele (2009) use data for 
Switzerland and Sweden; Dreher, Mölders, and Nunnekamp (2009) also focus on Sweden, 
                                               
9 Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) offers online annual reports starting from 1992/1993-
2005/2006. The reports provide geographical distribution of aid recipients for the period covered in the reports.  
10 In the case of Lebanon, close to 100 percent of aid flows labeled under non-DAC come from Arab countries.   
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where data are available and detailed. Gilles and Yontcheva (2006) build a dataset covering 
data on NGO activities supported by institutional donors. These datasets comprise European 
NGOs co-financed by the European Union.  Due to the unavailability of comprehensive and 
accurate datasets on NGO aid it is questionable whether the use of available data (sub)sets can 
better reflect NGO decisions in allocating aid. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the 
OECD database which covers DAC and non-DAC members is the most important source of 
aid data.
11
   
In conclusion, for aid allocation analysis (section 2.5.1) I follow Kang and Meernik 
(2004) and use ODA commitments, which seem to better reflect the donor‘s calculus. The 
International Development Statistics (IDS) of the OECD provides data for donor i in year t, 
for recipient country j.
12
 I prefer aid per capita to total aid flows to be able to account for the 
size of the countries since large countries receive more aid in absolute volumes (Dowling and 
Hiemenz, 1985). Further, use of aid volumes might lead to heteroscedasticity issues since the 
residuals for larger recipients might be much bigger (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). To 
investigate the time-scale of aid to countries in post-conflict (section 2.5.2; second dataset), I 
prefer disbursed amounts of aid as per Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Actual amounts of aid 
allow me to better trace aid patterns in relation to outcome variables (e.g., economic growth) 
and link them to the effectiveness debate—as will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 DAC members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States, European Commission. Non-DAC members: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, 
Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Turkey.  
12 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids. 
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   Figure 3: Bilateral and Multilateral flows in the Post-Conflict Decade 
 
 
Source: OECD International Development Statistics  
Note: amounts are in USD million in current prices 
 
Lastly, this chapter distinguishes between bilateral and multilateral aid. As can be seen 
from Figure 3, aid flows from bilateral and multilateral donors have evolved differently in the  
post-conflict countries, like Guatemala, Uganda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Guatemala 
and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina there has been a surge in post-conflict bilateral aid 
as compared to multilateral aid. Bilateral and multilateral aid in Uganda has evolved 
somewhat at the same pace—with multilateral aid exceeding that of bilateral donors. This is 
indicative of the possibility that different types of aid/donors react differently to post-conflict 
situations. Through this analysis, it is possible to investigate the extent to which donor 
decision-making processes differ.  
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2.5. Methodology and Data 
 
The econometric analysis in this chapter is conducted in two steps. In the first step, I extend 
the analysis on determinants of post-conflict aid as per Kang and Meernik (2004); and in the 
second step I examine temporal patterns of aid allocation limited to a sample of civil conflicts,  
largely grounded on Collier and Hoeffler (2004).  Accordingly, the estimations are derived 
from two different datasets that will be dicussed in turn.  
2.5.1. The extended analysis 
 
The results presented in Tables 1-5 are drawn from the first dataset that is an extension of 
Kang and Meernik (2004). In this dataset, the calendar years are transformed into event years, 
that is, the year conflict started, five years before the conflict started, and five years after the 
conflict ended (11 years).  For example, if a conflict started in 1973 and ended in 1980, the 
period under analysis covers: 1968-72 (five years before the conflict episode started); 1973 
(the year the conflict episode started); and 1981-1985 (after the conflict episode ended).  
The analysis of Kang and Meernik (2004) is extended in three aspects. First, the 
dataset is expanded through more years/conflicts and it contains 227 conflict 
episodes/countries. Thus, the series are extended from 1968-2001 to 1968-2007 covering 
conflicts that started in 1973-onward and ended up by 2002. This is in line with the 
availability of time series data, which start from 1968.  Second, this chapter extends to the 
examination of aid determinants on the sub-groups of total aid (multilateral and bilateral aid) 
and on subsections of armed conflict dataset (interstate and intrastate conflict).  Third, it 
applies robustness tests by adding control variables, removing outliers, and using fixed effects 
approaches. Kang and Meernik (2004) do not address two important issues when interpreting 
their results. First issue has to do with the use of the random effects techniques and the 
potential presence of biased estimates. Second, they do not address the issue of sensitivity of 
the results in the presence of outliers, which are present in the dataset (see scatter plot figures 
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in Appendix C). Hence, to address these issues, I run robustness tests through fixed effects 
approaches; I include/exclude Israel which appears to be an outlier; and add control variables 
(Population size, Infant Mortality Rates, and Oil/gas exporting countries) which are expected 
to account for donor responses to post-conflict situations.  
Since the starting point of this analysis extends Kang and Meernik (2004), I follow 
their estimation technique to be able to make comparisons between the results derived from 
the original and the extended sample. Thus, the parameters are estimated with the GLS 
random effects estimator following a first order autoregressive disturbance term (proposed in 
Baltagi-Wu, 1999): 
)2(,itiitit xy    
)3(,1, ittiit                                                                                               
 where 1   is the autocorrelation parameter and it  is independent and identically 
distributed (iid) with zero mean and variance 2 .            
  
By doing so, today‘s value of dependent variable y is predicted with a   that is 
constant across time.  If  i  are assumed to be fixed parameters, then the model is a fixed-
effects model. The random effects GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances uniquely reports 
the modified Durbin Watson statistic and the Baltagi-Wu locally best invariant test statistic 
for autocorrelation.  
In estimating the model, care has to be taken with regard to the serial correlation 
which might be present due to the nature and properties of time series cross sectional data and 
incremental nature of aid flows (Kang and Meernik, 2004). A Wooldridge test indicates the 
presence of the first-order serial correlation in the dataset suggesting that OLS will report 
biased estimates of standard errors.
13
 This happens since the level of the dependent variable 
                                               
13 Wooldridge test for first order autocorrelation in panel data: F(1, 213), Prob>F=0.0000 
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(foreign aid per capita) is determined by changes that occurred during the present period t and 
memory of its level in the period t-1 (an autoregressive process).  
 
2.5.2. Aid allocation and civil conflicts 
In the next step (Tables 7-8), I construct a second dataset to examine the patterns of aid 
disbursement during the first post-conflict decade.  The sample consists of four-year panels 
for 75 developing countries covering the period 1970-2009; 40 of these countries experienced 
civil conflicts of high intensity and were war-free 10 years after the conflict ended.  
The dataset consists of four ten-year periods between 1970-2009.
14
   I construct post-
conflict dummies as per Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Elbadawi et al. (2008): Peace onset 
consists of the year the conflict ended and one year after that (years 0-1);  Post-conflict1 
consists of  years 2-5 after the conflict ended; and post-conflict2 consists of years 6-9 after the 
conflict ended (see Appendix A and K). Post-conflict periods are coded based on the majority 
of years that dominate during the four-year periods (Elbadawi et al., 2008). If within a four 
year period, there are two years of peace onset, one year of war, and one year postconflict1, 
the period is coded as peace onset.  For example, the war in Bosnia ended in 1995, and so the 
post-conflict episodes are coded as follows: 1994-97 is coded as peace onset (one year of war, 
two years of peace onset, and one year of postconflict1); 1998-01 is coded as postconflict1  (3 
years postconflict1 and one year postconflict2); 2002-2005 is coded as postconflict2 (3 years 
postconf2 and one year after postconf2). 
The parameters are estimated by a fixed effects estimator. I do so, since I am interested 
in investigating the temporal allocation of aid during first post-conflict decade. A fixed effects 
approach accounts for unit effects such as the influence of colonial and historical links.     
                                               
14 Four year periods: (1970-73); (1974-77); (1978-81); (1982-85); (1986-89); (1990-93); (1994-97); (1998-01); 
(2002-05); (2006-09). 
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2.5.3. Aid and recipient related characteristics  
 
Democracy and Polity in Transition. Burnside and Dollar (2000), who assert the role of good 
policy environment for aid effectiveness, sparked debates among scholars as well as donor 
community about aid selectivity criteria. As a result, donors have widely recognized the 
importance of good policy conditions for aid effectiveness and some of them have started to 
attach more emphasis on the importance of good policy environment.  
Rusett (1993) and Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) argue that more democratic 
countries are expected to be more peaceful: they are less likely to engage in militarized 
disputes and even if they do so, the disputes are less likely to escalate. In this sense, it is 
important to consider the extent to which donors attach significance to the regime type of 
recipient countries, in particular to those affected by conflict. This analysis tests whether 
countries that are more democratic and are undergoing a change in polity receive higher 
amounts of economic assistance.  
The Polity IV project at the Center for Systemic Peace provides the longest time series 
measures of features of 161 countries‘ political systems starting from  1800 to 2007 (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2009).  It also offers indexes on regimes in transition—the level at which a polity 
is in transition and has no sovereign government.
15
 The Polity IV project is favored to other 
sources, such as the Freedom House and the World Governance Indicators, as it covers the 
longest time coverage and it also provides indexes on polity in transition, an important 
measure of institutions for countries coming out of conflict.  
Level of income/per capita GDP. Countries in the immediate aftermath of conflict are 
faced with destruction of their economic and social fabric and hence the magnitude of the 
drop in economic output is large. McGillivray (2004) argues that ‗donor performance‘ 
                                               
15
  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm 
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increases with increase in their preferences towards needy countries. In general, poor 
countries, with low per capita income are considered to be the neediest.  
I introduce the square of income to account for the potential middle-income bias: 
initially, per capita aid rises with income and then drops off at higher levels of income 
(Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Chauvet, 2002). Other measures of 
living standards are composite indexes like Human Development Index and Human Poverty 
Index; they are considered to better reflect the level of development in recipient countries, as 
they include both income and non-income dimensions of development.  However, these 
indicators are not available for the whole period under study (1968-2007).   
Infant Mortality Rate: Infant mortality rates deteriorate substantially during and after 
the conflict (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003). I introduce this variable in the second model 
(the first five post-conflict years) to account for the deterioration in the physical quality of life 
in countries affected by conflict/s and expect that donors will give more aid to countries with 
higher rates of infant mortality.  
In the first dataset, I use data from Abouharb and Kimbal (2007), who provide a 
comprehensive source of data on Infant Mortality Rates (1816-2002). In the second dataset, I 
use the WDI data (WB, 2010) for two reasons. First, the WDI datasets cover most recent years 
(beyond 2002) that are not available from Abouharb and Kimbal (2007); second, although the 
WDI database have more gaps in annual data (as compared to Abouharb and Kimbal, 2007), 
in the second dataset, I use values at the beginning of each four-year period which 
considerably remedies for these gaps.  
Openness. The empirical literature uses several measures of openness, although 
Edwards (1998) argues that many of these indexes are subject to limitations. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) openness index is considered to be an improvement over earlier attempts to 
measure openness. It is a composite index using 5 trade indicators: tariffs, quotas coverage, 
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black market premia, social organization, and the existence of export marketing boards. It has 
also been used in aid literature (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  
The main limitation of this measure is its dichotomous classification of countries (open 
or closed), and thus equal classification of countries with varying degrees of openness 
(Edwards, 1998). Also, its time series end in 1992—period not long enough for the present 
study. Similarly, the Heritage Foundation‘s index of trade policy, which classifies countries 
based on trade distortions does not provide long enough data series as they start in 1995. 
Openness to trade is widely measured through the value of total trade over GDP. The 
main problem with this measure is that it does not take into account other characteristics of 
countries such as geographical and economic characteristics. Notwithstanding this, I favor this 
measure due to the availability of  data: the WDI database (WB, 2010) provides time series on 
trade and GDP for most of the countries that have been included in the sample and for the 
whole period under consideration.  
 
2.5.4. Aid and conflict related characteristics 
 
Military intervention. Nye (1997) analyzes intervention, in its broad definition, as influencing 
domestic politics in another state through the use of different scales of coercion. While 
military action and invasion lies in the upper end of spectrum, economic aid lies more toward 
low coercion spectrum. This implies that both military and economic intervention may be 
means to the same end if aid is donor interest driven rather than humanitarian. Once a country 
has been the site of external military involvement, it is expected that it will also attract more 
donor attention.  
From a more altruistic viewpoint, larger amounts of post-conflict aid might also mirror 
OECD commitment to successful post-conflict reconstruction and stable peace building 
process (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). In either case, it is 
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expected that military intervention of one or more OECD countries in a conflict will be 
followed by higher attention among the OECD countries and hence larger aid shares. 
UN peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping operations are seen as important 
mechanisms to deal with conflicts. These missions are large and complex involving different 
components, such as military, police, humanitarian, and electoral  (Howard, 2007). Scholars 
argue that with the end of the Cold War, there were more opportunities for the UN to get 
involved in solving conflicts albeit their performance results have been mixed. Similar to the 
case of OECD military involvement, it is expected that UN presence will also be 
complemented by high aid flows from donor countries.  
Intensity of conflict. Gleditsch et al. (2002) classifies conflicts based on their intensity 
of violence. The intensity variables are coded in the ‗minor‘ category with between 25 and 
999 battle related deaths in a given year and ‗war‘ category with at least 1000 battle related 
deaths in a given year. This analysis tests the hypothesis that more intensive conflicts (with 
higher number of battle related deaths) will be followed by more donor assistance.  
Incompatibility/governance vs. territorial conflicts. Incompatibility concerning 
governance or territory is one of the separate elements of the armed conflict definition. As 
Kang and Meernik (2004) assert, territorial conflicts are more likely to repeat as compared to 
those over governance and hence it is considered that they are more difficult to be resolved. 
This implies that donors might not want to commit high levels of economic assistance to 
countries with higher probability of recurring conflicts.  
Post cold war period. The beginning of 1990s recorded a decrease in foreign aid from 
many donors. At the same time, it has been argued that with the end of the Cold War, 
geopolitics received less importance in aid allocation while other developmental criteria 
received stronger emphasis (e.g., promotion of democracy, support for social and economic 
transitions, and mitigation of conflicts).      
38  
 
Population size. To account for the small country effect, I control for total population 
of recipient country whereby the inverse relationship between per capita aid and the 
population size is tested. Each country receives aid from a number of donors and the smaller 
ones benefit disproportionately (Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985). Since small countries tend to 
be more open, they are more vulnerable to external shocks and thus attract more aid. Also, 
smaller countries have a disproportional representation in international organizations and this 
could be used to buy favorable votes in UN (Claessens et al. 2009). Hence, the small country 
effect can be interpreted as reflection of donor interests.  
Oil/gas exporting countries. Following Chauvet (2003), to capture another strategic 
aspect of aid allocation, I include a dummy variable for countries that export oil and gas.  
2.5.5. Econometric equations 
 
After having presented all the variables included in the model, to test for aid allocation before 
and after the conflict, the following equation is specified:   
                                                
)4(,321 ititititit postconfpostcwXY  
                                                                       
 
 
itY  is aid per capita adjusted for inflation; itX  is the set of recipient countries‘ characteristics; 
itpostcw  is a dummy for post Cold War period; itpostconf  is a dummy denoting the end of conflict; 
and it  is the error term. 
 
To take into account the post-conflict period only, I restrict the sample to post-conflict years 
by denoting five post-conflict years through time dummies, with the first one as the reference 
year. This equation includes variables that are related to conflict characteristics Zit, as 
explained in the previous section.  
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The econometric equation run on the sample of civil wars, and relied on the fixed effects 
technique is specified as follows:  
)6(,210 74321 itiitititititit postconfpostconfonsettimeXY  
 
itY  is aid as a share of GDP; itX  is a set of control variables; ittime0 , itonset , itpostconf 1 , 
itpostconf 2  are the conflict related dummies; i  are unit fixed effects. 
 
 
As the focus of this analysis will be on aid inflows across different periods during the 
conflict cycle, I also estimate differences in variable means across pairs of periods, through 
simple paired comparisons or paired-differences t-test. The objective in this estimation 
technique is to test the null hypothesis that mean weight at period1 is the same as mean 
weight at period 2 (e.g., peace onset and postconf1). The equation takes the following form:  
 
)7(),( 12 iiiD    
 
iD  is the difference score;   denotes the change in the average from time 1 to time 2; 12 , ii   
are the disturbance terms representing random variation that is specific to a particular unit at a 
particular point in time. 
 
2.6. Regression Results 
 
This section presents the regression results related to each aid determinant, different conflict 
samples, and different donors. In the first part, I present the results based on the extended 
sample (for all armed conflicts 1973-2002 and OECD donors) and compare them to Kang and 
Meernik (2004). Then, I present findings on sub-samples of conflicts and donors. All the 
regression tables have an additional column with results derived from the extended model. In 
the second part, I analyze findings about patterns of actual aid flows estimated via fixed 
effects approaches that have been drawn from the second dataset.  
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2.6.1. Aid determinants: sample of all armed conflicts  
 
The econometric results derived from the extended dataset are partially consistent with Kang 
and Meernik (2004). GDP Per Capita, Openness, and OECD Military Intervention are 
consistently significant in both the regressions, whereas Regime in Transition, Post-Cold War, 
Post-Conflict, and Conflict Incompatibility lose their significance (column 2 in Tables 1 and 
2).  
As can be seen from the Tables 1 and 2, the overall R-squared in the extended model is 
lower than in Kang and Meernik (2004) and the fourth column in both the models shows that 
additional variables have added more explanatory power to the model. As compared to Kang 
and Meernik (2004), the autocorrelation coefficients are higher in the extended analysis. The 
increase in autocorrelation might be due to the inclusion of a higher number of conflicts, in 
particular of those civil conflicts which tended to have more than one conflict episode. The 
inclusion of multiple conflict episodes might lead to overlapping of pre-and-post conflict 
years‘ data and hence add to the problem of serial correlation in the datasets (the issue of 
multiple conflicts is discussed in more detail in section 5.4). When testing for 
multicollinearity, the highest value of Variance Inflation Test (VIF) is above 2. This meets the 
acceptability criteria set by Neter et al. (1989), who recommend that any value greater than 10 
is an indication of potential multicollinearity problems (see Table 2 in Appendix B).  
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Table 1: All Armed Conflicts: OECD Aid to Conflict Nations Before and After Conflict 
 
 Kang and Meernik 2004 
 (1) 
Extended sample 
(2) 
Without Israel 
(3) 
New Variables 
(4) 
Democratic State 
 
2.0879 
(0.77) 
7.661 
(2.26)** 
 
4.328 
(1.56) 
5.731 
(1.89)* 
Polity in Transition 
 
6.5130 
(1.81)* 
 
4.942 
(1.57) 
5.661 
(2.07)** 
4.782 
(1.58) 
Openness  
 
.2658 
(6.12)*** 
 
.2538 
(5.09)*** 
 
.2511 
(6.34)*** 
.1436 
(3.18)*** 
Recipient GDP Per Capita 
 
-.0014 
(-2.54)** 
 
.0049 
(3.98)*** 
 
-0.018 
(-1.98)** 
 
Ln of GDP Per Capita    53.153 
(3.48)*** 
(Ln of GDP Per Capita)squared    -3.990 
(-3.53)*** 
Recipients‘ Population    -11.154 
(-10.43)*** 
Oil/Gas Exporters    -19.775 
(-4.91)*** 
Israel    393.554 
(19.11)*** 
Post-Cold War -6.8063 
(-2.83)** 
 
-2.864 
(-0.94) 
-1.638 
(-0.66) 
-.8678 
(-0.33) 
Post-Conflict Period 
 
5.2853 
(2.71)** 
1.1308 
(0.55) 
.3638 
(0.19) 
2.514 
(1.10) 
Constant 
 
11.73988 
(3.72)*** 
11.806 
(2.54)** 
 
17.052 
(5.07)*** 
41.588 
(0.79) 
N 1483 2035 2018 2059 
R-sq overall .17 .13 .12 .50 
Rho AR1  .28 .66 .57 .66 
Wald χ2 50.09 52.61 46.05 711.28 
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in the text 
t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the income level of the residents of recipients‘ countries is 
consistently significant throughout different models and samples but its sign is sensitive to 
sample changes and the use of polynomial specifications. Specifically, when I tests for 
income elasticity, the results suggest the presence of a middle income bias towards aid 
recipients which has been found in other studies (Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000; Chauvet, 2003).  The scatter plot diagrams in appendix C show that Israel stands 
out as an outlier in four out of five years. After having excluded Israel from the sample, the 
coefficient on GDP variable changes its sign from positive to negative and is statistically 
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significant at the 5 percent level.  Hence, after taking into account extreme outlier cases, the 
results show that donors do tend to give more aid to poorer countries.  
 Positive results between openness and foreign aid indicate that more open economies 
are more capable of absorbing larger aid inflows and attracting donors‘ attention. Moreover, 
this positive relationship is premised on the assumption that more open economies are larger 
markets and there will be a donor interest; it is, thus, a donor interest variable.  
Democratic states seem to determine the behavior of donor aid allocation only 
partially. Unlike in Kang and Meernik (2004), this variable has the expected sign and is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level when pre-and-after conflict period is taken into 
account. In the post-conflict period only, the variable loses its statistical significance. An 
explanation could be that donors account for the fact that countries in early post-conflict years 
tend to perform poorly in terms of policy and institutional quality and penalizing them is 
considered as an inappropriate policy. This would not help their recovery; on the contrary, the 
poorer they are, the greater would the risk of recurring conflict be (Addison and McGillivray, 
2004).   
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Table 2: All Armed Conflicts: OECD Aid to Conflict Nations After Conflict 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text 
t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level;   **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level; in the last column, F-test statistics are reported  
 
 
 
 Kang and Meernik  
2004 
 (1) 
Extended sample  
(2) 
Without Israel 
(3) 
New Variables 
(4) 
Extended sample 
Fixed Effects  
(5) 
Democratic State 
 
5.033 
(1.39) 
 
5.545 
(1.08) 
4.373 
(1.10) 
5.442 
(1.31) 
5.971 
(0.93) 
Polity in Transition 
 
10.296 
(1.95)* 
 
7.731 
(1.31) 
8.646 
(1.81)* 
8.689 
(1.66) 
6.543 
(0.98) 
Openness 
 
.3097 
(5.26)*** 
 
.2411 
(3.36)*** 
 
.1801 
(3.23)*** 
.0593 
(0.97) 
.1227 
(1.16) 
Recipient GDP Per Capita 
 
-.0029 
(-4.09)*** 
 
.0042 
(2.14)** 
 
-.0035 
(-2.26)** 
 -.0049 
(-1.00) 
Ln of GDP Per Capita    64.657 
(3.23)*** 
 
(Ln of GDP Per 
Capita)squared 
   -5.130 
(-3.40)*** 
 
Ln of Recipients‘ Population    -13.287 
(-9.23)*** 
 
Ln of Infant Mortality Rate    -12.446 
(-2.89)** 
 
OECD Military Intervention 
 
51.822 
(7.096)*** 
 
54.222 
(4.88)*** 
 
44.056 
(5.21)*** 
16.062 
(2.14)** 
58.472 
(2.61)** 
UN Peacekeeping 
 
5.894 
(0.85) 
 
8.622 
(1.12) 
4.025 
(0.67) 
3.594 
(0.64) 
1.903 
(0.18) 
Level of Violence 
 
-5.223 
(-1.39) 
 
-1.179 
(-0.14) 
-7.743 
(-1.50) 
-.1939 
(-0.04) 
 
Conflict over Governance 
 
8.778 
(2.21)** 
 
4.645 
(0.67) 
13.894 
(2.66)** 
-4.974 
(-1.10) 
 
Post-Cold War -13.799 
(-3.80)*** 
 
-6.900 
(-1.38) 
-3.603 
(-0.92) 
-6.665 
(-1.78)* 
-1.123 
(-0.17) 
Oil/gas Exporters    -22.677 
(-4.81)*** 
 
Israel    463.018 
(15.63)*** 
 
Post-Conflict year 2 
 
2.726 
(0.93) 
 
5.021 
(2.05)* 
 
3.040 
(1.47) 
4.999 
(2.13)** 
4.889 
(1.60) 
 
Post-Conflict year 3 5.899 
(1.90)* 
 
6.8341 
(2.29)** 
 
4.197 
(1.74)* 
5.317 
(1.87)* 
6.523 
(2.09)** 
Post-Conflict year  4 9.102 
(2.89)** 
 
3.337 
(1.03) 
.2365 
(0.09) 
2.312 
(0.72) 
2.907 
(0.91) 
Post-Conflict year 5 5.554 
(1.75)* 
 
.2353 
(0.07) 
-2.824 
(-1.09) 
.1804 
(0.05) 
.1418 
(0.04) 
Constant -.0835 
(-0.01) 
 
.8309 
(0.07) 
1.132 
(0.13) 
121.783 
(1.65) 
21.099 
(2.28)** 
N 782 908 903 839 908 
R-sq overall .32 .22 .18 .66 .07 
Rho AR1 .11 .46 .33 .51  
Wald χ2 157.94 75.88 71.16 608.76 (11, 702) 
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0487 
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The explanatory variables added to the original model like population size and oil 
exporting countries are statistically significant at 1 percent level in both the regressions. The 
coefficient on population has the negative sign and confirms findings from much of the 
literature that smaller countries, on average, receive more aid per capita. This is consistent 
with previous findings suggesting a bias against larger countries and the donors‘ desire to 
‗show the flag‘ widely (Knack, 2004: 9).  Surprisingly, oil/gas exporters tend to receive 
roughly, 20$ less per capita aid. This suggests that post-conflict aid is not determined by the 
countries that are rich with oil and gas.  
Among the group of conflict characteristics, the OECD Military Intervention does the 
main work; the variable is robust to changes in samples and estimators. The results indicate 
that countries that have been site of OECD military involvement tend to receive roughly 54$ 
per capita more of OECD aid. The inclusion of the dummy variable for Israel (column 4) 
seems to have absorbed part of the variation from the military intervention variable, whose 
coefficient becomes smaller but remains significant at the 5 percent level.   
The coefficient on Infant Mortality Rate, as a measure of physical quality of life in 
post-conflict period, is significant at 1 percent level but it has a negative sign suggesting that 1 
percent increase in Infant Mortality Rate leads to 0.11$ decrease in aid per capita. This 
portrays a rather unsatisfactory picture of donor behavior which seems to punish countries 
with increasing rates of infant mortality.  However, as it will be shown in the following 
section, these results are largely driven by the presence of interstate conflicts in the sample.  
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2.6.2. Interstate and intrastate conflicts 
  
The regression results run on sub-samples of armed conflicts reveal that in large part, the 
importance of post-conflict aid determinants vary between interstate and intrastate conflicts. 
Democracy, Polity in Transition, and OECD Military Intervention seem to direct more of 
donors‘ attention in the case of civil conflicts. In the pre-and-after conflict periods, donors 
tend to provide roughly 8$ more of aid per capita to countries affected by civil conflict(s) that 
score higher on a democracy scale. The coefficient on OECD Military Involvement (columns 
3 and 4 in Table 4) is significant at 1 percent level and suggests that countries affected by 
conflict receive on average 30-45$ more of per capita aid.  
The presence of UN Peacekeeping Operations in countries that have been sites of 
interstate conflict attracts on average 66$ more of aid per capita.  Also, for interstate conflicts, 
the Infant Mortality Rate is significant but with negative sign, meaning that countries affected 
by interstate conflict that have higher infant mortality rate receive less aid.  
Yet, there is a set of variables that are equally important in attracting donors‘ attention 
in the case of both types of conflicts. These variables are Recipients‘ Population, Openness (in 
the first model), variable dummies for Oil/Gas Exporters and Israel. The relationship between 
the level of income and aid per capita exhibits mixed results: the coefficient on GDP per 
capita is positive and significant in both types of conflicts in the first model, whereas in the 
second model it has different signs. The negative sign on the sample of civil conflicts might 
also be attributed to the lack of aid data on Israel after 1997, which ranks among the highest 
income countries in the sample and hence exerts influence in the overall results.
16
  The 
squared relationship between aid per capita and GDP of the recipient countries is found to be 
statistically significant in the case of civil conflicts only (column 4 in Tables 3 and 4). 
 
                                               
16 Conflict episode 1990-1999 with Hezbollah (Gledtisch et al., 2002) 
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Table 3: Interstate and Intrastate Conflicts: OECD Aid to Conflict Nations Before and After 
Conflict 
 
 Interstate conflicts 
(1) 
 
Interstate conflicts 
(2) 
 
Civil conflicts  
(3) 
Civil conflicts 
(4) 
Democratic State 
 
9.207 
(0.82) 
1.243 
(0.12) 
8.236 
(2.54)** 
7.582 
(2.54)** 
Polity in Transition 
 
.0094 
(0.00) 
-2.026  
(-0.22) 
6.297 
(2.05)* 
6.867 
(2.31)* 
Openness  
 
.5115 
(2.83)** 
.3212  
(1.89)* 
.2120 
(4.47)*** 
.1165 
 (2.63)** 
Recipient GDP Per 
Capita 
 
.0039 
(1.80) 
 .0046 
(2.88)** 
 
Ln of GDP Per Capita  8.090 
(0.19) 
 68.159 
(3.72)*** 
(Ln of GDP Per Capita) 
squared 
 -.7253 
(-0.24) 
 -5.164 
(-3.74)*** 
Ln of Recipients‘ 
Population 
 -7.693 
(-2.41)** 
 -12.033 
(-9.77)*** 
Oil/Gas Exporters  -26.176 
(-2.06)** 
 -17.854 
(-3.99)*** 
Israel   325.157 
(8.13)*** 
 488.652 
(16.30)*** 
Post-Cold War -10.170 
(-1.08) 
-5.244 
(-0.63) 
-1.774 
(-0.60) 
-.4888 
(-0.18) 
Post-Conflict Period 
 
15.549* 
(2.25) 
16.182 
(2.49)** 
-3.563 
(-1.57) 
-1.596 
(-0.73) 
Constant 
 
-10.776 
(-0.85) 
118.053 
(0.80) 
17.712 
(3.69)** 
11.919 
(0.19) 
N  407 407 1628 1628 
R-sq overall .24 .55 .099 .53 
Rho AR1  .74 .74 .57 .57 
Wald χ2 22.75 137.90 39.26 510.14 
Prob> χ2 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text 
t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level;   **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level. Note: (1) and (3) extended sample; (2) and (4) new additional variables. 
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Table 4: Interstate and Intrastate Conflicts: OECD Aid to Conflict Nations after Conflict 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text 
t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level;   **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level. Note: (1) and (3) extended sample; (2) and (4) new additional variables. 
 
 
 Interstate conflicts 
(1) 
 
Interstate conflicts 
(2) 
 
Civil conflicts  
(3) 
Civil conflicts 
(4) 
Democratic State 
 
-55.183 
(-2.70)** 
-9.805 
(-0.52) 
5.885 
(1.63) 
7.870 
(2.68)** 
Polity in Transition 
 
.6559 
(0.03) 
-1.356 
(-0.08) 
11.996 
(2.60)** 
9.693 
(2.65)** 
Openness 
 
.4949 
(1.73)* 
.0202 
(0.07) 
.1181 
(2.30)** 
.-03006 
(-0.66) 
Recipient GDP Per Capita 
 
.0352 
(6.46)*** 
 -.0041 
(-2.86)** 
 
Ln of GDP Per Capita  26.432 
(0.32) 
 78.606 
(4.23)** 
(Ln of GDP per 
capita)squared 
 -2.671 
(-0.42) 
 -6.013 
(-4.29)** 
Ln of Recipients‘ 
Population 
 -16.389 
(-3.74)** 
 -12.166 
(-8.47)** 
Ln of Infant Mortality 
Rate 
 -35.924 
(-2.09)* 
 -.8811 
(-0.22) 
OECD Military 
Intervention 
 
-41.259 
(-1.48) 
-6.226 
(-0.23) 
45.406 
(5.08)** 
30.748** 
(4.11) 
UN Peacekeeping 
 
66.231 
(2.60)** 
22.254 
(0.85) 
7.878 
(1.39) 
6.568 
(1.46) 
Level of Violence 
 
-13.924 
(-0.66) 
-2.080 
(-0.11) 
-6.972 
(-1.40) 
-1.812 
(-0.43) 
Conflict over Governance 
 
86.690 
(1.70) 
73.150 
(1.73) 
12.291 
(2.41)** 
-4.126 
(-0.89) 
Post-Cold War -16.143 
(-1.28) 
-14.694 
(-1.36) 
-.6415 
(-0.15) 
.1445 
(0.04) 
Oil/Gas Exporters  -34.716 
(-2.24)* 
 -13.964 
(-2.97)** 
Israel  439.966 
(6.82)** 
  
Post-Conflict year 2 
 
14.953 
(1.70) 
18.117 
(2.19)* 
2.151 
(1.05) 
1.5457 
(0.92) 
Post-Conflict year 3 19.464 
(1.73) 
23.931 
(2.22)* 
3.081 
(1.39) 
.3818 
(0.21) 
 
Post-Conflict year  4 12.737 
(1.04) 
15.856 
(1.37) 
.9391 
(0.41) 
-.6277 
(-0.33) 
Post-Conflict year 5 9.405 
(0.73) 
12.527 
(1.03) 
-2.010 
(-0.86) 
-3.023 
(-1.55) 
 
Constant -107.521 
(-2.18)* 
324.448 
(1.19) 
3.867 
(0.41) 
-4.734 
(-0.07) 
N 198 192 710 635 
R-sq overall .60 .79 .20 0.46 
Rho AR1 .59 .57 .16  .16 
Wald χ2 101.10 237.93 70.54 197.82 
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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2.6.3. Multilateral versus bilateral aid 
 
Bilateral and multilateral donors seem to be attracted similarly to aid determinates like 
Population size and GDP Per Capita. First column in Table 5 shows that both bilateral and 
multilateral aid goes to richer countries whereas in the second model, multilateral donors give 
more aid to poorer countries. The latter is in line with much of the exiting literature 
contending that multilateral donors tend to reward needy recipients. When tested for 
nonlinearity (second model), the sign of GDP per capita changes for both donors indicating a 
squared relationship between aid levels and changes in income per capita.   
Yet, aid allocation by multilateral and bilateral donors is not framed by the same set of 
determinants. For bilateral donor countries, in both the models, the Openness variable and the 
variable indicator for Israel are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level showing 
their consideration for countries of economic and strategic importance. The effect of the 
OECD military intervention, which is highly significant in the first column in Table 5 seems 
to be absorbed by the variation coming from dummy on Israel whose coefficient is large and 
highly significant. 
Multilateral donors seem to discard political and strategic motives (Military 
intervention and Israel) and reward countries that are changing their authority regimes. Also, 
they appear to give on average 3$ per capita more aid to countries affected by conflict of 
lower intensity and conflicts with disputes over governance. This indicates that multilateral 
donors are more averse towards higher intensity conflicts and conflicts with disputes over 
territories—known for lasting longer than conflicts over governance.  This reconfirms that 
while bilateral aid is driven by political consideration, multilateral aid is driven more by 
recipients‘ countries merits.   
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     Table 5: Different Types of Aid: OECD Aid to Conflict Nations Before and After Conflict* 
 
 Bilateral 
(1) 
Bilateral 
(2) 
Multilat. 
(3) 
 
Multilat. 
(4) 
Bilateral 
(5) 
Bilateral 
(6) 
Multilat. 
(7) 
 
Multilat. 
(8) 
Democratic state 7.108 
(2.16)** 
4.813 
(1.64) 
.4966 
(0.92) 
1.237 
(2.37)** 
11.806 
(1.31) 
12.622 
(1.74)* 
-.2820 
(-0.34) 
-.8444 
(0.98) 
Polity in transition 3.540 
(1.15) 
3.315 
(1.13) 
2.014 
(3.74)*** 
2.063 
(3.92)*** 
-3.726 
(-0.33) 
1.903 
(0.21) 
2.635 
(2.63)** 
2.285 
(2.21)** 
Openness .2543 
(5.26)** 
.1563 
(3.58)** 
.0216 
(2.87)** 
-.0035 
(-0.46) 
.5132 
(3.76)*** 
.2892 
(2.38)** 
.0126 
(0.94) 
.0043 
(0.28) 
Recipient GDP p.c. .0053 
(4.47)*** 
 -.0002 
(-0.80) 
 .0181 
(6.74)*** 
 -.0010 
(-3.06)*** 
 
Ln(GDP p.c.)  45.327 
(3.10)*** 
 10.622 
(3.13)*** 
-40.601 
(-1.21) 
 .2797 
(0.06) 
 
(Ln of GDP p.c.)sqrd  -3.336 
(-3.09)*** 
 -.8440 
(-3.21)*** 
2.747 
(-1.07) 
 -.1454 
(-0.43) 
 
Ln (population)  -9.273 
(-9.02)*** 
 -1.986 
(-10.75)*** 
-7.670 
(-2.90)** 
 -1.199 
(-3.46)*** 
 
Ln (IMR)     -5.545 
(-0.76) 
 .1126 
(-0.13) 
 
OECD Military 
Intervention 
    63.604 
(3.37)*** 
.7730 
(0.06) 
2.600 
(1.42) 
.9245 
(0.57) 
UN peacekeeping     -5.142 
(-0.42) 
-1.990 
(-0.23) 
-.2942 
(-0.26) 
.3153 
(-1.21) 
Level of Violence     -.8.721 
(-0.82) 
4.021 
(0.57) 
-2.606 
(-2.64)** 
-1.123 
(-1.21) 
Conflict over Governance     -21.525 
(-2.22)** 
-12.050 
(-1.77)* 
2.857 
(2.90)** 
1.509 
(1.56) 
Post-Cold War -1.871 
(-0.65) 
-.1323 
(-0.05) 
-.1864 
(-0.40) 
-.1002 
(-0.03) 
-7.449 
(-0.92) 
-10.463 
(-1.75)* 
.7326 
9((0.92) 
.1995 
(0.25) 
Post-conflict period -.5178 
(-0.15) 
-1.099 
(-0.35) 
-.4400 
(-0.83) 
.1002 
(0.20) 
    
Oil/gas exports  -16.873 
(-4.42)*** 
 -2.646 
(-3.72)*** 
 -3.962 
(-0.56) 
 -1.544 
(-1.57) 
Israel  394.836 
(20.09)*** 
   440.719 
(12.85)*** 
  
Constant 7.445 
(1.67) 
27.890 
(0.55) 
4.693 
(7.32)*** 
6.798 
(0.62) 
8.328 
(0.49) 
315.371 
(2.62)** 
.6772 
(0.42) 
26.648 
(1.63) 
N 2035 2035 1554 1554 370 344 287 263 
R-squared .14 .50 0.07 .29 .53 .82 .30 .44 
Rho AR1 .6659 .6642 .4803 .4831 .5575 .5517 .30286 .3093 
Wald χ2 56.83 731.82 22.78 175.75 122.32 529.20 46.73 84.74 
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text; t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level;   **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level; *Regression results (1)-(4) belong to the first model and (5)-(8) belong to the second model, restricted to post-conflict period only.  
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2.6.4. Aid in the post-conflict period 
 
The results in Table 1 and 2 show that post-conflict countries, on average, receive 5$ and 7$ 
more of per capita aid in the second and third years, respectively. The fourth column suggests 
the same time-scaling of aid flows albeit with smaller coefficients. The aid peak is recorded in 
the third year. Previous findings (Kang and Meernik, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) differ 
precisely at the point that aid starts to level off. The results from Table 1 and 2 are closer to 
those of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), who find that aid tends to increase more in the first two 
years after a conflict ends and then begin to decrease in subsequent years.  
The coefficients on aid flows are sensitive to the presence of outliers, as well as 
sample changes. As shown in the column 3 of Table 2, when Israel is dropped from the 
analysis all but the third indicator variable on aid flows are insignificant. Coefficients on aid 
inflow variables attain statistical significance for some particular sub-samples (interstate 
conflicts) and donors (bilateral donors). These cases show consistently that the aid peak is 
achieved in the third post-conflict year.  This is confirmed with the fixed effects approach as 
shown in the last column of Table 2, although the explanatory power of the model is 
significantly reduced.  
           In the following, I discuss the estimations derived from the second dataset  that 
consists of 75 developing countries (35 non-conflict and 40 conflict affected countries).   
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Table 6. Aid allocation (fixed effects estimates) 
 
Variables Aid/GDP Log(Aid/GDP) 
Log(initial GDP per capita) -6.4887 
(-4.76)*** 
-.6402    
(-7.39)*** 
Polity IV index .4616 
(5.10)*** 
.0381   
(6.63)*** 
Log of Infant Mortality -2.7264 
(-1.64) 
.0233   
(0.22) 
Log of Population .94580 
(0.39) 
.1675 
(1.09) 
Time0 (pre-peace)                                              2.1099 
(1.16) 
-.0867  
(-0.75)    
Peace Onset 2.2805 
(1.57) 
.1340 
(1.45)    
Post-conflict1  2.4162 
(1.72)* 
.0308 
(0.35) 
Post-conflict2 -.2299 
(-0.17) 
.0006 
(0.01)      
Constant 
 
52.210 
(1.33) 
3.6550   
(1.46) 
No of observations 376 376 
No of countries 66 66 
R squared .19 .35 
   
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text 
t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level;   **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level.  
 
 
Table 7. Differences in variable means across pairs of periods before and after the conflict   
 Aid/GDP AidCap 
Peace onset=PrePeace .0141971 
(0.81) 
8.298154 
(1.24) 
No of countries 31 36 
Postconf1=PeaceOnset .0043528 
(0.41) 
10.76848 
(1.95)** 
No of countries 33 37 
Postconf2= Postconf1 -0345727 
(-1.98)** 
-4.53742 
(-1.32) 
No of countries 33 36 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text 
t statistics in parentheses;  *significant at 10 percent level;   **significant at 5 percent level; ***significant at 1 
percent level 
 
            The results confirm claims that aid reduces considerably during the postconflict2 
period: after the 5th year during the full peace period, aid is not significantly different from 
non-conflict countries. Table 6 shows that the peace onset variable is not significant, while the 
postconflict1 period is marginally significant and substantial. Hence, at a marginal 
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significance, the results suggest that aid in post-conflict countries reduces by the end of the 
first post-conflict decade, after having achieved its peak in the first four years after the 
conflict. 
           This last result is confirmed by simple paired means tests, where aid in the 
postconflict2 is substantially reduced and is significantly lower than in the postconflict1 
period. These estimations show that aid is significantly lower after the postconflict1 by 3 
percent of GDP, whereas aid is higher in the postconflict1 by some 10 dollars per capita. 
Surprisingly, the evidence shows no statistical difference between the peaceonset and 
prepeace period, which is in contrast to Collier and Hoeffler‘s (2004) findings.   
 
2.7. Conclusions and Caveats 
 
The econometric analysis in this chapter provides evidence about determinants and time-
frame of post-conflict aid and raises some important issues related to successful recovery and 
development in post-conflict societies. 
The results based on the first dataset (extended analysis) are largely consistent with 
previous studies showing that donors consider both national and conflict characteristics in 
allocating aid to countries affected by conflict. Recipients‘ country characteristics like the 
level of income and openness, as well as military intervention by OECD countries are 
consistently significant, although other aid determinants like changes in authority regimes and 
sources of conflict seem to lose their importance in the extended analysis.  
In addition, the results run on sub-samples of types of conflict and types of aid reveal 
differences in aid responses to countries/conflict characteristics. Correlations of political and 
geostrategical objectives with bilateral aid imply that aid to conflict affected countries flows 
within a politicized environment and thereby follows a selective approach. Shifts in the global 
security agenda following the War on Terror have increased concerns by the development 
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community that aid funding might be diverted from poorer countries to those of geostrategical 
importance. This raises doubts about the deliverance of effective aid and sustenance of the 
human development goals on the forefront of the changing policy agendas. 
The central question posited in the beginning of this chapter is related to the timescale 
and volatility of aid flows in post-conflict countries. The econometric results on foreign aid 
amounts and timing provide positive and significant results for indicator variables on second 
and third post-conflict years, showing that aid comes in larger amounts in the second and third 
year and drops off in subsequent years. This is confirmed through fixed effects estimates, 
although the explanatory power of the model is considerably reduced. In the case of civil 
conflicts, which is the focus of the next two chapters, two important conclusions can be 
drawn, albeit the results are marginally significant: aid is higher around the first post-conflict 
period (years 2-5) and it significantly reduces afterwards; and there is no significant 
difference between the pre-peace and peace onset period (years 0-1), which is in contrast to 
Collier and Hoeffler‘s (2004) findings.   
These findings tell a familiar story about donor weariness shown after the 5
th
 year in 
post-conflict, where aid flows are not significantly different from non-conflict countries. If aid 
inflows are not in line with the time-frame of growth opportunities during the post-conflict 
decade, as argued by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the deliverance of effective aid is hindered.  
As such, proper time-sequencing and scaling of aid flows is the crux of aid effectiveness.  
The estimates of post-conflict aid determinants such as those of Kang and Meernik 
(2004) are sensitive to sample changes. Their results are fragile with respect to the outliers 
(case of Israel) as well as polynomial specifications. The potential presence of biased results 
which are based on random effects model is a source of fragility in all the results.  This 
problem is addressed by the use of fixed effects approaches.   
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There are also data caveats, which might make the results sensitive to changes in 
samples and model specification and presumably conceal real aid patterns in post-conflict 
period. The first caveat is related to multiple conflicts, that is, countries that have experienced 
several conflicts in different parts of their territory within a decade.
17
 For example, according 
to PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002), in the 1990s, there were seven conflict episodes in 
the territory of Myanmar. This implies that the first post-conflict year for Myanmar (in the 
1990s) ranges from 1993 to 1997. For example, 1997 enters the dataset twice for two separate 
conflicts in Mynamar: one as the first post-conflict year, and the other as the last one. This 
makes results sensitive to changes; while at the same time unclear aid peak patterns may 
prevail.  
Second, the introduction of the explanatory variable on intensity of conflicts (level of 
violence=war2) adds more to the issue of multiple conflicts. To enter this variable, in some 
cases, a single conflict episode had been split into two conflicts. This was the case for 
conflicts, whose intensity of violence escalated from low to high level (e.g., if a conflict 
episode started in 1998 and ended in 1999 and its intensity level changed, then this conflict 
was split into two single episodes: 1998 low intensity conflict (war2=0) and 1999 high 
intensity conflict(war2=1).  The issue of multiple conflicts is mitigated in the second step of 
analysis, whereby the second dataset covers only those countries that have been war-free for 
10 years after the conflict/s ended; but at the same time this reduces considerably the number 
of post-conflict countries. 
The last point is attributed to the way the three post-conflict periods are coded. The 
coding procedure calls for some discretion, where a four-year panel might consist of one year 
of war, two years of peace onset, and one of postconflict1. As explained in section 2.5.2., ‗the 
rule of thumb‘ is to code a period based on number of years from each post-conflict group 
                                               
17 e.g., Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, India, Lebanon, Congo, Somalia, Angola, Croatia, Bosnia, and some former Soviet 
countries (See Appendix A for a list). 
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(peace onset, postconflict1, and postconflict2) that dominate during the four-year periods 
(Elbadawi et al. 2008: 127). This can be a bigger problem in five-year panels that might, for 
example, consist of one year of war, two years of peace onset, and two years of postconflict1. 
In my case, this is ameliorated, to some extent, by the use of four-year panel datasets.  
In spite of these data and econometric problems, the results consistently show that 
more of bilateral aid flows to countries of geostragetical interests and that aid peak is recorded 
around the first post-conflict period; beyond this period, aid flows are not significantly 
different from other non-conflict countries. The question as to whether the prevailed time-
scaling of aid is in line with recovery needs and patterns in post-conflict countries deserves 
further investigation. Hence, the time-frame, the politicized nature of foreign aid flows, and 
their possible links to the question of post-conflict aid effectiveness are analyzed in detail in 
the next two chapters—through cross country and case study analysis. 
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3. AID EFFECTIVENESS IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: A 
CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The UNDP (2008) reports that during the 1990s, 35 countries affected by civil conflicts 
entered a post-conflict period. The aftermath of conflict is the point when the risk is highest 
for these countries to ‗go wrong‘ as they confront humanitarian catastrophes, shattered 
infrastructure and institutions, and displaced labor; investment and savings decisions are 
distorted and productive activity is suppressed (Demekas et al., 2002; Addison and 
McGillivray, 2004). Ex-combatants need to be re-integrated and their demobilization and 
disarmament requires strong national security forces. In these environments, as Addison and 
Brück (2009) argue, tensions exist between the goals of development and peacebuilding. 
Thus, an agenda that encompasses the three Ps—peace, political participation, and 
prosperity—goals should be in place.  
In this context, foreign aid has an important role to play: although it cannot reduce the 
risk of conflict directly, it can do so through its effect on growth and higher employment 
(Collier, 2005; 2007). Addison and Brück (2009: 24) argue that growth alone cannot be the 
primary objective for donors: ‗insofar as aid contributes to achieving the political goals, then 
it should facilitate the achievement of the economic and social goals‘. Hence, the scope of 
tasks supporting post-conflict transition include democratization, investments in justice, 
security and institutions, reconstruction, as well as balance of payment and budgetary support 
(Addison, 2000).  
    Against this background, I examine the role played by the donor community in the 
process of post-conflict recovery. My goal is three-fold: I first revisit the exiting evidence 
about aid and growth in post-conflict contexts. Particular focus is given to the timeframe of 
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aid and growth recovery during their first post-conflict decade. Second, to address the issue of 
multi-dimensional objectives of aid, I introduce new variables, such as social outcomes, into 
the post-conflict framework. This is a new contribution to the debate on effectiveness of post-
conflict aid. I also use variables that are specific to conflict-affected countries and control for 
the presence of International Peacekeeping Missions. Lastly, the methodology employed 
offers an additional dimension to the post-conflict aid literature. This paper follows the 
instrumentation strategy used by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Arndt et al., (2009). 
3.2. Survey of the Literature: Measuring Aid Effectiveness 
 
The impact of foreign aid on recipient countries‘ economies has been subject of research and 
debate among scholars and policymakers for more than five decades. There are two 
discernible strands in the literature of foreign aid effectiveness (Radelet, 2006): one argues 
that foreign aid spurs growth and development of the recipient countries (e.g., Stiglitz, 2002; 
Sachs, 2004) while the other opposes this view by arguing that aid crowds out savings and 
investments and thus slows down economic growth (e.g., Easterly, 2001). 
In order to investigate aid impact on recipient countries‘ economies, the scholars have 
relied on econometric techniques. Aid effectiveness can be measured in terms of growth 
promotion, development, and welfare of the recipient countries. Changes in development 
concerns have broadened the focus and role of the development aid from the large scale 
resource transfer, which would fill the savings and foreign exchange gap, to multidimensional 
role including poverty alleviation, structural adjustment, and stabilization (Thorbecke, 2000).  
These changes have influenced selection of theoretical frameworks, models, and 
databases for tracing the relationship between foreign aid and growth of recipient countries; 
given the differences in theoretical frameworks and techniques used, it comes as no surprise 
that econometric studies on foreign aid effectiveness have provided mixed results. This 
section provides an account on how the empirical literature on aid effectiveness has evolved 
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during the past 50 years of extensive research, in terms of measurements and the techniques 
used.  
3.2.1. Aid-growth nexus 
 
A large and growing literature measures the macroeconomic impact of aid on growth. 
According to Harrod-Domar model the impact of aid on growth is traced through increased 
rates of savings and investments. In this analytical framework, a linear relationship between 
output and capital is assumed, where output growth will be a function of the rate of 
investment. The two-gap model developed by Chenery and Strout (1966) extends this 
approach by assuming that developing countries have shortage of both savings and foreign 
exchange, and foreign aid will help to fill these gaps. This will be done through increased aid 
flows to fill the savings gap, or through provision of the necessary foreign exchange, to 
remove current account deficits (Thorbecke, 2000). 
In light of the two-gap models, the empirical analysis in the beginning of 1970s, 
examined the link between aid-induced savings and investments and found that aid increases 
savings at a rate smaller than one for one (Papanek 1972, 1973). Later studies during 1980-
1990 traced the impact of aid on growth through investments and found mixed results. Mosley 
(1987) analyzed the so called micro-macro paradox in aid effectiveness studies. By doing so, 
he refers to contrasting results in micro and macro studies: while aid projects are evaluated as 
successful in meeting the objectives set, aid does not seem to have a positive effect on 
aggregate.     
The major criticism to Harrod-Domar and the two-gap theoretical frameworks is the 
assumption about the direct link between investment and growth based on a constant capital-
output ratio. In addition, it is not clear whether all aid goes to investments since part of it is 
given for humanitarian reasons (Tarp, 2010). Another criticism is that the impact of aid can be 
undermined by the misuses from corrupt governments that pursue anti-developmental goals. 
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In this way, aid induces corrupt practices and the struggle for power, and hence it becomes 
counterproductive for recipient countries (Bauer, 1991).  
Endogenous growth theory and advances in econometrics have allowed for further 
research and measurements of foreign aid effectiveness by indicating the role of human 
capital, institutions, and policies across recipient countries. These studies utilize mainly panel 
datasets, account for the endogeneity of aid, and cover more countries than previous studies. 
This literature analyzes recipient country conditions such as policies, political and economic 
stability, environment, fraction of land in tropic areas, and warfare.  A typical  econometric 
model that estimates aid effectiveness takes the following form: 
18
)8(,''' ,,3,2,1 timtimtimtiit AZXY   
 
itY  is the outcome variable, usually real per capita GDP growth; mtiX ,  is vector of exogenous 
variables; 
mtiA ,  is aid to recipient i in period t-m; mtiZ ,  is vector of aid interactions with 
other variables; 
ti ,  residual term; i,t are recipient countries i in time t. 
 
 
The vector of aid interactions usually contains an interaction term between aid and a 
measure of recipient country‘s characteristics (e.g., policies and institutions). Within this 
framework, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid is positively related to growth in 
countries with better policies. Findings by Burnside and Dollar (2000) have been cited widely 
and have sparked new empirical work on aid and growth, with some of these studies 
questioning the robustness of their results. Most notably, Hansen and Tarp (2001) find that the 
interaction term between aid and policy (as per Burnside and Dollar, 2000) is not significant. 
Instead, aid and aid squared are significant, suggesting that aid is effective but with 
diminishing returns. Easterly et al. (2004) add more countries and years to Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) dataset and find their results to be fragile to the use of additional data. Other 
influential studies that estimate aid-growth conditionality terms, find a positive relationship 
                                               
18 See McGillivray and Noorbakhsh (2007) 
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between foreign aid and growth, when aid is conditioned upon ‗severe environments‘, or ‗the 
fraction of land outside tropics‘ (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; 
Dalgaard et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  Roodman (2007: 1) tests the robustness of 
‗7 important aid-growth papers‘ (including Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and finds that all the 
results are fragile, particularly to sample expansion. His results suggest that fragility of 
findings found in Burnside and Dollar (2000) ‗is the norm in the cross-country aid 
effectiveness literature‘ (Roodman, 2007: 17).  
Recent contributions on aid and growth have applied new methods and techniques in 
the aid-growth debate. Rajan and Subramanian (2008), for example provide a comprehensive 
examination of the relationship between aid and growth and test the robustness of aid-growth 
results in terms of time horizons, types of aid, types of donors, timing of impact of aid, and 
different specifications and samples. They claim to have controlled carefully for the 
endogeneity of aid, as they take into account that aid can be given to both, worse and good 
performer countries. In response to this, they model the supply of aid based on donor-related 
rather than recipient-specific characteristics and start constructing their instruments from the 
donor-recipient relationship as done by Frankel and Romer (1999). This means that Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008: 648) take into account ‗considerations that drive individual donors to 
give aid to a country other than those related to a country‘s level of income and growth.‘ 
Their results suggest that there is no systematic effect of aid on growth.  
Using program evaluation techniques, Arndt et al. (2009) provide a different story. 
They use a counterfactual framework in which, for the first time, the aid growth nexus is 
formulated in terms of the Rubin Causal Model.  Program Evaluation literature tries to 
establish what results were produced or caused by a program: two situations that are identical 
in every respect save for the program (the ‗treatment‘), are compared. The units of treatments 
are countries whereas treatment is measured by aid shares in these countries. To derive the 
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binary instrument, countries are sorted in ascending order of the instrument generated from 
the preliminary stage (from lowest to highest predicted aid shares) and then the first 30 
countries are selected for the ‗control‘ (Zi=0) and the rest for the treatment (Zi=1).  
Arndt et al. (2009) use doubly robust estimators for casual effects that are considered to 
be robust to misspecification of either the propensity score or the outcome regression. Their 
results show that the average treatment effect of aid on growth is positive in both the 1960-
2000 and 1970-2000 periods and that aid remains an important tool for development.  
 
3.2.2. Aid and non-growth outcomes  
 
One strand of recent aid literature focuses on the impact of aid on non-growth outcomes. 
Kosack (2002) estimates the impact of aid on HDI with and without interaction term between 
aid and democratization. He finds a positive and significant effect of the interacted term on 
HDI values, and no impact of the aid variable when the interaction term is excluded from the 
regression.  
 Earlier contributions about social indicators and the role of aid do not find a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between aid and infant mortality (Boone, 1996). 
However, Masud and Yontcheva (2005) find that aid flows from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are significantly associated with reduced infant mortality. To 
disentangle the effects of different types of aid on intermediate outcomes, Mishra and 
Newhouse (2007) and Dreher et al. (2008) use sector-specific aid. Mishra and Nehhouse 
(2007) find that health aid has a statistically significant effect on infant mortality and doubling 
per capita health aid leads to a 2 percent reduction in the infant mortality. Positive effects of 
education aid on primary school enrollment is suggested by Dreher et al. (2008), who find that 
higher per capita aid for education significantly increases primary school enrollment, while 
increased domestic government spending on education does not have a positive significant 
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effect. These findings raise the issue of decomposition of total aid into sectoral aid flows (the 
shortcomings from using this measurement are discussed in the last section of this chapter).
19 
 
The empirical studies that investigate the role of aid on institutional quality and 
policies in the recipient countries exhibit mixed results. Scholars argue that higher levels of 
aid worsen bureaucratic quality in developing countries by bolstering rent-seeking activities 
and corruption (Svensson, 2000; Knack, 2001; Alesina and Weder, 2002). On the other hand, 
after having corrected for the potential endogeneity of aid, Tavares (2003) shows that aid does 
reduce corruption in recipient countries.  
In sum, most of the published research on aid effectiveness focuses on the effects of 
aggregate aid on growth, with no conclusive results. Mavrotas (2010: 9) argues that aid 
effectiveness debate will not reach a consensus at all ‗as long as the analysis is restricted to 
the aid-growth nexus.‘ Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) emphasize the need to ‗open the 
black box‘ and look at political economy issues such as heterogeneity of aid motives, the 
limitations of the tools of the analysis, and the complex causality chain that links aid to final 
outcomes.  In response to this discussion, more disaggregated analyses of aid effectiveness 
have come to dominate published research. The focus of these studies goes beyond aid-
growth nexus and examines poverty reduction through better outcomes in health, education 
and institutional development. Yet, Arndt et al., (2009) argue that aid and growth studies 
should not be disregarded and growth should remain the key objective of aid. Development 
objectives such as poverty reduction cannot be achieved ‗without a substantial outward shift 
in the production possibilities frontier‘ (Arndt et al., 2009: 9). 
Another emerging strand in aid effectiveness research are country case studies, which 
add up to cross-country analysis. For example, Feeny (2003) examines the case of Papua New 
                                               
19
 Radelet et al. (2006) divide aid into three categories: humanitarian (disaster relief, food aid), early (transport, 
communications, energy, construction), and late impact aid (health, education, government and civil society, 
NGO support).  
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Guinea and the effectiveness of aid in terms of poverty reduction. A comprehensive study on 
Mozambique is conducted by Arndt et al. (2006:2), who find that ‗Mozambique has benefited 
from sustained aid inflows in conflict, post-conflict and reconstruction periods‘. However, 
they highlight the administrative challenges that come from the proliferation of donors and 
aid-supported interventions; hence high aid flows and short term-benefits might not be 
sustained in longer run.  This again, brings forth the issue of the effectiveness of aid in post-
conflict societies, which will be discussed in turn.   
 
3.2.3. Aid effectiveness in post-conflict countries  
 
The starting point for examining the effectiveness of post-conflict aid is the study by Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), who examine the relationship between economic growth, policy, and aid 
in post-conflict countries. They claim to have provided the first systematic empirical analysis 
of aid and policy in post-conflict situations. Specifically, their study is based on a 
comprehensive listing of large civil wars and covers 17 countries in their first post-conflict 
decade.  
By investigating the ‗time-profile‘ of post-conflict growth, Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 
1142) suggest that aid is considerably more effective in augmenting growth in post-conflict 
situations since the absorptive capacity for aid is approximately double than in non-conflict 
countries. Thus, aid should be phased in gradually during the first four years after the conflict, 
and then ‗gradually taper back to normal levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade‘.  
Collier and Hoeffler‘s (2004) recommendations about aid sequencing are in line with 
economic recovery goals for growth but seem to conflict with other goals that have an 
immediate effect on peace dividends such as demobilization of soldiers and  reconstruction of 
destroyed infrastructure. Demekas et al. (2002) suggest that aid has the greatest welfare effect 
immediately after the conflict whereas reconstruction aid takes time to act and hence needs to 
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be designed with care. They recommend that in the post-conflict environment there is need for 
larger amounts of humanitarian aid over a shorter period of time instead of small amounts 
over a longer period of time.  
Addison (2004) argues that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) ‗overemphasize the growth 
objective‘, and he points to other important objectives of aid such as revenue recovery, 
poverty reduction, and the use of aid as a tactical instrument to secure peace. In the first years 
after the conflict, aid can finance recurrent spending and invest in reconstruction and 
institution building projects while keeping macroeconomic stability. By financing 
infrastructure and service delivery in rebel areas, aid can also provide a ‗partial substitute‘ for 
insufficient government resources; this investment provides a tactical case for higher aid 
flows in the first post-conflict years.  
In light of this debate, two important issues can be summarized. First, aid seems to be 
more effective in post-conflict environments. As such, aid is an important tool for post-
conflict recovery, if carefully designed. Second, proper sequencing of aid is contingent upon 
identification of recurring trade-offs and which objectives should receive higher priority, 
remains a point of contention. This unravels the issue of aid objectives in relation to 
countries‘ specific needs and the respective trajectory of aid inflows during the post-conflict: 
aid is given for a variety of purposes and consequently, it impacts growth and other outcomes 
in different ways at different points in time. These issues are crucial for successful post-
conflict recovery, and will be subject of analysis in the present and the following chapter.  
To this end, I trace aid‘s impact in relation to growth and non-growth outcome 
variables.
20
  The main focus lies in the link between post-conflict aid and the infant mortality 
rate for three reasons. First, infant mortality rates deteriorate substantially during and after the 
conflict (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003). Second, it is a comprehensive indicator of 
                                               
20 Chen et al. (2008) and Elbadawi et al. (2008) use a wide range of indicators to measure performance in the 
aftermath of the civil war, e.g. real exchange rate misalignment, financial development, health and education, 
political development, demographic development, and incidence of terrorist attacks.  
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changes in economic conditions of the poor encompassing access to medicines and health 
facilities, water and sanitation, maternal health, female literacy, and fertility patterns (Boone, 
1996; Mishra and Newhouse, 2007). Third, datasets on infant mortality have a broader 
coverage and are also considered to be more reliant than those on life expectancy (Mishra and 
Newhouse, 2007).  
Another important aspect to be addressed in countries coming out of conflict is the 
state of their institutions and policies. To build post-conflict institutions, there is need for 
budgetary support, and aid can play a valuable role, if properly used.  Institution building and 
better budgetary management enable countries to absorb aid more effectively (Addison, 2004; 
Addison and Brück, 2009). In this context, I use another outcome variable to test for aid‘s 
impact: the Economic International Country Risk Guide (ICRGE), which was proposed by 
Knack and Keefer (1995) and measures institutional quality in aid recipient countries.  
3.2.4. Aid and the role of peacekeeping forces 
 
Peacekeeping missions can play a vital role when there is need to rebuild political institutions 
and implement complex peace agreements (Sambanis, 2008). These missions enable 
governments to quickly downsize their militaries whereas commitments to maintain 
peacekeeping through the first decade can reassure potential investors and hence accelerate 
economic recovery (Collier, 2009).  
I control for the presence of international peacekeeping troops and examine their effect 
on performance outcomes in post-conflict environments. This is done through dummy 
variables by denoting the presence of peacekeeping forces.  
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3.3. Methodology and Data 
 
Cross-country panel data analyses are commonly used approaches in studies examining the 
conflict affected countries. Typically they cover periods of four to five years, where dummy 
variables are used to mark the presence of conflict in a given country and are interacted to 
variables of interest (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Elbadawi et al., 2008; Adam et al., 
2008).  
3.3.1. Interaction terms 
 
The role of aid in post-conflict situations is examined through interaction terms between 
conflict-related dummies and aid variables. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use interaction terms 
between aid, aid squared, and post-conflict year dummies; their triple interaction terms consist 
of aid, post-conflict dummies, and the policy measure (Post-Conflict 1*CPIA; Post-Conflict 
1*(ODA/GDP) 
2
; Post-Conflict 1*CPIA*ODA/GDP). 
Roodman (2007) raises concerns about the near-collinearity of some of these terms 
with the variables from which they are constructed. He refers to the inability of estimators to 
distinguish between interaction terms that are highly correlated with simpler interaction 
variables, called the black box problem. In other words, conclusions drawn on complex 
interaction terms might indeed refer only to the importance of variables and simpler 
interaction terms from which they are constructed.
21
  For this reason, I avoid the use of triple 
interaction terms, such as aid*Post-Conflict*UN operation or aid*Post-Conflict*ICRGE.  
3.3.2.Endogeneity 
 
An important methodological issue in using panel data is to find plausible estimation 
techniques that account for the endogeneity in the regressors (e.g., Bazzi and Clemens, 2009). 
For example, if more aid is given to countries with poor policy environments, lower income, 
                                               
21 When referring to Collier and Hoeffler‘s  results (2004), Roodman argues that their triple interaction term 
between aid×policy×post-conflict is highly correlated with the simpler aid×post-conflict status interaction 
variable.   
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or poor social indicators, then this raises concerns about potential simultaneity bias whereby 
aid might not be exogenous to outcomes like growth and social indicators. Until the mid-
1990s, the aid–growth studies used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) techniques. Subsequently, 
more advanced techniques, like Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) were preferred as a 
straightforward technique to deal with endogeneity.  
More recently, the advanced technique of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
became the tool of preference as it takes into account endogeneity, country fixed effects, and 
avoids the bias of standard panel estimates in panel settings. However, due to the highly 
complex nature of the growth process there is a growing concern about the presence of weak 
internal instruments in both Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators. As a result of weak 
instruments, the estimates will be biased towards their unadjusted counterparts such as OLS 
or panel fixed effects (Bun and Windmeijer, 2007; Arndt et al., 2009).  
Hence, an important issue is to find instruments that can reasonably determine 
exogenous variation in aid. These instruments are lagged levels of aid or can be derived from 
the literature that analyzes recipient country characteristics. Another issue is how to judge the 
validity of the instruments chosen. Roodman (2007), for example, identifies two alternatives: 
technical procedures that deal with specification tests to detect the presence of weak or invalid 
instruments, and conceptual approaches that judge whether the set of instruments chosen has a 
plausible theoretical grounding.  
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) take a step further in their instrumentation strategy by   
modeling the supply of aid based on donor-related rather than recipient-specific 
characteristics. Their construction of instruments starts from bilateral relations between 
donors and recipients, by looking at the colonial relationship, country‘s relative size, and 
common language, as opposed to the literature that picks instruments at the level of the 
recipient country. This is based on the argument that donors allocate aid not just because of 
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low income, but also because of colonial links and influence. As Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008) made improvements relative to past instrumentation approaches, I follow their 
approach to identify my external instruments.  
3.3.3. Estimation technique 
 
To estimate parameters of interest, I use the IV-GMM estimator. This estimation procedure 
requests the two-step feasible efficient GMM estimator and corresponding variance-
covariance matrix. First, the equation is estimated using IV and the residuals are formed. 
Then, the estimates from the first step are used to form the optimal weighting matrix and then 
to calculate the efficient GMM estimator and its variance-covariance matrix (Baum et al., 
2003; 2007).
22
  
To check for the robustness of the results, the Limited-Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) option is used, which is the preferred IV estimator in Arndt et al. (2009). 
Their justification is that 2SLS, GMM, and LIML converge to the same point estimates in the 
case of single instrument and endogenous regressors. However, LIML is their preferred 
estimator in the context of multiple instruments. Baum et al., (2007) argue that LIML 
provides no asymptotic efficiency gains over two-step GMM and IV. However, they point at 
the recent research suggesting that LIMIL‘s finite-sample performance may be superior. 
There is also evidence suggesting that LIML perform better than IV-GMM in the presence of 
weak instruments.  
In the context of GMM, the overidentifying restrictions are tested via Hansen J 
statistic. It is the most common diagnostic used in GMM estimation to evaluate the suitability 
of the model. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the instruments are not satisfying 
the orthogonality conditions required; that is, they are not strictly exogenous.  Other statistic 
                                               
22 Ivreg2 command in Stata; the Hansen J statistic of overidentifying restrictions and Anderson canonical 
correlation LR statistic for feasible efficient two-step GMM are automatically reported. 
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used to test model identification is the Anderson‘s (1984) likelihood ratio test, which 
evaluates the identification status of the estimated equation through the null hypothesis that 
canonical correlation is zero. If one or more of the canonical correlations is zero, the model is 
underidentified or unidentified. In the first-stage, a partial R-square and the Shea measure are 
reported to test correlation of instrumental variables with endogenous variable. Small values 
of partial R-square and the Shea measure indicate that the model may be unidentified (Baum 
et al., 2003; 2007) 
 
3.3.4. Econometric equation 
 
Building largely on Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Elbadawi et al. (2008), the econometric 
equation takes the form: 
)9(,2*1*
*21
1097
6543
2
21
ititititititit
itititititititit
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PeaceOnsetAPostConfPostConfPeaceOnsetAAy
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
 
itY  is dependent variable: average growth rate—first regression; infant mortality—second 
regression; and ICRGE index—third regression; A is Aid/GDP for the first and third 
regressions and Aid per capita for the second regression; itPeaceOnset , itPostConf 1 , and 
itPostConf 25  are post-conflict dummies; CV is a set of control variables; it  ,  are time and 
country fixed effects. 
 
 
To identify the control variables, I follow closely the existing literature on post-conflict 
aid and growth (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Elbadawi et al., 2008), on aid and social 
outcomes (e.g., Mishra and Newhouse, 2007), as well as aid and governance (e.g., Svensson, 
1999; 2000). As explained in the previous chapter, the data are four-year panels for 75 
developing countries covering the period 1970-2009; 40 of these countries experienced civil 
conflicts of high intensity and were war-free 10 years after the conflict ended. 
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3.4. Descriptive Statistics and Simple Paired Tests 
 
Figure 4 shows that, on average, real GDP growth rebounds from negative rates in the pre-
peace period to positive rates; growth peaks around the fourth and the fifth years in post-
conflict. After this peak has been achieved, growth records a falling trend decelerating to 
around 3-4 percent.
23
 
 
Figure 4. Per Capita GDP growth (average values, in percent) 
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations; See Data Appendix 
 
However, the evidence about growth performance across observations suggests that not all 
post-conflict countries experienced positive growth rates beyond the fourth and fifth years in 
post-conflict. The dotplot below shows that negative rates of growth have occurred in all post-
conflict years and hence they do not exhibit a clear pattern during the first post-conflict 
decade. For example, the dotplot shows that growth rates in different years vary from -32.97% 
in the first post-conflict year, to 106% in the fifth year.  
 
                                               
23
 The growth rates in the first post-conflict period are pulled up by Bosnia and Herzegovina: its rate of growth 
in the first post-conflict year exceeds 80 percent.  Hence the growth averages are presented without Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.   
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Figure 5. Pre and post conflict GDP growth  
 
  
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data described in text 
 
A clear temporal pattern is also not supported by the event study of mean differences as 
presented in Table 8. The estimation results shows that we fail to reject the null that there are 
no changes in the rates of growth across pairs of periods in the conflict cycle.  This is in line 
with the evidence provided by Davies (2008: 6), who argues that there is no obvious temporal 
pattern in post-conflict growth and suggests that ‗high post-war growth cannot be taken for 
granted‘.  
Table 8: Differences in Variable means across pairs of periods before and after the conflict   
 
 Growth Infant mortality 
Peace onset=PrePeace .2118103 
(0.1306) 
-10.43*** 
(-3.9302) 
No of countries 30 9 
Postconf1=PeaceOnset 2.618184 
(0.979) 
-11.97*** 
(-6.0715) 
No of countries 33 10 
Postconf2= Postconf1 -1.164285 
(1.1734) 
-9.875*** 
(-5.0057) 
No of countries 34 20 
Source: Author‘s estimates; See Data Appendix. 
 
Infant mortality rates show a slight downward trend during the conflict cycle; the rates are 
however still high during peace onset reaching as high as 188‰. The evidence from the 
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difference in means confirms the downwarding trend: the null hypothesis of no changes in 
infant mortality between the periods is rejected at 1 percent level.  
Figure 6. Infant mortality rates before and after the conflict  
 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations; See Data Appendix. Note: Liberia is in the circle 
 
These results are instructive about the temporal patterns of variables but should however be 
taken with caution. To properly trace the associations between the variables of interest, the 
influence of other variables should be observed. Issues such as endogeneity and interaction 
terms should also be addressed (as discussed in the methodology part). The next section 
presents results from regressions run on a multivariate framework and addresses the 
abovementioned issues. 
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3.5. Regression Results 
 
In what follows, the econometric results about the role of aid during the post-conflict recovery 
are discussed. The results are discussed in terms of growth performance and improvements 
made in infant mortality rates and good policies. In the end, the shortcomings of this analysis 
are addressed and suggestions for a future agenda are provided.   
3.5.1. Aid and growth  
 
The evidence shows that aid supports growth but with diminishing returns. The coefficients 
on aid and aid squared enter the regression with the expected signs in the five columns in 
Table 9 and are statistically significant when interaction terms are included (with the 
exception of the last column). The relationship between growth and aid reflects recipient 
countries‘ absorptive capacities where institutions and policies play an important role.  This 
can be seen from the importance of the governance indicator (ICRGE), the coefficient of 
which is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.    
Post-conflict dummies do not attain statistical significance, suggesting no clear 
temporal patterns of growth recovery; this is also exhibited through descriptive statistics on 
growth performance in post-conflict countries, as presented in the previous section. The 
results about the interaction of aid with post-conflict variables tell a different story from 
earlier contributions. Aid seems to have a negative growth effect during the peace onset 
period: the aid interaction term with peace onset dummy is negative and statistically 
significant. This result could be attributed to the composition of post-conflict aid during this 
period.  During peace onset, aid is mainly disbursed for humanitarian relief to provide a 
minimum level of consumption, and as such it might not be associated with growth (see 
Appendix D for an illustration). This result supports claims that reconstruction and 
humanitarian aid have opposite effects on investments (Demekas et al., 2002), and hence 
there is need for a distinction between these two components in an aid-investment-growth 
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framework.  Further, if aid in the peace onset is more effective in improving health outcomes 
(i.e., saving more lives), then this should have long-term effects for growth; but in the short 
run, this improvement could lead to a reduction of per capita income as the population size 
will be increasing.   
Table 9. Dependent Variable: Average growth rate      
Variables Post conflict 
recovery 
(IV-GMM 
robust SE) 
(1) 
Interaction terms  
(IV-GMM robust 
SE) 
 
(2) 
Interaction terms 
(IV-LIML  
bootstrapped SE) 
 
(3) 
Interaction 
terms 
(IV-GMM 
robust SE) 
(4) 
Interaction 
terms 
(IV-LIML  
Bootst. SE) 
(5) 
Aid/GDP .1950 
(0.60) 
.7421 
(2.29)** 
.9903 
(1.99)** 
.6005 
(2.36)** 
.5980 
(1.37) 
(Aid/GDP)squared -.0039 
(-0.51) 
-.0168 
(-2.04)** 
-.0227 
(-1.65) 
-.0136 
(-2.11)** 
-.0132 
(-1.17) 
Log(initial GDP per 
capita) 
-.4259 
(-0.48) 
1.013 
(1.10) 
1.714 
(1.36) 
.6835 
(0.94) 
.7714 
(0.61) 
Polity IV index -.0173 
(-0.35) 
-.0738 
(-1.69) 
-.1181 
(-1.83)* 
-.0479 
(-1.72)* 
-.0495 
(-1.18) 
Government Consumption .0151 
(0.17) 
-.0983 
(-1.43) 
-.1637 
(-1.65) 
-.0617 
(-1.38) 
-.0626 
(-0.64) 
ICRGE .8768 
(5.49)*** 
.9245 
(5.46)*** 
.9074 
(3.14)*** 
.8682 
(6.05)*** 
.8071 
(4.68)*** 
Education  .9540 
(1.16) 
1.140 
(1.31) 
1.275 
(1.28) 
.9844 
(1.28) 
.8689 
(0.85) 
Peace Onset -.8585 
(-0.61) 
1.344 
(0.69) 
1.001 
(0.23) 
1.394 
(0.88) 
1.492 
(0.35) 
Post-conflict1  .0712 
(0.07) 
-.2770 
(-0.24) 
-.1530 
(-0.07) 
-.3096 
(-0.30) 
-.1934 
(-0.05) 
Post-conflict2 .9032 
(0.91) 
.8094 
(0.72) 
1.312 
(0.34) 
-.1339 
(-0.15) 
.1340 
(0.07) 
Peace Onset*Aid/GDP  -.1941 
(-1.83)* 
-.1756 
(-0.24) 
-.2010 
(-2.50)** 
-.2190 
(-0.31) 
Post-conflict1*Aid/GDP  .1197 
(1.21) 
.1437 
(0.19) 
.1054 
(1.43) 
.0860 
(0.02) 
Post-conflict2*Aid/GDP  .1393 
(1.72)* 
.0998 
(0.04) 
.1670 
(2.72)** 
.1460 
(0.14) 
Constant -2.505 
(-0.31) 
-14.81 
(-1.78)* 
-20.45 
(-1.75)* 
-11.37 
(-1.72)* 
-11.26 
(-1.23) 
No of observations 199 199 199 197 197 
Anderson canon. corr. LR 
statistic  
p-value 
0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 0.0002 
Hansen J statistic 
/Anderson Rubin Statistic  
p-value 
 
0.0810 0.2930 0.3325 0.4147 0.1784 
R – squared   .22 
 
.15 .05   0.17 
 
0.17 
Partial R squared 
(excluded instruments) 
.10 .10 .10 .10 .10 
 t-statistic in parentheses;  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
Regressions include regional dummies. Excluded instruments for aid are colony dummies and recipients‘ relative sizes. 
The estimates in Columns (4) and (5) are derived from the new sample without Azerbaijan and Liberia.  
Source: Author‘s estimates; See Data Appendix. 
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The results on interaction terms between Aid and Post-conflict2 dummy provide some 
evidence about positive effects of aid in the second post-conflict period (6
 –9 years). This 
evidence is rather fragile as the coefficient does not attain statistical significance in all 
specifications; the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions and the R-square are weak for 
different regressions. Moreover, findings about the time period when aid could have a larger 
positive growth impact are not in line with earlier contributions (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Elbadawi et al., 2008).  
However, the results are consistent after checking for influential points and outliers. 
After plotting leverages against the squared residuals, two country-observations stand out: 
Azerbaijan and Liberia. After having them dropped from the sample, the signs of the 
coefficients do not change although some variables, such as Post-conflict2*Aid/GDP attain a 
larger explanatory power (columns 4 and 5). Also, new estimates provide larger p-values of 
Hansen J test implying that the instrument set satisfies better the orthogonality conditions.   
 
3.5.2. Aid and infant mortality  
 
The regression results presented in Table 10 suggest that aid on average has a positive effect 
on remedying physical miseries, such as infant mortality. This analysis finds a strongly 
significant effect of aid on infant mortality using total aid inflows. The coefficient on aid per 
capita is significant in four columns that use different specifications (with and without 
interaction terms), periods, and estimation procedures. In spite of existing controversies about 
the importance of aid as a tool for development, the evidence strongly supports the argument 
that aid increase is inversely related to infant mortality rate.   
Following the immediate aftermath of the conflict, mortality rates remain high as 
shown by the Peace Onset dummy. This is in line with earlier findings (e.g., Chen et al., 2008) 
where infant mortality rates are expected to record a slightly increasing trend in the first years 
after the war and then start to drop off (see Appendix D). During the post-conflict period, aid 
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plays a positive role in lowering infant mortality rates as reflected by interaction effects 
between aid and period dummies; however the effect is significant at the 5 percent level 
during Post-conflict1 only.  Hence, a peace dividend for health outcomes is achieved through 
higher aid per capita from 2nd to 5th years in post-conflict: 1 percent increase in aid leads to 
0.12-0.15 percent decrease in infant mortality rate (columns 2-6). The results are robust in 
terms of changes in estimation procedures, GMM and LIML. Also, when I focus the analysis 
on the entire post-conflict period, the results remain unchanged and aid is significantly 
important in lowering high rates of infant mortality throughout this period (column 4).  
Control variables for infant mortality exhibit the expected signs and are strongly 
significant in  all the columns (with exception of access to water): higher income per capita, 
and better access to sanitation lead to lower rates of infant mortality whereas higher fertility 
rates are associated with higher rates of infant mortality. The presence of peacekeeping 
operations does not demonstrate a positive effect in improving social indicators. This result 
should be taken with caution as the sign of the dummy variable for the presence of 
peacekeeping troops can go either way and depends on countries‘ characteristics and the type 
of the deployed missions. In other words, the circumstances in conflict countries differ: they 
might be less or more hostile and might have different economic and social capacities. Hence, 
a dichotomous variable denoting the mere presence of peacekeeping troops conceals 
heterogeneities in the type of deployed missions and the severity of environments and could 
not provide enough information about their effectiveness.   
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Table 10. Dependent Variable: Log of Infant Mortality Rate 
 
t-statistic in parentheses;  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
Regressions include regional dummies. Excluded instruments for aid are colony dummies (French and British colonies) and 
recipients‘ relative sizes (population size). (5) and (6) samples without Ethiopia, Eritrea and Trindiad&Tobago  
Source: Author‘s estimates; see Data Appendix. 
Variables Post 
conflict 
recovery 
(IV-GMM 
robust SE) 
(1) 
Interaction 
terms  
(IV-GMM 
robust SE) 
 
(2) 
Interaction 
terms 
(IV-LIML  
Bootst. SE)  
 
(3) 
Interaction 
terms  
(IV-GMM 
robust SE) 
 
(4) 
Interaction 
terms 
 (IV-GMM 
robust SE) 
 
(5) 
Interaction 
terms 
(IV-LIML  
Bootst. SE)  
 
(6) 
Log of aid per 
capita 
-.0840 
(-3.18)*** 
-.0645 
(-2.13)** 
-.0764 
(-2.15)** 
-.0659 
(-2.15)** 
-.0815 
(-3.05)*** 
-.0878 
(-3.13)*** 
Log(initial GDP 
per capita) 
-.2437 
(-5.55)*** 
-.2437 
(-5.56)*** 
-.2716 
(-5.27)*** 
-.2580 
(-5.98)*** 
-.2505 
(-6.61)*** 
-.2573 
(-6.55)*** 
Log Fertility .6878 
(7.27)*** 
.6814 
(7.26)*** 
.7030 
(6.45)*** 
.6732 
(7.22)*** 
.6621 
(7.95)*** 
.6685 
(7.30)*** 
Log of Access 
to clean Water 
(%) 
-.0076 
(-0.05) 
-.0018 
(-0.01) 
.0355 
(0.28) 
-.2217 
(-0.16) 
-.0203 
(-0.15) 
-.0136 
(-.0136) 
Log of Access 
to Sanitation 
(%)  
-.1518 
(-2.50)*** 
-.1408 
(-2.29)** 
-.1009 
(-1.71)* 
-.1248 
(-2.04)** 
-.2478 
(-4.21)*** 
-.2402 
(-3.92)*** 
Peacekeeping 
Operations 
.2036 
(2.41)** 
.2288 
(2.59)** 
.2103 
(2.66)** 
.1920 
(2.41)** 
.2002 
(2.95)*** 
.2030 
(2.44)** 
Post-conflict  
 
   .3941 
(2.30)** 
  
Peace Onset .1857 
(2.26)** 
.8175 
(2.27)** 
.7538 
(2.01)** 
 .9057 
(2.93)** 
.8905 
(2.36)** 
Post-conflict1  .0179 
(0.19) 
.5504 
(2.01)** 
.4382 
(1.56) 
 .6237 
(3.13)*** 
.5990 
(2.63)** 
Post-conflict2 -.0500 
(-0.61) 
.1602 
(0.82) 
.1239 
(0.48) 
 .2718 
(1.84)* 
.2516 
(1.78)* 
Post-conflict* 
Log of aid per 
capita 
 
   -.1005 
(-2.09)** 
  
Peace Onset* 
Log of aid per 
capita 
 -1782 
(-1.78)* 
-.1628 
(-1.45) 
 -.1862 
(-2.14)*** 
-.1829 
(-1.73)* 
Post-conflict1* 
Log of aid per 
capita 
 -.1544 
(-2.18)** 
-.1228 
(-1.72)* 
 -.1528 
(-3.00)*** 
-.1460 
(-2.45)** 
Post-conflict2* 
Log of aid per 
capita 
 -.0644 
(-1.10) 
-.0513 
(-0.67) 
 -.0763 
(-1.66)* 
-.0690 
(-1.73)* 
Constant 5.571 
(9.35)*** 
5.435 
(8.93)*** 
5.340 
(8.46)*** 
5.592 
(9.49)*** 
6.050 
(11.42)*** 
6.060 
(10.09)*** 
No. of 
observations 
234 234 234 
234 
224 224 
Anderson 
canon. corr. LR 
statistic  p-value 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J 
statistic/ 
Anderson Rubin 
Statistic  p-
value 
0.1415 0.1111 0.0745 0.1703 0.6615 0.6602 
Centered R 
squared 
.75 .76 .76 .75 .81 .80 
Partial R 
squared 
.49 .44 .43 .43 .48 .48 
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The Hansen J statistic suggests that the test of overidentifying restrictions cannot 
reject its null hypothesis, whereas in the LIML estimates, the Anderson Rubin test of 
overidentifying restrictions is on the borderline of rejecting its null hypothesis (at the 10% 
level). The latter does not give a complete confidence about the appropriateness of the 
instrument set.  
To test for the robustness of the results, I omit those countries that have high leverage 
points and high squared-residuals and then re-run the regressions on a new sample. As shown 
in Appendix E some country observations exert a strong leverage but their residuals are small 
(e.g., Eritrea). The new estimates (columns 5 and 6) are more robust and the tests of 
overidentifying restrictions are far from rejecting the null, providing stronger confidence 
about the instrument set. Also, partial R square is high and Anderson‘s likelihood ratio test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no canonical correlation between the excluded instruments and 
endogenous regressors. The results are more efficient with unchanged signs on the 
coefficients; access to water enters with the right sign, but remains insignificant.  This 
evidence provides confidence about the robustness of the results and the significantly strong 
effect of aid in reducing infant mortality rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79  
 
3.5.3. Aid and the Quality of Governance 
 
The regression results indicate that aid is detrimental to good governance in developing 
countries in general. This seems to support claims that aid promotes rent-seeking activities in 
recipient countries. Also, aid allocated for geostrategical interests strengthens dictatorships in 
developing countries and consequently has worsened the quality of governance. 
The results depict a different picture for countries recovering from conflict. The 
coefficients on aid and post-conflict dummies are positively significant for the peace onset 
period. For the second post-conflict period, the coefficient in column 3 is significant at the 5 
percent level whereas it is close to a statistically significant domain in the second column.  
Among the control variables, growth, infant mortality, and democracy exhibit the 
expected positive effects on good governance. An interesting result is high explanatory power 
for the presence of peacekeeping troops as expressed by large and highly significant 
coefficients. This result suggests that the presence of peacekeeping troops creates conducive 
environments for reform and sound policies in countries recovering from conflict.  
In the second column, which is the preferred equation, I run the regressions without 
the democracy variable in order to account for potential presence of collinearity with the 
governance index. Among the set of regional dummies, I omit the European dummy that 
appears to be insignificant in the first regression; consequently, the p-value of the Hansen test 
of overidentifying restrictions is larger.  
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Table 11. Dependent variable: ICRGE index   
 
Variables Interaction terms 
(IV-GMM robust SE) 
Without polity Interaction 
terms 
(IV-LIML  
bootstrapped 
SE) 
Aid/GDP -.0975 
(-2.78)** 
-.1264 
(-3.22)*** 
-.1339 
(-3.58)*** 
Log(initial GDP per capita) -.0534 
(-0.27) 
-.0418 
(-0.21) 
-.0112 
(-0.06) 
Growth .1231*** 
(5.52) 
.0941 
(4.08)*** 
.0925 
(3.74)*** 
Log of Infant Mortality Rate -1.117 
(-5.10)*** 
-1.115 
(-4.73)*** 
-1.071 
(-4.63)*** 
Polity IV Index .0443 
(3.32)*** 
 .0478 
(3.16)*** 
Peacekeeping Operations 1.915 
(3.38)*** 
1.376 
(2.30)** 
1.669 
(3.85)*** 
Peace Onset -1.592 
(-4.46)*** 
-2.058 
(-5.18)*** 
-1.511 
(-3.07)*** 
Post-conflict1  -1.099 
(-2.43)*** 
-.9562 
(-2.12)** 
-1.055 
(-2.06)** 
Post-conflict2 -.8861 
(-1.85)* 
-1.140 
(-2.31)** 
-.9362 
(-1.98)* 
Peace Onset*Aid/GDP .1019 
(3.07)*** 
.1317 
(3.85)*** 
.1159 
(2.93)** 
Post-conflict1*Aid/GDP .0121 
(0.21) 
.0592 
(1.37) 
.0748 
(2.02)** 
Post-conflict2*Aid/GDP .0543 
(1.49) 
.0317 
(0.46) 
.0344 
(0.70) 
Constant 9.445 
(4.40)*** 
9.571 
(4.23)*** 
9.116 
(3.92)*** 
No. of observations 303 319 303 
Anderson canon. corr. LR 
statistic  
p-value 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J statistic p-
value/Anderson Rubin Statistic  
p-value 
 
0.0256 0.4399 0.0242 
Centered R square .25 .10 .19 
Partial R square 
(on excluded instruments) 
.13 .11 .12 
t-statistic in parentheses;  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
Regressions include regional dummies. Excluded instruments for aid are colony dummies and recipients‘ relative sizes. 
Source: Author‘s estimates; see Appendix A. 
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3. 6. Conclusion and Caveats 
 
This chapter examined the impact of post-conflict aid on growth, infant mortality, and ICRGE 
index. It was particularly interested on the relationship  between aid and infant mortality rates, 
due to its importance for the socio-economic conditions of the poor. The econometric analysis 
was based on a sample of 40 post-conflict countries that are war–free for at least 10 years 
following civil conflicts between 1970-2009. 
The evidence suggests that post-conflict aid supports higher growth attainment in the 
second post-conflict period, although the evidence about aid and growth in post-conflict 
environments is not robust and the pattern of recovery is not in line with earlier contributions 
(e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The statistically positive effect of aid on growth for the 
whole sample of developing countries supports claims that aid helps developing countries 
finance their investment and increase productive capacities. 
Post-conflict dummies do not attain statistical significance, showing no clear temporal 
patterns of growth recovery; this is suggested also through descriptive statistics on growth 
performance in post-conflict countries. Hence, conclusions about the proper sequencing of aid 
flows must be drawn with caution since growth effects of interactions between aid and the 
three post-conflict dummy variables could go either way, depending on the country-local 
capacities (Elbadawi et al., 2008).  
The most robust results suggest that aid appears to be more effective in improving 
social indicators like the infant mortality rate, which is a flash indicator of human 
development. Aid that is effective in improving social indicators can have favorable long-term 
effects on economic growth. However, it takes time for the improved health indicators to 
translate into economic growth. Yet this is an encouraging finding about aid‘s impact ‗…as 
whatever the impact on economic growth rates, aid definitely does something far more 
important: it saves lives‘ (Mishra and Newhouse, 2007; citing Kristof, 2006). Aid also 
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supports the adoption of sound policies and this effect is significantly correlated with 
countries with peacekeeping missions. This provides some insights into the right mix and time 
sequencing between aid and peacekeeping troops in post-conflict settings.  
One important caveat to be addressed in this analysis is the lack of comprehensive 
datasets on decomposed aid inflows. Use of sectoral aid data could provide clearer patterns 
about the effects (the signs) of humanitarian and reconstruction aid components on post-
conflict recovery. The OECD database provides sectoral data on ODA commitments available 
from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), but it does not provide data on aid disbursements 
before 1990, which means that researchers who adopt this approach must resort on aid 
commitments. However, aid commitments may not be fully disbursed and consequently the 
figures on actual aid flows tend to be overstated. These problems with data are even more 
exacerbated in the case of conflict countries. In addition, in some cases, sector-specific 
commitments are unreported and aid totals in the CRS are less than those in the DAC (Mishra 
and Newhouse 2007, Dreher et al., 2008). A way to address the heterogeneity in recovery 
patterns would be through case study analysis where sectoral aid data are available; and this is 
done in Chapter 4.   
Another issue is related to the estimates of the effects of UN peacekeeping missions, 
whereby a selection on observables might be a possible source of bias.  However, Sambanis 
(2008) argues that UN missions, in general are assigned to more difficult cases with deeper 
hostilities and lower local capacities; he suggests that the model should use interactions 
between peacekeeping missions and other covariates and be estimated by matching on the 
propensity score and on covariates.    
Lastly, a future research agenda would be to augment new models of aid effectiveness 
literature in post-conflict contexts. The study on aid-growth nexus, framed in terms of Rubin 
Casual Model (Arndt et al., 2009), provides a strong motivation to expand the existing 
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framework by including post-conflict variables and hence testing the robustness of the results 
under the counterfactual framework. However, a small sample of post-conflict countries and 
gaps in the data leave the researcher with a very small number of observations, after the 
matching between the treatment and control groups has taken place. This is an inherent 
problem in small samples, whereby trade-offs between efficiency and bias prevail; this entails 
challenges in finding plausible matching algorithms among the group of propensity score 
matching estimators.   
These caveats notwithstanding, the evidence provides strong support for the view that 
aid offsets negative effects of conflict on social outcomes, such as infant mortality. Hence, 
growth is important, yet not the ultimate goal of post-conflict aid, as it appears to be more 
effective in saving lives. These findings suggest the importance of generous aid flows during 
the early years after the conflict, since better absorptive capacity of aid in later periods may 
not be attained if countries fail to reconstruct their social capital (Addison, 2004).  
Consequently, the time-sequencing of aid should be governed by multiple goals, if it is to 
attain an immediate peace dividend. The role of foreign aid in terms of three sets of 
objectives: peace security, reconstruction, and institution building in post-conflict Kosovo is 
the focus of the next chapter.  
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4. POST-CONFLICT AID IN KOSOVO (1999-2008)  
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Post-conflict Kosovo is an example of massive aid infusion combined with heavy 
international involvement in state building and policy design. During the first post-conflict 
decade, donor community spent 2.3 billion euro for the reconstruction and development of 
Kosovo, with more than 50 percent, or 300 euro per capita allocated in the first two years 
(Figure 7). At the same time, another 1.1 billion was spent by the UN Civil Administration 
and the NATO troops, making the international state building efforts in Kosovo as one of the 
most comprehensive projects, in terms of the money spent and the military troops involved. 
Two former peace builders in Kosovo estimate that ‗per head, the international community 
has spent 25 times more money and committed 50 times as many troops to Kosovo as it has to 
its intervention in Afghanistan‘ (King and Mason, 2006). 
Figure 7. Annual aid flows 1999-2008 
 
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010.  Note: spent amounts are in million euros. 
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Transition from war to peace in Kosovo was peculiar in many aspects. As Kosovo was 
not a sovereign state, the reconstruction process was designed and led by the UN—a new 
practice in international peace building, where a peacekeeping mission performs civil 
administration functions. As a result, the reconstruction process involved an array of 
challenges that could be specific to Kosovo case in the areas like fiscal and monetary policies, 
as well as external finance. The unresolved status raised issues of legitimacy and property 
rights which created uncertainties in the privatization process, with negative effects on 
investment and growth (del Castillo, 2008). In addition, Kosovo‘s economy is atypical in the 
regional context with its post-socialist and post-conflict characteristics and historically has 
been the poorest part of the region. The legacies of pre-conflict period have had a strong 
impact on choices of the international community on how to design and pursue a successful 
post-conflict recovery process.  
As shown by Figure 7, in the first two post-conflict years, foreign assistance in 
Kosovo reached very high levels in per capita terms, but declined drastically thereafter. 
Within these two years, Kosovo recorded double digit growth rates, falling down to moderate 
rates of 3-4 percent per annum (Table 12). Kosovo is a case where aid has played an 
important role in boosting growth in the post-conflict period and the challenges of aid 
dependency (and heavy reliance on remittances) remain even one decade after conflict.    
The abovementioned characteristics make Kosovo an insightful case to be examined in 
order to see the role of aid during the process of post-conflict recovery. Furthermore, in the 
context of dissertation work, this chapter sharpens understanding of the issues related to post-
conflict aid and its effectiveness in a particular post-conflict environment, which attracted 
large amount of aid inflows and experienced a distinctive nature of post-conflict 
reconstruction and state building process.   
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Specifically, the amount and pattern of aid inflows in post-conflict Kosovo seem to be 
in line with the results from the cross-country analysis on the relationship between aid 
allocation and donor interests. The European Union (EU) and the United States  (US) are the 
largest donors in post-conflict Kosovo and seemed to have shown a particular interest during 
and after the Kosovo conflict.  Kosovo belonged to the list of countries that had affected US 
security indirectly, through media attention. Nye (1999) argues that countries belonging to 
this list (including Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia) seemed to have affected public opinion 
through striking portrayals of human sufferings. In this way, the US interests in former 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, presented a mix of humanitarian and strategic concerns of 
European allies and NATO.  
Large scale financial and technical assistance to Kosovo can be related to its 
geographic position—being in Europe—as confirmed in 2008, at the post-independence 
Donor Conference for Kosovo. In the venue of this event, the Enlargement Commissioner Olli 
Rehn called upon the donors to contribute generously to Kosovo‘s socio and economic 
development by stating clearly that ‗Kosovo is a profoundly European matter‘ and that 
economic prosperity in Kosovo will help secure stability in the Western Balkans.
24
  
Although lack of time series data renders it difficult to conduct a rigorous econometric 
analysis, the datasets on donor activities in Kosovo allow for disaggregation of the data by 
sector/year and hence make inferences on aid‘s role in terms of three sets of objectives, peace, 
participation, and prosperity.  The strength of using this approach is the possibility to examine 
some important aspects of post-conflict aid in terms of non-growth objectives such as peace 
security, democratization, and institution building. This emphasizes the ‗multiplicity of 
overarching goals‘ where growth is an important but, not the sole objective (Addison and 
Brück, 2009: 15). In light of this discussion, Kosovo case can therefore provide deeper 
                                               
24 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/913&type=HTML  (accessed on June 10, 
2010). 
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insights into time sequencing and sectoral composition of aid; thus, complementing Chapters 
2 and 3 that are based on cross-country analysis.  
The importance of a detailed study on the role of post-conflict aid in Kosovo is 
underlined by the increasing dissatisfaction of academics and practitioners with international 
involvement into peace building and reconstruction process. Hence, this study is also timely: 
in spite of huge investments made, many analysts and practitioners see Kosovo case as a 
failure in terms of a prosperous and multi-ethnic society (King and Mason, 2006).  Since post-
conflict Kosovo is a typical recipient of massive aid amounts and the site of heavy 
international involvement in state building, the lessons learnt from this case would be relevant 
for future peace recovery and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.    
 
4.2. Background 
 
Kosovo has historically been the poorest province of former Yugoslavia. The economic 
activity was dominated by heavy industries, notably in the mining sector, production of raw 
materials, and semi-finalized products. Less developed regions of Yugoslavia exported 
mainly cheap raw materials, energy and labor to the more developed northern republics, 
which exported more expensive manufacturing products (Dallago and Uvalic, 1998); these 
sectors were characterized with low productivity and unfavorable terms of trade. Yugoslav 
investments in Kosovo in heavy industries were intended to accommodate increased needs for 
cheaper inputs from other parts of the country: Kosovo exported some two thirds of its energy 
production to other regions of Yugoslavia, mainly at artificially set lower prices, whereas 
most of the Kosovo mineral wealth was exported (Marengelen, 2000). The gap between 
economic output of Kosovo and more developed regions increased over time; for example, 
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the differences with Slovenia increased from 5:1 in 1955 to 8:1 in 1989 (Dallago and Uvalic, 
1998).
25
 
During the Milosević regime (in the 1990s), Kosovo experienced a decade of drastic 
decline in economic activities due to the poor economic policies, disinvestment, and halting of 
the technological progress. During 1989-1995 the national product almost halved (47.5 
percent) falling to less than $500 per capita; around 150,000 K-Albanian employees were 
expelled from their jobs in public and Government sector, whereas industries operated with 
low capacities. Consequently, people started to migrate abroad or work in a private sector, 
performing mainly activities different from what they were educated for, which lead to 
depletion of human capital. Declining economic activity—mostly in industries—resulted in 
rapid fall of exports and the collapse of trade relations with foreign partners (Riinvest, 1998).  
After a decade of repression by the Serbian police, political segregation, and growing 
ethnic tensions between K-Serbs and K-Albanians the situation escalated into an armed 
conflict.  The conflict in 1998-99, between the Yugoslav Army and the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) and the following NATO air campaign brought an end to the control of Serbian 
regime over the Kosovo territory. The war caused massive destruction of productive 
capacities and physical infrastructure; about 13,000 people were killed during the war; about a 
million K-Albanians fled to neighboring countries, and 500,000 people were internally 
displaced; after the hostilities were over, about 100,000 K-Serbs fled Kosovo in fear of 
retaliation (UNHCR, 1999).
26
 In June 1999, Kosovo economy was wrecked by war damages, 
a decade of poor economic policies, investment backlog, and the collapse of trade and 
financial relations.   
Immediately after the end of NATO bombing in June 1999, a UN mission was 
deployed in Kosovo with the mandate to ‗provide transitional administration while 
                                               
25 Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro were the less developed regions of Yugoslavia 
whereas Slovenia, Croatia, Central Serbia and Vojvodina belonged to the most developed regions.  
26 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3c2b204a0.pdf (accessed on April 25, 2011). 
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establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo‘ 
(UNSC 1244, 1999: 3).
27
 The international civil presence in Kosovo was organized in four 
pillars: Pillar I – Police and Justice; Pillar II – UN lead civil administration, Pillar III – OSCE 
for institution building and democratization; and Pillar IV – EU led reconstruction and 
development process. 
 Initially, the United Nations Mission Interim in Kosovo (UNMIK) was focused on 
establishing a secure environment so that all refugees and internally displaced persons would 
be able to safely return to their homes. Another priority was the development of the 
institutional infrastructure through Kosovar Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG). Huge amounts of aid were channeled toward supporting reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of the housing stock and provision of essential food and clothing to population. 
Gradually, donor community increased funding for supporting economic development.  
Starting from a very low base and supported by huge aid inflows and remittances, Kosovo 
managed to record impressive growth rates in the first years after the conflict. As foreign 
assistance started to fall, the economy experienced moderate rates of growth at an average rate 
of 4 percent per annum (see Table 12).  
In the first five years of its mandate, UNMIK was relatively successful in building 
domestic institutional capacities for self-governance. The Central Banking Authority (later 
Central Bank of Kosovo), with competencies in overseeing the payment system and 
monitoring the banking system, was established; departments (later ministries) for provisional 
self-government were created; free elections were held; country dollarized (official adoption 
of Deutsche Mark as a legal tender in 1999, followed by Euro); and with donors‘ support, a 
new fully funded pension scheme was put in place. As agreed, Kosovo Liberation Army 
                                               
27 http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf (accessed on July 18, 2010). 
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(KLA) fighters were demilitarized and integrated into the KPC (Kosovo Protection Corps), an 
unarmed body with competencies in providing disaster response services; demining; 
providing humanitarian assistance in remote areas and contributing to rebuilding 
infrastructure.  
UNMIK administration and PISGs focused in developing a market economy and 
hence adopting liberal trade policies. The private entrepreneurial spirit of K-Albanians, which 
was developed in former Yugoslavia due to discriminatory employment policies, enabled a 
rapid development of small businesses in the first post-conflict years. Fiscal policies have 
arguably supported this process, as personal and corporate income taxes were continually 
decreased to marginal rates of 10 percent. At the same time, KTA (Kosovo Trust Agency) 
was established; an UNMIK supervised agency, in charge of implementing the privatization 
of socially owned enterprises and restructuring state owned companies. KTA was later 
transformed into the KPA (Kosovo Privatization Agency) and handed over to Kosovar 
institutions; it is one of the most criticized institutions, mainly for mismanagement and 
possible corruptive cases.  
Establishing a sound and sustainable tax system was one of the major challenges in 
post-war Kosovo. The tax administration had to be build from zero; a completely new tax 
legislation was to be drafted and implemented; and tax payers had to be educated. However, 
within only few years, the country managed to cover all of its budget expenditures through its 
own tax revenues. This success was mainly attributed to the heavy reliance on taxes on 
international trade as about two-third of tax revenues were collected from imported goods and 
services. On the expenditure side, Kosovo recorded budget surpluses for several years in a 
row (see Table 12). This paradoxical development, which came as an outcome of the adopted 
(i.e., imposed) annual balanced budget philosophy and its division into the PISG and UNMIK 
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components, represented one the weakest aspects of the post-conflict developments in the 
public sector. Yet, the situation has not improved after the declaration of independence.   
Table 12: Kosovo Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Nominal GDP (in 
million euros IMF, 
2004) 
--- 1,848 2,240 2,797 2,884 2,977 3,099 3,464 3,724 3,792 
GDP per capita  989 1,179 1,447 1,467 1,438 1,475 1,629 1,722 1,724 
Real growth rates %  21.2 1.2 3.1 3.2 2.0 3.9 5.0 5.4 3.8 
Donors‘ direct 
contribution to GDP  
274 376 314 254 221 179 171 170 185 187 
 Donor contribution to 
GDP (in % of GDP) 
-- 20.3 14.0 9.1 7.6 6.0 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Budget revenues 
Border taxes 
 321.3 
243.4 
 
 
 
499.6 
364.5 
589.7 
424.9 
601.3 
430.0 
638.4 
426.1 
712.6 
456.4 
903.0 
531.6 
942.5 
604.2 
1,146.7 
634.0 
Budget Expenditure  239.5 401.6 542.6 748.5 696.1 635.5 661.2 950.5 1,232.4 
Budget Balance  
81.8 98 47.1 -147.2 -57.7 77.1 241.8 -8 -85.7 
 
Exports 
 10.56 
 
27.59 
 
35.62 
 
56.56 
 
56.28 
 
110.77 
 
165.11 
 
198.46 
 
165.3 
Imports  684.5 
 
854.7 
 
973.2 
 
1,063.3 
 
1,157.4 
 
1,305.8 
 
1,576.1 
 
1,928.2 
 
1,935.5 
Trade Balance  -673.9 
 
-827.1 
 
-937.6 
 
-1,006.7 
 
-1,101.2 
 
-1,195.1 
 
-1,411. 
 
-1,729.7 
 
-1,770.2 
Worker‘s Remittances  217 241 241 244 274 359 431 438 439 
Population  1,868 1,900 1,932 1,965 2,070 2,100 2,126 2,162 2,199 
Sources:  IMF Staff Mission to Kosovo, July 14 – 25 (2005); IMF Mission Concluding Statement (2009)28; WB (2004); SOK (2010) 
Note: GDP figures presented in this table are based on IMF Authorities‘ calculations after their revisions made in 2009; I have recalculated 
GDP figures for 2001-2003, in light of the IMF revisions.  
 
The declaration of independence in February 2008 was coordinated with relevant 
international stakeholders and came as an outcome of long UN-led negotiations with Serbia. 
Soon after the independence, Kosovo became a full member of the two important 
international institutions, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
KPC were advanced to a Security Force (KSF) and many of the remained UNMIK 
competencies were transferred to the Kosovar government. This transfer of competencies was 
seen as an important event as UNMIK was growing inept in promoting economic 
development and attracting foreign investors in Kosovo. However, due to the supervised 
                                               
28 http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2009/091609.htm 
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nature of the independence, the international influence in decision-making remains, although 
this time under the EU umbrella. The International Civilian Office (ICO) is in charge of 
monitoring the independence and EU Mission called EULEX maintains broad competences in 
the area of security, justice, and customs. Negotiations with Serbia on the final status led also 
to the creation of new municipalities with Serb majority; however the implementation of the 
decentralization process was only partially possible due to the resistance of Serb minority (in 
some municipalities) to recognize the independence.  
Notwithstanding all these achievements, Kosovo still faces very high unemployment 
rates in international comparisons, at 48 percent (ESK, 2009). Kosovar companies face 
massive obstacles to penetrate in the regional and international markets, largely due to non-
tariff barriers and political blockade from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, 
Kosovo post-conflict trade deficit has been high and persisting. As seen from Table 12, 
Kosovo is heavily dependent on imports (imports constitute around 50 per cent of GDP) and 
the trends indicate that in a short-run no major changes are to be expected. During 2002-2008, 
scrap metal and mineral products comprised, on average, about 60 per cent of total exports.  
Poverty rates are still the highest in Europe, with some 45% of the population living 
below the poverty threshold as defined by the World Bank (WB, 2007). Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranks Kosovo in the lowest end of the neighboring countries (Figure 1 in 
Appendix I).  Budgetary spending on education and health is relatively low whereas 
investments in physical infrastructure seem to be on the forefront of government agenda.  
 
4.3. Methodology and Data 
 
In this chapter, I examine sectoral composition and geographic distribution of aid in relation 
to Kosovo‘s needs. This methodology involves a description of annual aid flows and patterns 
by year and region (when distinguished) and then assesses the impact of post-conflict aid on 
promoting economic development and poverty reduction. Through this approach, I distinguish 
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between humanitarian and reconstruction aid and first, I analyze the role played by donors in 
providing emergency relief and ensuring peace security (e.g., demobilization and reintegration 
of former combatants) and then I examine aid inflows related to the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction process.  
The reconstruction aid is not merely about rehabilitation of physical infrastructure; 
hence I examine other areas of intervention such as institution building and democratic 
governance. Finally, the impact of aid on poverty alleviation will be inferred through final 
outcomes in education, health, infrastructure, etc., by looking at the delivery of the services to 
the targeted groups and improvements in the coverage and quality of these services. Thus, 
through sectoral analysis I look at the role of aid in relation to the three sets of objectives: 
peace and security, institution building and democratization, and economic prosperity. 
This approach follows partially previous studies that examine aid impact in a 
particular country.  For example, in a case study on the role of aid on poverty reduction in 
Papua New Guinea, Feeny (2003) examines allocation of aid among three components: 
promotion of economic growth, direct targeting of the poor, and the provision of safety nets 
and direct transfers. In the same vein, Arndt et al. (2006) look at the delivery of health and 
education services to the targeted groups and improvements in the quality of these services 
and make inferences about aid‘s impact in Mozambique.  
In the second part, I examine macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth, 
consumption, investment and the role of foreign aid since 1999. IMF Authorities (Moalla-
Fetini et al., 2004) use a theoretical framework through which they calculate the impact of the 
presence of expatriates in Kosovo (UN staff, police, and KFOR soldiers), whereby 
consumption of Kosovar goods and services by them is seen as a virtual export market. A 
rigorous econometric estimation of the relationship between foreign aid, and other 
macroeconomic indicators cannot be carried out due to the insufficient variation in the data as 
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a result of the too short time span (2000-2008). One possibility would be to add pre-conflict 
time series data, which are not available for Kosovo. The other possibility would be to use 
municipalities as units of analysis and construct a ten year-panel dataset but most of the donor 
projects are ascribed to the category ‘different regions‘, which makes it impossible to 
construct a panel dataset.  Thus, the backbone in assessing aid effectiveness would be the 
sectoral analysis, through which aid inflows are disaggregated into different sectors of 
economy.   
To conduct the research, I use data from both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary source for sectoral analysis is the Reconstruction Intervention Monitoring System 
(RIMS) database, which has been created by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE) in 
1999 and covers donor activities in post-conflict Kosovo. The data are obtained from a 
standard questionnaire filled by bilateral and multilateral donors operating in Kosovo. The 
questionnaire asks for information about the amount of assistance committed, contracted, and 
spent, as allocated by sector/program description and their geographic concentrations (MFE, 
2005). The collected data on donor activities are disaggregated by intervention type of aid 
(e.g., capital investments, technical assistance), by year, donor, municipality, and sector. For 
this study, I use amounts that have been spent during the first post-conflict decade (1999-
2008). Within the macroeconomic analysis, I use other data sources on different economic 
sectors and macroeconomic indicators from the WB, IMF, Statistical Office of Kosovo 
(SOK),
29
 UNMIK, and UNDP.    
4.4. Sectoral Analysis 
 
By the end of the conflict in June 1999, Kosovo economy had collapsed. Thousands of houses 
were damaged and destroyed by the Yugoslav Army. One month after the conflict ended, the 
International Management Group (IMG), funded by the European Commission (EC), 
                                               
29 In Albanian: Enti i Statistikave te Kosoves (ESK). 
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conducted a rapid assessment of the housing situation in Kosovo and found that around 
120,000 houses (out of 250,000 housing stock) were destroyed and damaged during the war; 
around 70,000 houses were severely damaged and needed urgent reconstruction (category 3 
and 4). UN Agencies reported that within a month, most of the refugees have returned home 
and needed food and shelters before the onset of the winter. The landscape posed a threat to 
the returnees due to landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO); only in the first month after 
the refugees began to return, mine and UXO caused up to 170 casualties (UNHCR, 1999). 
Power stations and bridges were hit hard and damaged by NATO bombs during its 78-days 
campaign.   
Aid agencies identified the emergent needs of Kosovo for food, clothing, medicines, 
shelter and de-mining to ensure a safe return and reintegration of people into their 
communities. There was an immediate need for the reconstruction process to start. To this 
end, UN Agencies appealed for the Kosovo emergent needs in the Donors‘ Conference that 
was organized in Brussels on July 28 (1999), by the EC and the WB. Donor pledges made at 
the Conference reached around 2 billion euro including funding already disbursed during the 
first half of 1999; US and EC were the largest contributors (see Table in Appendix F). The 
EU established the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) to help Kosovo with the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process. Creation of EAR was seen as an attempt to improve 
aid allocation to Kosovo after having drawn lesson from Bosnia and Herzegovina: an EU 
office on the ground was expected to shorten the time to distribute money from the 
headquarters in Brussels and it would also play a coordinating role in Kosovo (Kosovar 
Stability Initiative, 2007).  
The cumulative portfolio spent by the donor community in Kosovo during the first 
post-conflict decade amounts to 2.34 billion euro. Public Utilities and the Housing sectors are 
the largest absorbers of foreign assistance with 890 million euro, which makes up around 40 
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percent of total aid. This reflects specific circumstances in Kosovo caused by the war 
damages in the housing stock. At the same time, little aid has been disbursed for health, 
education, and agriculture (Figure 8).   
The pattern of annual aid flows and their composition mirror the unique characteristics 
of post-conflict aid.  As discussed, foreign assistance in Kosovo reached very high levels in 
per capita terms in 2000 and 2001, but then typically declined. Humanitarian and 
reconstruction components evolved in different amounts and directions: as humanitarian 
emergencies were met, humanitarian aid fell drastically whereas aid for reconstruction and 
development takes in the largest portion of external funding.  Except for the physical 
infrastructure, a significant part of this funding was spent on institution building efforts (tax 
administration, local administration), as well as strengthening of the democratic governance 
and judiciary (see Appendix G).   
Figure 8: Sectoral distribution of aid in Kosovo (Spent 1999-2008) 
 
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010.  Note: spent amounts are in million euros. 
* inlcuding sectors with less than 1 percent of total aid  (e.g, culture, youth, environment, minority rights) 
 
 
The next section presents the analysis of the pattern of annual aid inflows by year, 
amount, main donors, and geographic distribution. The analysis is followed with an 
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assessment of aid impact in rehabilitation and reconstruction process in the first post-conflict 
decade in Kosovo.    
 
4.4.1. Aid, Security and Emergency Relief 
 
4.4.1.1. Emergency Relief 
 
As seen from table in Appendix G, up to 60 percent of the total aid in 1999 was allocated to 
emergency relief; in two years this assistance amounted to 120 million euro.  During 1999, 
UNHCR received funds from the donor community (e.g., Japan, Denmark and EAR) for the 
Kosovo emergency program that provided mainly food, medicines, and prefabricated shelters. 
Humanitarian organizations distributed food to more than 900,000 people; wood stoves and 
firewood were also distributed to ensure that the returnees survive the winter (Tarnoff, 2001).   
Figure 9. Emergency relief 1999-2000 
 
  
Source: RIMS database, 2010.  Note: figures are in percentages 
 
Another component of emergency relief was to provide temporary shelters to the 
returned refugees and internally displaced persons. The Temporary Community Shelters 
program (as part of the Social Welfare Sector in RIMS dataset) makes up one third of the total 
aid spent on emergency relief (see Figure 9). As the humanitarian crisis abated, after 2000 the 
humanitarian aid inflows fell drastically, to negligible portions.   
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4.4.1.2. Mine Action and Coordination Center 
 
As the refugees began to return to Kosovo, threats from landmines and UXO posed a serious 
danger. Most of the casualties during the first month were caused by landmines. WHO, 
UNHCR, and mine clearers warned about the high risk from mine accidents as people start to 
work in the fields and collect firewood; Kosovo was ranked as high as Cambodia and 
Afghanistan for its mine risk (UNHCR, 1999).  
To deal effectively with threats posed to returned refugees and internally displaced 
persons from landmines and UXO, UN Mission in Kosovo established The Mine Action and 
Coordination Center for Kosovo (MAAC). The Center was designed as a coordination body 
with no assets of its own but relying on donors for funding and on other organizations for 
conducting mine cleaning operations (UN departments, NGOs, and corporations). Some 10 
percent of total aid in 1999 went for the MACC activities, notably mine and UXO clearance.  
Table 13. Mine Action Co-ordination Center 
 
Subsector 1999 2000 2001 % 
Planning. 
Management 
and Finance 
1001.03 4692 
 
489.60 
 
 16.19  
 
Mine Awareness 
Education 
4835.82 599.86 
 
67.32 
 
 14.41  
 
Mine/UXO* 
Clearance 
11333.91 5311.65 
 
9867.87 
 
 69.41  
 
Total 17170.76 10603.51 
 
10424.79 
 
100.00  
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; *unexploded ordnance.  Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
Organizations involved in mine cleaning operations performed their activities in their 
area of specialization and combined them under the umbrella of MACC. For example, HALO 
Trust, which was bilaterally funded by DFID, conducted a field survey of the land and then 
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provided demining organizations with necessary information (The Praxis Group, 2002).
30 
 At 
the same time, donors financed mine awareness and victim assistance programs through the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Handicap International (HI). Mine 
awareness activities were also provided out of Kosovo (e.g., Montenegro) to equip returning 
refugees and NGO staff with knowledge about landmine threats as they traveled in and out of 
Kosovo. 
The mine action program in Kosovo was a successful combination between the donor 
community efforts, engagement of the NGOs, and Kosovars themselves who cleaned the land 
(The Praxis Group, 2002). As a result, MACC managed to clear the territory of landmines in 
less than three years and is thus called as ‗the most successful mine action program ever‘ 
(Scott, 2002).  By the end of 2001, the country was declared generally impact-free of mines: 
45,000 lethal devices were destroyed, and over 30 million square meters of land were restored 
to their pre-conflict state. Accordingly, the number of accidents caused by mine and UXO fell 
drastically as presented in the table below.  
Table 14. Civilian Accidents in Kosovo  
 
 Jun-Dec 1999 Jan-Dec 2000 Jan-Sep 2001 Total All Years 
Injured 267 84 12 363 
Killed 74 9 4 87 
Total 341 93 16 450 
Source: The Praxis Group, 2002 
                                               
30
 Immediately after the NATO troops entered Kosovo, on the next day, June 13 1999, the HALO Trust started a 
rapid assessment of the mine/UXO contamination throughout the country to provide the UN and donors with a 
clearer overall picture of the situation. DFID was praised for this rapid response to crisis.  
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Further, in the case of Kosovo, mine action organizations were the experts, who informed 
local residents about landmine threats, instead of the local residents serving as the primary 
source of information, which has been the case in other countries. This unique situation was 
created due to the large scale displacement of the local residents during the war on one hand, 
and rapid response of mine action organizations and donors, on the other (Messick, 2000).  
4.4.1.3. Civil Security and Emergency Preparedeness 
 
Donor community spent some 26 million euro for civil security and emergency preparedness 
in the first three post-conflict years. The highest share of this donor funding was channeled 
toward demobilization and transformation of the KLA combatants, as stipulated in the UNSC 
Resolution 1244.   
Bilaterally financed through various donors (Japan, US, EAR, Germany, UNTF), 
UNMIK and KFOR entrusted the IOM as an implementing organization in the transformation 
process of the KLA combatants into the KPC. This process focused on the recruitment of 
former KLA fighters into the KPC troops that were constituted in 2000 and provide them with 
training. According to UNMIK regulations, the KPC was responsible for the following tasks: 
provide disaster response services; perform search and rescue; provide a capacity for 
humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; assist in demining; and contribute to rebuilding 
infrastructure and communities.  
Table 15. Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness 
 
Subsector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
KPC  
13247.03 
 
7495.49 
 
4507.14 
 
- - - - - -   97.33  
 
Kosovo fire 
services  
22.95 
 
670.65 
 
- - - - - - -     2.67  
 
Total  
13269.98 
 
8166.14 
 
4507.14 
 
- - - - - - 100.00  
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
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Another channel of integrating KLA fighters is through their transformation into the 
Kosovo Police (KPS), with an initially high quota agreed for the KLA fighters (Pozhidaev and 
Andzhelich, 2005). For those demilitarized combatants that were left out of the KPC (and 
KPS), the IOM established Information Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS). This 
program offered counseling and referral services to the KLA fighters, as well as grants and 
services to help them reintegrate into society.  
 
4.4.1.4.  Assessment of the effectiveness of donor activities in responding to emergency needs 
 
 
Donors moved quickly to respond to emergency needs in Kosovo‘s post-conflict environment. 
Massive infusion of aid assistance after June 1999 facilitated the return of refugees and 
provision of food, basic medication, and shelters to prepare people for the incoming winter. 
The UN and participating donors targeted around 350,000 people with their winterization 
activities: 60,000 emergency repair kits were provided, more than 10,000 roofing kits 
distributed, thousand of tents were also distributed and temporary community centers were 
made available (Tarnoff, 2002).   
Another successful aspect of emergency assistance in Kosovo is the influx of mine action 
resources after the conflict. This is very important for the post-conflict security given that 
casualties by land mines increase demands on overstretched health services, disrupt 
transportation, and prevent people from using their land for farming (Addison, 2000).  As 
shown in Table 14, the number on accidents/casualties caused by mine/UXO dropped 
substantially (from 341 to 16) in three years time.  Threats to mined areas were almost 
completely eliminated and restored to their pre-conflict state.  MACC annual reports suggest 
that awareness activities reached a considerable part of dangerous areas that have experienced 
higher number of casualties (The Praxis Group, 2002). These indicators suggest that mine 
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action programs in Kosovo have been successful in demining and raising awareness within a 
short period of time (mid 1999-end 2001).  
 Peace security is contingent upon successful demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) of the combatants. According to del Castillo (2008), the transformation 
of the KLA fighters into the KPC, instead of their integration into productive capacities, was a 
risky move and presented a source of instability for the Kosovo security situation. However, 
the DDR process should be analyzed in terms of socio-economic challenges that exist in the 
first post-conflict years: limited economic capacities cannot provide employment 
opportunities for its citizens, including ex-combatants. In that context, one way to deal with 
ex-combatants is by ensuring their societal prestige and finding new roles that would give 
them a similar amount of status (Nilsson 2005). This was the case in Kosovo, where UNMIK 
and KFOR acquiescenced the preferential treatment and quota for the KLA combatants in 
both KPC and KPS. Since these two bodies could not absorb the KLA combatants entirely, 
donors provided education and training programs as a way of keeping them away from 
activities that might hinder the peace process in the first post-conflict years. These are seen as 
important instruments to secure peace until more stable environments are created and the 
revived economic activities could provide longer-term job perspectives for former 
combatants. 
Another important aspect that facilitated the DDR process in Kosovo is that former 
combatants seemed to have less problematic characteristics than those in different African 
countries. The IOM survey conducted with the KLA fighters in 2000, shows that the majority 
of the caseload have a settled family life, have finished high school, and have fought for only 
one year; child soldiers is also not an issue in the case of Kosovo since the majority of 
combatants were between the age of 20 and 40 years (Özerdem and Barakat, 2005; Pozhidaev 
and Andzhelich, 2005). 
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4.4.2. Aid , Reconstruction and  Service Provision 
4.4.2.1. Housing Sector  
 
Housing sector in Kosovo suffered considerable damages during the conflict. Based on the 
IMG preliminary assessment that was done in July 1999, the number of total damaged houses 
in the 29 municipalities of Kosovo was 119, 518. Out of this stock, 66 percent fell into the 3rd 
and 4th category, that is, houses that were destroyed for more than 40 percent (Appendix H). 
The damage has been mainly caused by the fire, but also by gunfire and artillery. Landmines 
caused difficulties to start with the reconstruction process; therefore, in absolute terms, donors 
gave more money for the housing sector in 2000, one year after the conflict ended.  
Table 16. Aid inflows to Housing Sector 1999-2008 
 
Subsector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
House 
reconstr. 
26894.5 
 
155530.6 
 
90831.6 
 
17159.0 
 
11512.5 
 
3079.5 
 
3154.80 
 
- - - 96.71 
 
Social 
housing 
- - - - 1184.44 
 
2000 
 
3600 3650 
 
34.3 
 
- 3.28 
 
Total 26894.5 
 
155530.6 
 
90831.6 
 
17159.0 
 
12697.0 
 
5079.5 
 
6754.80 
 
3650 
 
34.3 
 
- 100.00 
 
No of 
reconstr. 
and rehab. 
Houses 
11713 
 
19264 12484 2039 659 60 
 
-- - - - - 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
EAR and numerous donors have engaged in supporting the immediate reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed houses. During 1999-2008, the housing sector 
received about 320 million euro, which makes up 13 percent of the cumulative portfolio of 
foreign assistance.  In 1999, donors spent around 27 million euro for the reconstruction of 
roofs of the damaged and destroyed houses by targeting badly hit parts of Central and 
Western Kosovo (Drenas, Skënderaj, Deçan, Gjakovë, Malishevë, and Pejë).  From the 
project descriptions in RIMS database, it can be calculated that by the end of 2002 donors 
assisted roof reconstruction of around 12,000 houses and rehabilitation of other 30,000 
 104  
 
damaged houses
31
. KDSP Secretariat (2006) however, provides a figure of 60,000 houses that 
were rebuilt by the donor community; this implies that not all the houses were tallied in the 
RIMS dataset.  
The pattern of annual disbursement of aid flows for the housing sector follows that of 
emergency needs for reconstruction: it increases rapidly in the first two-three years and then 
starts to drop off. Most of the donor reconstruction schemes, notably that of EAR ceased by 
the end of 2002. From 2003, social housing gains more importance but with negligible 
amounts. These schemes targeted vulnerable persons living in Temporary Community 
Shelters. In 2003, the SDC project aimed at providing durable solutions for this group (in 
Istog and Deçan, and later in Mitrovica) by providing necessary technical and social 
infrastructure to improve their general living conditions.
32
 
Donor community played a significant role in rehabilitation of the housing stock. 
Within three years, it financed half of the damaged houses and the other half was rehabilitated 
or rebuilt by the private efforts of the Kosovars (UNDP, 2007a).  This can be seen as a 
successful way of responding and complementing activities between donor community and 
local people. Another joint effort between the Government, participating municipalities, and 
the donor community is creation of adequate housing conditions for vulnerable households, in 
particular those living in Temporary Collective Centers. As a result of these efforts, Ministry 
of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP) reports that 160 housing facilities have been 
built/provided to most vulnerable groups (female headed households and non-Serb minorities) 
during 2003-2007 (UNDP, 2007a).  
                                               
31 I have counted the number of the reconstructed and renovated houses from the RIMS dataset. To do so, I have 
used the project description section in the housing sector to add up the total number of houses reconstructed and 
renovated in different years by different donors and municipalities, for each given project (e.g., ‗roof 
reconstruction for 9 houses‘ or ‗rehabilitation of 3 houses‘ etc.)  
32http://www.swisscooperation.admin.ch/kosovo/en/Home/Domains_of_Cooperation/Completed_projects_under
_the_Social_Area_domain/Durable_Solutions_in_Istog_and_Mitrovica_Municipalities (accessed on August 6, 
2010).   
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4.4.2.2. Transport and Infrastructure 
 
The highest amount of aid to this sector was given in first two post-conflict years (7-8 percent 
of the total aid disbursed). In the following years it decreased drastically in both absolute 
terms and in relation to other sectors.  Donor dependency of this sector decreased as certain 
level of improvements were achieved (Appendix B).   
Half of aid inflows to Transport and Infrastructure went for the rehabilitation of roads 
and bridges. The IMG reported that the roads in Kosovo did not suffer much from the war but 
they have been degraded due to the lack of investments and maintenance during the 1990s.  
Hence, this subsector was needy of donor support for the supply of equipment and financial 
assistance to public companies due to a decade of investment backlog in physical 
infrastructure. Further, the report identified 13 destroyed bridges that needed repair.  
The RIMS directory of the projects/programs reports that in 1999, donor funding was 
disbursed by the IOM for the rehabilitation of the roads all over Kosovo and the Lepenc 
bridge reconstruction. In the following years, the roads sector remained the largest absorber of 
the donor assistance. Until 2003, donor community supported rehabilitation of 435 km of 
roads and 5 bridges (MFE, 2004). The assistance to the Planning, Finance, and Management 
subsector was provided mainly for institution building to the Directorate of Roads.    
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Table 17. Aid inflows to Transport and Infrastructure 1999-2008 
 
Subsector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
Planning. 
Manag. and 
Finance 
  637.5 
 
1375 
 
597.49 
 
902.31 
 
1731.25 
 
1021.27 
 
877.38 
 
- 5.86  
 
Airport - 
Landside 
and airside 
 10549.1 121.6 - - - - - - - 8.76  
 
Public 
Transport 
 2856 1178 - - - - 1503.55 
 
- - 4.55  
 
Railway  8462.89 7573 2607.7 1679.87 53.43 
 
- - - - 16.73  
 
Roads 174.17  
 
25834.9 
 
33504 5684.6 7961.88 
 
1000 1798.54 
 
- 504 
 
1618.37 
 
64.10  
 
Total 174.17  
 
47702.9 
 
43015 
 
9667.3 
 
10239.2
4 
 
1955.74 
 
3529.79
7 
 
2524.82 
 
1381.38 
 
1618.37 
 
100.0 
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
 
Based on IMG estimations, Pristina Airport needed and urgent rehabilitation at a cost 
of 10 million euro. Accordingly, in 2000, donors spent 10.5 million euros on rehabilitation of 
both landside and airside of the Prishtina Airport. These initial investments enabled the re-
opening of the airport to commercial traffic in January 2000 and round-the-clock operations in 
the beginning of May (Department of Reconstruction, 2001). As seen from the Table 1 in 
Appendix I, the number of passengers flying to and from Prishtina increased continually. In 
2006, Prishtina Airport was awarded with a ‗Best Airport 2006 Award‘ from Airports Council 
International, in the category of small airports; this reflects a satisfactory progress made in 
airport‘s transformation from a former military base into a modern civilian airport.33  
4.4.2.3. Health, Education and Science 
 
As of the end of 2008, health and education sectors received altogether 204.2 million euro, 
some 8.7 percent of total amount spent by the donor community (3.6 percent for health; 5.1 
percent for education); this seems to be a modest figure as compared to other sectors, like 
housing, public utilities, democratization and civil society. In absolute terms, the largest 
                                               
33 http://www.airportpristina.com/en/page/sub/id/c5/s47/ (accessed on August 23, 2010) 
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amount of donor funds spent in these two sectors is recorded in the first post-conflict year 
(2000), with the lion share channeled toward rehabilitation and reconstruction of health and 
education facilities. In the following two years, the amounts of donor funds spent decreased 
drastically and have fluctuated since.   
Within the sector of education and science, building reconstruction and rehabilitation 
received some 58 percent of donor money; other subsectors, such as vocational education and 
teacher training received smaller aid portions (around 7-8 percent of total each). Another 
objective of the donor community was modernization and the reform of the education system, 
notably that of higher education, by implementing the Bologna process and the Tempus 
program.  
Table 18. Aid Inflows to Education and Science 1999-2008 
 
 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
Planning. 
Manag. and 
Finance 
- 54.06 
 
1076.05 
 
1451.19 
 
826.09 
 
1435.73 
 
1841.97 
 
535.46 
 
1629.88 
 
- 7.38  
 
Building 
Reconst. and 
Rehab. 
 
6968.75 
 
38427.9 
 
22316.9 
 
1346.58 
 
- 242.65 
 
783.96 128.48 
 
183.77 
 
- 58.70  
 
Pre-University 
education 
119.85 560.9 1147.57 759.77 251.33 3196.39 533.52 1016.72 1307.94 55 
 
7.46  
 
Higher education - 498.13 
 
589.18 
 
1317.48 
 
228.72 
 
1272 
 
670.74 
 
2016.3 
 
665.21 
 
1792.5 
 
7.55  
 
Special needs 
education 
- 347.82 
 
769.11 
 
- 556.62 
 
360.84 
 
60 
 
- 936.15 
 
802.31 
 
3.20  
 
Teacher training - 307.02 
 
264 
 
2698.88 
 
3252.33 
 
1128.02 
 
797.55 
 
225 
 
29.45 
 
 7.26  
 
Vocational 
education 
- 418.3 
 
464.1 
 
- - 1450 
 
1434.21 
 
3287.1 
 
1350 
 
1734.7 
 
8.45  
 
Total 7088.6 
 
40614.14 
 
26626.9 
 
7573.9 
 
5115.09 
 
9085.63 
 
6121.95 
 
7209.1 
 
6102.40 
 
4384.7 
 
100.00 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
Considerable results have been achieved in terms of stabilizing the education system. 
Donor community engaged in the successful rehabilitation of school facilities all over 
Kosovo.  MFE (2004a) reports that during 1999-2003, 310 school buildings were rehabilitated 
and 151 schools were constructed; the student center in Prishtina was also rehabilitated with 
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the assistance of donor funding. The return of students to their schools in 1999/2000 can be 
seen as a satisfactory result. All the more, K-Albanian students that have been expelled by 
force in the previous decade could access formal education facilities and a reach a satisfactory 
attendance level in only few months.  The number of students enrolled in primary and 
secondary schools (pre-University level) have recorded and increasing trend, as shown by the 
figure below.    
Figure 10. Number of students (pre-University) 2004/05-2006/07 
 
 
Source: MEST, 2008 
 
Positive developments have been noted in education system in post-conflict Kosovo, 
although there is need for further improvements.  Donor funding has decreased drastically 
over the years—from about 40 million euro in 2000 to 4 million euro in 2008. Limited 
capacities of the Kosovo budget and this drastic fall in donor funding pose a challenge to the 
quality improvements in the education. One challenge is to increase enrollment rates in pre-
school and tertiary education (UNDP, 2007a). 
Within the health sector, the largest portions of donor funds were absorbed by 
hospitals and by the subsector of planning, management and finance. Prishtina University 
Hospital and Peja Hospital were the largest beneficiaries of the donor rehabilitation funds in 
2000-2001, with DFID and the Italian Government as the largest contributors. In four years 
after the conflict, donors financed reconstruction of 237 health centers and hospitals; in 
421635
422819
439445
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
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addition, another 41 health centers were constructed (MFE, 2004a). For the subsector of 
planning, management and finance, EAR provided assistance to capacity building efforts and 
activating of the health care system.  
Table 19. Aid inflows to Health Sector 1999-2008 
 
Subesctors 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
Planning. 
Management 
and Finance  
54.06 
 
2311.8 
 
12765 
 
433.89 
 
3532.47 
 
3922.59 
 
2284.7 
 
1158.81 
 
630.28 
 
- 32.14  
 
Hospitals  
 
545.39 
 
7214.45 
 
7268 
 
80 
 
230.64 
 
1228.01 
 
2271.7 
 
3425.13 
 
1639.219 
 
715.468 
 
29.20  
 
Primary 
health care 
 
736.94 
 
4139.05 
 
3563 
 
813.3 
 
52.71 
 
- - - - - 11.04  
 
Mental 
Health 
 484.5 
 
751.9 
 
1325.12 
 
225.03 
 
- 504.93 
 
0.177 
 
- 178.73 
 
4.12  
 
Public 
Health 
 6247.52 
 
3869 
 
770.2 
 
2841.31 
 
1540.29 
 
481.9 
 
1168.52 
 
1455.90 
 
1439.758 
 
23.50  
 
Total 1336.39 
 
20397.32 
 
28217 
 
3422.51 
 
6882.16 
 
6690.89 
 
5543.3 
 
5752.64 
 
3725.406 
 
2333.95 
 
100.00  
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
These efforts by the donor community helped restore basic service provision in health 
centers and hospitals throughout Kosovo. Yet Kosovo ranks low in terms of health indicators. 
Available data show that perinatal and maternal mortality rates have fallen since 2000, but 
remain among the highest in Europe (MoH, 2008). 
 Figure 11: Perinatal Mortality Rate 2000-2006 
 
 
Source: (MoH, 2008) 
 
29.1
28.7 27.1 27.6 25.7
22.1
23.1
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Data on infant mortality is contradictory and figures differ substantially from different 
sources, namely SOK and DHS.
34
 One of the main challenges for the health sector is to 
develop capacities for gathering data and tracking health statistics (UNDP, 2007a). Another 
weakness in the health sector in Kosovo is mismanagement of health resources and low 
compensation of health workers, which has led to deterioration in motivation of health 
workers and increase in incidence of informal payments.  These weaknesses give rise to poor 
quality and quantity performance. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the health sector 
remains one of the most under-financed sectors of the economy; the level of government 
spending on health is the lowest in the region. 
 
4.4.2.4. Public  Utilities 
 
The sector of public utilities absorbed one-fourth of total aid inflows during 1999-2008 
(Figure 8 and Appendix G).  This sector consists of three main sub-sectors: energy, water, and 
solid waste disposal. As shown in Table 20, the energy sub-sector received the largest amount 
(462 million euro) of donor assistance, 83 percent of total. In this way, the pattern of aid 
disbursed to energy shapes that of the whole sector; 2007 is an exception with a shift of 
emphasis on the water sector rehabilitation.  
Bilateral and multilateral donors, notably EAR, allocated large funds for a variety of 
projects related to the rehabilitation of the energy sector such as, the rehabilitation of the 
power plants (Kosovo A and B), reparation of the electricity lines, electricity import during 
winter, and technical assistance for the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) management. In 
the years following the reconstruction period (after 2003), the largest share of funds spent on 
energy sector went for technical assistance through provision of consultancy and training to 
KEK and District Heating management, as well as for environmental actions in coal mines. In 
                                               
34
 According to Statistical Office in Kosovo, the Infant Mortality rate in 2004 was 11.8‰, while the Demographic 
Health Study (DHS) 2003 reports an alarming Infant Mortality rate of 35 and 49‰, and Under 5 mortality rate at 69‰. 
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2008, the energy sector received assistance for the South-West mine in Sibovc as part of the 
CARDS-2005 program.   
The results achieved in the energy sub-sector present one of the weakest points when it 
comes to assessing aid effectiveness in post-conflict Kosovo. Developments in the energy 
sector in post-conflict Kosovo can be used as an exemplary argument for aid skeptics: huge 
aid inflows (around half a billion euro in 9 years) have been followed by mixed and 
controversial outcomes, as well as corruptive practices by local and international officers 
alike. One of the most discussed corruption incidents during the post-conflict recovery 
involved a former UN official, the then President of the KEK Board. He was accused and 
sentenced in Germany for stealing around four million euro from the KEK budget (Kosovar 
Stability Initiative, 2007).  
There have certainly been improvements in the energy sector and with the support of 
donor funding, the power plants and lignite mines have been reactivated for energy 
production. Table 1 in Appendix I shows that there has been a continual increase in electricity 
production and consumption in the post-conflict years suggesting for improvements made in 
this sector. However, high energy imports during the winter indicate the existing gap between 
production and consumption of electricity. This is in contrary to what Kosovo used to be in 
the pre-conflict period—a regional electricity exporter. Lack of sufficient energy produced by 
the Kosovo power plants and the need for huge imports during the winter has been followed 
by frequent blackouts in power supply during the post-conflict years. Moreover, due to low 
electricity billing and collection, the public company of KEK continually operates with losses 
and has been highly subsidized by foreign funding and/or Government budget. 
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Table 20. Aid Inflows to Public Utilities 1999-2008 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
Energy 
Sector 
Rehab. 
16006.2 111245.77 153826 52835.1 54039.9
6 
47482.6 10391.7 2840.94 1343.61 12165.7
3 
  83.35  
 
Solid Waste 
Disposal 
Rehab. 
164.69 9180.23 9240.03 300 - 450 418 - - -   3.56  
 
Water 
Sector 
Rehab. 
683.36 7267.58 30144.5 6058.55 5967.39 3916.27 6062.24 1618 6402.69 4479.99   13.09  
 
Total 16854.2
5 
127693.58 193210 59193.65 60007.3
5 
51848.8
7 
16871.9 4458.94 7746.31 16645.7
2 
  100.00 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
Consequently, lack of energy remains one of the daunting issues in the Kosovar 
society and donor community seems to recognize the contradictory results achieved in this 
area. At the Donors‘ Conference in 2008 (post-independence), when donors made pledges for 
Kosovo‘s socio-economic development they urged Kosovo Government  ‗to reform its energy 
sector by taking convincing measures to increase electricity billing and collection, reduce 
non-technical losses, and to improve the overall financial management and governance to the 
electricity utility.‘35  
The priorities in the water sub-sector were related to increase of system efficiency, 
reliability and water quality (Department of Reconstruction, 2001). Donor projects in this sub-
sector aimed at the rehabilitation of the water supply and sewage, water pipelines, and 
pumping stations; provision of vehicle and network spares to all water companies in Kosovo. 
This resulted in continual increases in citizens‘ access to safe drinking water (WB, 2007).  
Other big projects aimed at the improvement of management and the efficiency of the water 
companies through training and technical assistance. A small amount of funds was spent for 
                                               
35 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/913&type=HTML (accessed on June 20, 
2010).  
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the supply of collection equipments and improvement of the management of the solid wastes 
companies.  
 
4.4.2.5. Trade, Industry, and Agriculture 
 
Trade and Industry sector received around 190 million euros or 8 percent of total aid allocated 
to post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo. Some 75 percent of the amount spent went for 
Private Sector Development. First two years (1999 and 2000) involved reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of private sector activities and the Trepça Mining Complex. Donors also 
supported SMEs by provision of credit lines through the KfW. In later years (2006 and 2007) 
aid funds were spent on economic development subsector: for the Cluster Business Support, 
the Kosovo Development Plan (DFID), and Projects on Economic Development Initiatives 
(USAID). The pillars of Kosovo Privatization Agency and Investment and Employment 
Promotion are main absorbers of aid flows spent for the private sector development in 2008.   
Figure 12. Aid Inflows to Trade and Industry 1999-2008 
 
 
               Source: RIMS datasets, 2010; Aid flows are in million euro 
 
 
Agriculture sector suffered huge damages due to the conflict in terms of its capital, 
machinery, and livestock; This sector received 4 percent of total aid, which has oscillated and 
does not show a clear pattern of donor spending. Following the end of conflict, donors made 
emergency interventions to restore livestock inventory, repair and provide new machinery, 
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and rebuild capacity of the agricultural institutions. The agricultural sector showed 
improvements but could not rebound quickly to the pre-war levels (WB, 2004). In later years, 
and notably, in 2007 donors increased their funds to the agriculture sector. This amount was 
boosted by the introduction of the Horticultural Project funded by Switzerland to help 
producers in the horticultural agribusiness sector improve their competitiveness and enable 
them to produce and sell high quality production that could considerably substitute for  the 
imported products.   
            Figure 13. Aid Inflows to Agriculture 1999-2008 
 
 
 
               Source: RIMS datasets, 2010; Aid flows are in million euro 
Donor activities in the sectors of Trade, Industry, and Agriculture have produced 
results, in particular, within small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The number of registered 
SMEs in Kosovo records and increasing trend: from 29,564 in 2000 to 90,929 in 2008, mainly 
focused on trade and services (MTI, 2009). Kosovar businesses still face barriers related to 
the legislation, lack of energy, and unfair competition. Kosovo farmers have been harmed by 
unfair competition from the imported agricultural products that receive export subsidies. 
These subsidies that are given in many originating countries enable better quality products 
with lower prices to enter the market in Kosovo.
36
  
                                               
36 For example, in the case of milk, subsidies of 8.5; 6.6 and 6.0 cents per liter were provided in 
Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia respectively (WB, 2004).  
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Problems related to export promotion in Kosovo are also of political nature.  In 2008, 
Kosovar exports were blocked from two CEFTA countries, Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina due to lack of recognition of Kosovo Customs Authority. This trade embargo 
and the need to use other (indirect) transit routes to penetrate into other European markets has 
had overall negative effects on Kosovo trade in 2008 and 2009 (WB, 2010).  
 
4.4.3. Institution Building and Democratization 
4.4.3.1. Central  Fiscal Authority 
 
After the conflict, Kosovo lacked supporting institutions and policies for economic recovery. 
In the first post-conflict years, functioning of the public sector was mainly donor-financed. 
The development of fiscal institutions was one of the main priorities of the UNMIK 
administration. This entailed creation of the legislative framework for the introduction of new 
taxes, as well as establishment of the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA). This process involved 
extensive engagement of international community, notably IMF, the WB and USAID, who 
continually provided economic policy assistance to this institution.  
Table 21. Aid inflows to CFA/MFE 1999-2008 
 
Subsector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
Revenue 
Generation 
 
3044.7 1813.56 - 1618.85 - - - - - - 
     
10.29  
 
Planning. 
Management 
and Finance 
- 5612 - 11171.13 17104.73 6214.64 9859.64 6485.69 - - 
 
89.71 
 
Total 
3044.7 7425.56 - 12789.98 17104.73 6214.64 9859.63 6485.69 - - 
 
100.00 
 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
In addition to this, donors allocated money for the revenue generation through supply 
of equipments and technical assistance to the Customs Service; SIDA funded the supply of 
equipments for free balance software. The CFA (administered by UNMIK), transferred its 
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competencies to the MFE in 2002, whereby USAID continued to provide economic policy 
assistance to the MFE departments.   
The success achieved with tax system was impressive and after only three years, 
Kosovo was able to ensure internal financing of all budget expenditures. Introduction of the 
new taxes during 2001 and 2002, economic growth, and the continual strengthening of the tax 
administration contributed to substantial increases in tax revenues (MFE, 2004). However, the 
following years recorded a rather stable trend with modest revenue increase (Table 12).  
On the expenditure side, Kosovo recorded budget surpluses for several years—an 
irrational situation for an economy with huge demands for public services. This situation 
came as an outcome of annual balanced budget philosophy stipulating that the level of 
expenditures should not exceed the level of collected taxes. In addition, division of the budget 
into the PISG and UNMIK entities (which has often complicated the implementation of the 
budget expenditures) and the lack of administrative capacities had an impact in the 
accumulation of budget surpluses.
37
  
Donor efforts in building fiscal institutions in Kosovo could be assessed as successful, 
given that the whole institution building process started from the scratch. In only four years, 
the Kosovo Consolidated Budget was totally covered by domestic sources. These 
achievements prompted the IMF staff (2004) to assess the performance of the tax system 
as,‘…the single most positive features in all economic developments since the end of the 
conflict.‘  These positive achievements have somewhat been tarnished by an excessive 
amount of money being spent on technical cooperation, notably on foreign consultants who 
end up performing duties on behalf of local officers. For example, in 2005 and 2006, technical 
cooperation constitutes the greatest source of aid to Kosovo amounting to 80 and 67 percent 
                                               
37 Kosovo budget ran with two surpluses: an accumulated budget surplus, carried forward from the previous year 
and the surplus of the respective year as a result of higher revenues over expenditures (e.g. 2002 surplus consists 
of the combined surplus of 2000 and 2001 which is carried forward and 2002 surplus coming as a result of 
revenue minus expenditure). 
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of total aid. After the institutions have been successfully built and consolidated, the most 
effective way for donors to spend aid in Kosovar institutions would be the transfer of 
knowledge and expertise from foreign experts to local people, instead of performing duties 
that go beyond the scope of their advisory jobs.  
4.4.3.2.  Democratization and Civil Society 
 
The total amount of donor funds spent in this sector during 1999-2008, was 137.8 million 
euro; this makes up around 6 percent of the total aid spent. The trend of annual inflows 
provided for this sector shows a continual increase in the first three years followed by 
fluctuations in the next years until 2008. More than half of aid spent in this sector went for 
democratization thereby making it to be the largest absorber. 
Table 22. Aid inflows to Democratization and Civil Society 1999-2008 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
Democratization 
General 172.12 3946.79 8875.23 14767.22 6932.78 16052.21 10861.9 8876.02 3375.27 3490.65 56.0 
Equal 
Opportunity 
Initiative 0.41 215.42 236.13 3689.5 273.08 - 515.48 315.49 926.65 831.52 5.1 
Media Affairs 
(Non-PRIP) 744.99 5246.41 10090.13 4300 2025.62 736.08 1393.37  1245.49 - 18.7 
Media Support 
initiative 57.12 882.91 1037.03 1213.52 4726.38 646.05 417.99 1472.69 643.49 - 8.0 
NGO and Civil 
Society Initiative - - 1052.99 4510.3 1383.85 910 3671.32 2086.77 2049.82 984.57 12.1 
Total 974.64 10291.53 21291.51 28480.54 15341.71 18344.34 16860.06 12750.98 8240.73 5306.75 100 
Source: RIMS database, 2010; Note: spent amounts are in million euro. 
 
Kosovo has received assistance in building democratic institutions as the competencies 
began to be transferred from international administration to local institutions. The 
international community largely supported political party development and election 
organization and supervision. From 1999 until the declaration of independence in 2008, the 
OSCE (pillar II of UNMIK) has organized and controlled the entire electoral process in 
Kosovo. One of the largest NDI programs in Kosovo, funded by the USAID (under the 
Democratization rubric), has focused on political parties development with the objective of  
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reaching all political parties and challenging them to enhance their voter outreach, define their 
policies, and strengthen their internal structures. 
38
  
Building of Kosovo‘s institutions of self-government followed a ‗decentralized 
approach‘: first local elections were held in 2000 followed by the establishment of municipal 
assemblies; and then Kosovo-wide elections were held in 2001, out of which central bodies 
like the Kosovo Assembly and the Kosovo Government (Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government PISG) were established. The first municipal elections and general elections were 
successfully completed and were praised for having met democratic standards for free and fair 
elections. Voter participation was also very high during these elections, with turnouts above 
90 percent. This success was considered to have drawn ‗significantly from the long 
democratic underground tradition of the Kosovo-Albanian community during the 1990s‘ 
(Narten, 2009: 3). The turnout figures declined continually in the following years, for 
example, voters‘ turnout in 2009 elections was around 45 percent whereas due to heavy 
pressure from Belgrade, the postwar elections have been boycotted by the majority of Serb 
voters.  
In sum, development of political parties, organization of successful elections followed 
by establishment of the then-PISGs, can be seen as successful achievements of the 
international community in rebuilding of an emergent post-war democracy. It is difficult to 
assess the pace and the extent to which these institutions would have been built and advanced 
into a functioning democracy in the absence of external funding and technical assistance. 
However, Narten (2009) argues that without external assistance, the Kosovar Institutions 
would have likely been able to continue their democratic culture of free elections but ‗most 
probably they would have not been able to include the current level of legal provisions for 
minority protection, municipal decentralization, and self-governance into its constitutional 
                                               
38 See http://www.ndi.org/kosovo  (accessed on August 25, 2010) 
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framework and its post-UDI constitution.‘39  Hence, the donor community has been the key 
factor in the democratization process in Kosovo. 
Various donor projects that aimed media development absorbed altogether one quarter 
of total subsector aid (26 percent); whereas those on civil society received some 12 percent. 
Civil society in Kosovo emerged in the end of 1980s and throughout the 1990s as a response 
to events related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and revocation of the Kosovo autonomy by 
the Serbian regime. The pre-conflict civil society in Kosovo gradually took the shape of a 
non-violent civil resistance and attained a good public image.
40
  
The post-conflict period is characterized by the so called ‗NGO mushrooming‘ that 
came as a response to the availability of donor funding. The civil society analysts in Kosovo 
claim that in some cases, foreign donors ‗subtly or unsubtly‘ defined by themselves 
parameters of the role played by the civil society (UNDP, 2008a). Although there are some 
well-established and active NGOs, a large number of post-conflict NGOs remain inactive and 
ineffective due to the lack of funding and profile. As compared to the 1990s, the market-
oriented behavior of some NGOs after the war has clouded their image and diminished their 
overall effectiveness.     
4.4.4. Assessment of Aid’s role on post-conflict reconstruction   
 
During the first post-conflict decade, donor community spent 2.34 billion euro for 
reconstruction and development of Kosovo. As discussed in section 3.1., donors‘ rapid 
response to emergent needs of the returnees, ensuring of overall public security through 
successful disarmament and demobilization of KLA combatants, as well as cleaning of the 
territory from landmines and UXOs in only three years can be clearly seen as a success story.   
                                               
39 Post-independence Constitutions of Kosovo is based on the 2007 Ahtisaari Proposal and the counsel of U.S. 
and EU experts. Note: Author refers to UDI as ‗Unilaterally Declared Independence‘.  
40
 For example, Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms—Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave 
dhe Lirive të Njeriut (KMDLNJ);  Mother Teresa Association; Motrat Qiriazi (see, UNDP 2008a on a history of 
civil society development in Kosovo). 
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This assessment can be extended to nearly all fields of physical reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure that was hardly hit and damaged during the war. Specifically, 
half of the destroyed houses were rehabilitated by the donor support; basic education and 
health services were reactivated immediately after the war. Rehabilitation of roads, bridges, 
and the Prishtina Airport enabled reactivation and improvement of the transport of goods and 
passengers in and out Kosovo. Institutional infrastructure, based on free elections was built 
from the scratch with support and supervision of international community. The tax system 
was built from zero and in only three years after the conflict ended, Kosovo was able to 
ensure internal financing of all budget expenditures. Donor community has been the key 
factor in this process and their involvement can be rated as a successful achievement.   
Shortcomings of donor assistance in Kosovo are evident in several aspects. Frequent 
collapses of power plants and huge import needs suggest that the situation in the energy sector 
is not satisfactory, in spite of huge inflow of funds from both donors and the Kosovo budget. 
This implies that aid has not been effective in this sector and the results achieved in the first 
post-conflict decade leave much to be desired.  
After the reconstruction phase, donors showed a tendency to over-fund some sectors 
that either suffered from mismanagement, like energy sector, or involved heavy technical 
assistance like democratization, economic policies, media, and civil society. As UNMIK was 
in charge of negotiating the modalities for technical cooperation, while the PISGs were in 
their nascent shape, the most technical cooperation was based on donor-related proposals 
(supply driven) rather than on requests from the beneficiaries (Donor Coordination Center, 
2007). This leads to excessive involvement of foreign experts in Kosovo institutions by 
accomplishing tasks that should fall on local responsibilities. By doing so, donors undermine 
efforts to build local capacities through technical assistance. Aid would be most effective if, 
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after a decade, international experts in Kosovo would be transferring their expertise to local 
people.  
Further, education and health, as the main sources for human capital accumulation are 
among the under-funded sectors with only 5 and 3.5 percent, respectively. In a comparative 
context, Kosovo has the lowest human development indicators, notably in health sector. Yet, 
the developments in these two sectors do not seem to have drawn any particular attention 
from donors (and the Kosovo Government) and the level of investments in these two sectors 
remains low. This situation could backfire in the long run as Kosovo has the youngest society 
in Europe with very high unemployment rates. A precondition to integrate younger generation 
into the labor market is to upgrade the educational and health system in the following years. 
41
 
This is a key challenge for both Kosovo Government and international community.  
In sum, foreign assistance spent on ensuring of physical securities and rebuilding of 
physical and institutional infrastructure was effective. Donor objectives, however, did not 
address properly major issues surrounding Kosovar environment, such as poverty reduction 
and job creation, before aid was drastically reduced after 2002.  In what follows, the impact of 
aid on economic growth and poverty alleviation is analyzed.  
 
4.5.  Aid, Growth, and Poverty Reduction 
 
Before moving on with the analysis on growth and aid in Kosovo, it should be noted that GDP 
figures on post-war Kosovo vary from different sources. They have changed even within the 
same source (eg., the IMF calculations); it is thus difficult to find a single study that reports 
GDP time series for the first post-conflict decade in Kosovo (1999-2008). Instead, IMF and 
Kosovo authorities estimates, provide segmented periods on basic indicators for periods 2000-
2004; 2004-onwards; and 2005 onwards. As there was a weak statistical base, the data were 
                                               
41 UNDP (2004) reports that 63 percent of all Kosovars are aged between 15 and 24 years.  
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constructed based on assumptions and have been revised throughout.  Constant revisions on 
GDP figures render it difficult to combine all these year-calculations into one table. For 
example, in March 2008, IMF changed its GDP figures based on the revision of private 
household consumption for the whole period covering 2004-2006, by about 750 million euro 
each year, and this led to a considerable jump of the GDP in 2004 and 2005, as shown in 
Table 12.  
4.5.1. Aid and Growth 
 
The direct impact of aid on post-conflict recovery can be analyzed through the role that 
international community played in promoting growth and employment opportunities. Lack of 
time series data before the conflict and a short time span of the data after the conflict (2000-
2009) make it impossible to use econometric techniques to calculate aid impact on 
macroeconomic indicators. This analysis is then based on the work done by the IMF 
authorities (Moalla-Fetini et al., 2004), through which they calculate the direct impact of 
foreign assistance to GDP. In their analytical framework, they divide the Kosovo economy 
among three sectors: the donor sector, the government, and households and firms. Donor 
sector is then decomposed into six components: 
Expatriates‘ wages expW ; wages of local employees leW ; and spending on goods and services 
done by UNMIK UNMIKG ; PIP component PIPI ; and KFOR KFORG .  
The amount of aid that was analyzed in the previous section (the sectoral analysis) 
presents direct donor spending on reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, technical 
assistance and training, and capital participation in local banks and is calculated under the 
umbrella of the so called Public Investment Program (PIP) including Donor Designated 
Grants (DDGs).  As per calculations done by Moalla-Fetini et al. (2004), donor sector budget 
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consists of PIP including DDGs as well as UNMIK and KFOR spending; thus, the figure on 
aid to Kosovo in 2001 exceeds 1 billion euro, reaching at 70 percent of GDP.  
 Within this framework, the role of foreign aid in Kosovo is seen as a ‗virtual export 
market‘ for Kosovar goods and services through three channels: wages of local employees 
that have been hired by the donor community, purchase of domestic goods and services for 
expatriates and KFOR soldiers, as well as donor-financed projects (Moalla-Fetini et al., 2004: 
14).  
The direct sectoral effects of donor financed projects in Kosovo (PIP component) were 
mainly felt in the housing and services sector, involving labor intensive activities. Huge aid 
inflows given for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the houses and other infrastructure 
induced a post-conflict construction boom; this enhanced the demand for construction 
companies and it also provided a source of employment for unskilled labor force.
42
   
The presence of international community, notably UNMIK, is seen as another source 
for creation of an ‗export market‘ for Kosovar goods and services. In an analysis of the 
economic impact of peacekeeping missions, Carnahan et al., (2006) find that, of the nine 
missions, the local impact was over six percent of GDP and was around ten percent in two 
cases (Timor Leste and  Liberia). Kosovo ranked fourth, and this high impact is attributable to 
the high percentage of mission budget spent locally. The peak of international engagement in 
Kosovo in terms of both aid inflows and employed officers is recorded in 2000 and 2001 
(Table 23). The employed staff by UNMIK in 2006 accounted for about 1% of official 
employment in Kosovo only. However, the employment structure suggests that younger 
people and minorities were disproportionately represented in UNMIK jobs (EPO, 2006). 
 
                                               
42 By the way of example, The Winterization program in Mitrovica (Cooperative Housing Foundation) employed 
36 local Kosovars directly in the area of construction, trained over 300 individuals through the ‗self-help 
method‘ of construction and provided opportunities for sales and services of local products (CHF, 2000).  
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Table 23. Employment by UNMIK (total) 
 
UNMIK total 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Employment of 
international staff 
3,506 6,385 6,488 6,101 5,208 4,747 3,708 
Employment of 
local staff 
 
4,111 5,242 4,777 4,436 4,056 3,838 3,263 
Total 7,617 11,627 11,265 10,537 9,264 8,585 6,971 
Source: UNMIK EOP, 2006 
 
The effect is gauged through the amount of the money that international community 
spends locally on housing and services sector—involving labor intensive activities—such as 
hotels, restaurants, retail stores, cleaning, and security. This is calculated as the local content 
of peacekeeping‘s injections into the economy in terms of the wages of local employees paid 
by UNMIK, international staff spending, and outsourced service contracts to local companies.  
Specifically, the direct contribution of foreign assistance to GDP ( GDPDCFA ) is 
obtained by subtracting import contents of the respective expenditure items and then summing 
up their domestic components: 
       CIPIPPIPGKFORKFORGUNMIKUNMIKGDP MCMIMGMGDCFA expexp   
To calculate the direct contribution of foreign assistance to GNDI ( GNDIDCFA ), the wages of 
local employees are added to the latter: 
GNDIDCFA = GDPDCFA + leW  
This exercise involves large margins of error as Moalla-Fetini et al. (2004) base their 
calculations on somewhat arbitrary assumptions: import content of spending on goods and 
services by UNMIK and PIP is assumed to be 30 percent of total, based on shares reported by 
Pillar III and IV; expatriates spend around 15 percent of their wages on local products and 
services, based on average spending estimates of 542 euro per month; and wages to local 
employees present a full injection to the local economy. Spending incurred by the donor 
sector (wage bill and spending on goods and services) is treated as public consumption, with 
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the exception of PIP component of spending on goods and services, which is considered as an 
investment spending and is added to investment total. 
Figure 14. Donor‘s direct contribution to GDP 
 
 
Source: Based on IMF calculations (2004, 2007, and 2009) 
 
Figure 14 reveals that donor community contributed directly to the Kosovo GDP by 
spending around 300 million euro in Kosovo‘s goods and services during 2000-2001 and 
boosted economic activity to the extent of 14-20 percent. By the end of the first post-conflict 
decade, this direct aid effect scaled down to the tune of 6-5 percent; yet sluggish growth of 
export sector in Kosovo remains lower than the one created by the donor sector, in both 
absolute terms and as a share of GDP (see Table 12). This suggests that despite solid growth 
rates, aid dependency remains one of the thorny issues for a sustainable economic 
performance, as in the medium term, external funding should be replaced with export earnings 
and foreign investments.  
 
4.5.2. Poverty Profile  
 
Kosovo has the highest estimated level of poverty in the region. The first report on Poverty 
Assessment in post-conflict Kosovo was based on the Living Standard Measurement Survey 
(LSMS) and presented a staggering 50 percent of population living below the poverty line, 
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with 12 percent being extremely poor (WB, 2007).  The next two WB reports used Household 
Budget Surveys (HBS) that were conducted in 2002/2003 and 2005/2006 showing that 
poverty remained persistently high. The 2005 WB Poverty Assessment Report provided an 
estimated rate of poverty at 37 percent, whereas in 2007 the poverty rate was estimated to be 
about 45 percent. While these assessments reported that poverty is high, the figures are not 
comparable as the reports used three different datasets that have used different methodologies 
during the data collection and consumption income. The HBS surveys were made non-
comparable due to changes in the length of the reporting period of consumed goods and 
consumption of own produced items. Hence, making comparisons with other reporting 
periods, involves a high level of caution.  
Table 24. Poverty Headcount by Location 
 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 38.7 43.5 34.8 45.1 
Rural 34.4 44.2 37.2 49.2 
Urban 46.6 42.1 30.3 37.2 
Source: World Bank, 2007 
As seen from the table above, the 2005/06 survey shows that about 45 percent of the 
population in Kosovo is poor as estimated by the poverty line which in 2002 prices was set to 
43 euro per adult equivalent month; out of this, about 15 percent of individuals report to have 
difficulty in meeting their basic needs—extreme poverty. Although poverty is widespread, it 
has been estimated that large fraction of the population is just around the poverty line and that 
an average increase on consumption of 10 percent is needed for these people to escape the 
poverty line (WB, 2010).  
Large families, female headed households, the unemployed, and the low skilled are at 
the highest risk of poverty. As shown in the Table 25, most of the poor are concentrated in 
rural areas. Households with more than 7 members are at a higher risk of being poor for at 
least 7 percentage points. Those households headed by women have a 4 percentage point 
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higher risk than male headed households to become poor. The poverty incidence for 
unemployed households is 20 percent higher than for those being employed. The employed 
poor belong mainly to the category of per diem workers. Higher education levels are followed 
with a lower incidence of poverty due to their increased opportunities to find jobs and better 
pays: 70 percent of the households with higher education (tertiary and vocational) are salaried 
employees as opposed to 25 percent of those with secondary education (WB, 2007).  
Non-income dimensions of poverty show better outcomes, but the results point at 
problems with quality and equity of service provision. As opposed to persisting income 
poverty, Kosovo has reached a near-universal access to education and the gaps between 
male/female and rural/urban disparities are negligible and have recorded a decreasing trend; 
in the case of tertiary enrollment rates, the disparities are higher than in the countries in the 
region.
43
 Further, figures on access to safe water, and living in safe dwellings report an 
increase between 2003 and 2005. During this period, there has also been an increased access 
to safe water in rural areas for all quintiles (Appendix I).  
4.5.3. Aid and Poverty Reduction  
 
The evidence about the widespread, albeit shallow, income poverty is disappointing.  Income 
poverty in Kosovo is related to the lack of sustainable and inclusive growth as well as 
generation of employment opportunities. The economy has made improvements during the 
first post-conflict decade but has failed to provide sustainable growth and employment 
opportunities; this implies that there was lack of structural changes in the domestic economy, 
notably in the field of trade, industry, and agriculture production.  
As argued earlier, poverty and unemployment in Kosovo are not war-triggered 
phenomenon and are rooted back to Yugoslav times. Legacies of the socialist system and the 
                                               
43 The gap in secondary enrollment rates between rural and urban areas was about 20 percentage points in 
2003/04 and fell down to 10 in 2005/06. Similarly, for tertiary education this gap was about 15 percent in 
2003/04 and fell down to 10 in 2005/06 (WB, 2007).  
 128  
 
decade of neglect, as well as the unresolved status complicated the issue of property rights in 
larger companies that were developed during the socialism.
44
 Augusted Knudsen (2010) 
points at uncertainties related to the legal framework for privatization in Kosovo, that was 
designed and implemented by UNMIK during 2002-2008, and argues that the framework 
leaves it unclear whether socially owned immovable property becomes private after 
privatization. These uncertainties became a major hindrance to reactivation of investments (in 
particular attraction of serious investors) and employment opportunities in the then leading 
exporting activities such as mining and metallurgy.   
Given all these uncertainties and the huge needs of the post-conflict Kosovo, the donor 
community was directed toward reconstruction of the housing stock, rehabilitation of 
infrastructure, promotion of private investments within  small and medium enterprises, as well 
the reactivation of agriculture and agro-business activities. This is illustrated by the sectoral 
distribution of aid inflows as shown in Figure 8.  Reconstruction spending, that was mainly 
donor financed, boosted growth but the challenges of aid dependency and heavy reliance on 
remittances remained. This situation is suggestive of very weak underlying fundamentals: low 
domestic savings and wide current account deficits (Moalla-Fetini et al., 2004). Hence, high 
rates of income poverty reflect the failure of the economic recovery to offer sustainable 
employment opportunities.  Further, Kosovar businesses face barriers that are related to the 
legislation and lack of electricity supply (which increases their cost of production), as well as 
trade embargos from the neighboring countries. Kosovo farmers are also considered to have 
been harmed by unfair competition from the imported agricultural products that receive 
export subsidies. 
                                               
44 An well-known example is the Trepça mining and metallurgical complex, that for the Mitrovica region was 
‗source of pride, income, employment, and ethnic conflict‘ for many years (del Castillo, 2008: 152). Trepça‘s 
past property rights could not be resolved and future uncertainties about property rights have resulted in the lack 
of investors‘ interest.  
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While income poverty remains high, non-income dimensions of poverty, like 
education, health, and access to water have shown continual improvements in terms of 
coverage and respondent‘s satisfaction with these services. From the sectoral analysis it can 
be inferred that improvements made in these sectors would have not been possible without 
large aid inflows. As seen from the Table 1 in Appendix I, within four years (1999-2003), 
donor sector supported rehabilitation of 310 schools and the construction of 151 new ones. 
School rehabilitation projects yield several benefits for the community and can reduce non-
income poverty through effects on education and health. For example, school rehabilitation 
and reconstruction have direct positive effects on school enrolment and attendance rates of the 
pupils. Better school condition (heating system, new windows etc.) also improve children‘s 
health by reducing the incidence of respiratory diseases during the cold winters (Lokshin and 
Yemtsov, 2004). The outcomes can be illustrated by the continual increase in school 
enrolment as presented in the WB Poverty Assessment Report (2007). This suggests that 
donor assistance in reviving education services has been successful and this has had positive 
impacts on enrolment rates that are near-universal at the primary and secondary levels. At the 
same time, perinatal mortality rates have recorded a decreasing trend during 2000-2006, 
although situation with the health services is less satisfactory due to the reasons of under-
funding and mismanagement in this sector.   
In terms of equity, in principle, all Kosovars are aimed to have access to education and 
health care services. In practice, general access to health care services is hindered by the cost 
of service which is mainly related to informal payments to the medical staff; this is seen as a 
consequence of low salaries received by them. Furthermore, due to continuing ethnic tensions 
between the majority K-Albanians and K-Serbs, there is a segregation of health and education 
services between these two ethnicities: Serbian minority runs parallel health and education 
services entirely funded by the Serbian Government along with semi parallel structures 
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receiving funds both from Serbia and Kosovo Institutions.  Non-Serb minorities like 
Bosniaks, Turks, Croats, and Gorans have integrated more fully into Kosovo‘s society and 
within services provided by the Kosovo Government. A persistent problem is related with 
access of Roma, Ashkalinj, and Egyptians (RAE) community, who are considered to have 
security, transport, and financial concerns that limit their access to health facilities (Bloom et 
al., 2006).  
Figures on access to safe water, and living in safe dwellings report an increase 
between 2003 and 2005. During this period, there has also been an increased access to safe 
water in rural areas for all quintiles (WB, 2007; See Appendix I).  This can be translated into 
better health outcomes through a reduction of water-borne diseases. The Early Warning 
Report (EWR) polls show an increase in the proportion of respondents satisfied with water 
services; education sector, although with fluctuations, tops the list of public services. These 
results are suggestive about improvements made in these two sectors. There is also an 
improvement of respondents‘ satisfaction with healthcare services, whereas electricity supply 
remains at the lowest end of the list.   
Table 25.  Respondents‘ satisfaction with Public Services in Kosovo (different opinion polls)  
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Water 43 47 50 53 
Education 66 47 78 57 
Healthcare 38 23 45 45 
KEK 14 8 22 20 
Source: UNDP 2007; 2008b; 2008c; 2010. Figures are in percentages. 
These improvements in non-income dimensions of poverty are however plagued with 
the low quality of service provision. In the education sector, there is need for continuing 
efforts in modernization of the education system and curriculum change as well as to induce 
competitive teaching to obtain better quality outcomes. There are disparities in access to 
indoor water tap between the richest and the poorest quintile, whereas inadequate electricity 
supply remains one of the most daunting issues of public service provision.  
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 4.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter examined the role played by the donor community in Kosovo during the first 
post-conflict decade (1999-2008). It particularly evaluated the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
the recovery process of post-conflict Kosovo, by looking at the time and sectoral composition 
of aid flows in terms of emergency needs, security issues, and reconstruction efforts.  In so 
doing, it added specificity to the analysis of aid allocation and effectiveness, conducted in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
Kosovo has made a remarkable progress with reconstruction efforts. The donor 
community managed to mobilize extensive financial support for the reconstruction of Kosovo 
immediately after the conflict, by spending more than one billion euros in only two years. 
This frontloaded aid came as a response to huge needs of the refugees to return to their 
homes, ensuring of overall public safety, and starting with the rebuilding of the infrastructure. 
It brought about considerable improvements in areas of road infrastructure, building of the 
local institutions, education, and health. Within a short period of time, Kosovo progressed in 
terms of rebuilding institutions and reviving public services.  
However, failure of growth oriented policies to generate sustainable employment 
opportunities and reduce high rates of poverty has been disappointing. Starting from a very 
low base and driven by donor-supported reconstruction spending, national output grew at 
impressive rates of more than 20 percent in the first two years, but decelerated to moderate 
rates of 3-4 percent annually after 2001.  
Although at high rates, poverty in Kosovo has been reported to be shallow. By 
properly addressing emergent needs in the first post-conflict years, the opportunity for 
sustainable development seemed to have been within reach. However, in some aspects of the 
international involvement—with privatization and energy policy being more prominent 
examples—the donor community was not able to design a strategy that addresses properly the 
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legacies of Kosovo‘s pre-conflict history. The donor community was effective in addressing 
short term issues, but seemed to have failed in producing favorable long-term results. Part of 
this failure can be attributed to the insufficient involvement of local stakeholders and not 
holding UNMIK officials accountable for their decisions and policies.   
Following this elaboration, a simple conclusion would be that aid has not been 
effective in reducing poverty in post-conflict Kosovo. But this ignores, as Feeny (2003) 
rightly argues, the issue of a counterfactual: what would have been the poverty rate in the 
absence of large amounts of aid in the first place. Figures of post-conflict Kosovo indicate 
that the country has recorded a decreasing trend in perinatal and maternal mortality rates, has 
achieved near-universal enrolment rates for primary education, and has an increasing number 
for people with access to safe dwelling and drinking water.  
This assessment exhibits similarities with the cross-country results from the preceding 
chapter in two aspects:  aid boosts post-conflict growth, but the timing of the effects is 
ambiguous; and aid is more effective in reducing infant mortality. Similarly, Kosovo 
experienced an aid-driven growth decade, but with limited and ambiguous effects on 
employment and income poverty; at the same time, aid in Kosovo seems to have been more 
effective in improving non-income dimensions of poverty such as education outcomes, better 
housing conditions, and access to safe drinking water—all of them having positive effects in 
improving the quality of life.  
These results highlight the existence of multiple goals in post-conflict settings, 
whereby different aid strategies might have a different impact on goals such as peace and 
security, poverty reduction, and institution building. For example, a project to train police 
personnel might have a high score on the conflict prevention dimension; it could have some 
impact on improving governance, but might have little impact on the poverty reduction 
objective. On the other hand, training health workers might have little impact on conflict 
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prevention, but a significant impact on the poverty reduction dimension (Anand, 2009). All 
this has produced different results in various sectors of the economy; and addressing these 
trade-offs is one of the crucial elements for a successful post-conflict recovery.  
Consequently, the second question that arises is related to whether the existing sectoral 
strategy and time patterns of aid have been appropriate for a successful recovery of Kosovo. 
In the Kosovo context, the frontloaded aid has been more than necessary given that everything 
had to be built from zero. With the support of the donor community, Kosovo now has a sound 
banking system, a completely new pension system scheme—capital based; the economy is 
officially euroized since 1999 and has not experienced high inflation rates since; and a new 
tax system has been drafted and implemented. In terms of sectoral composition, to produce 
long-term favorable effects, donors‘ focus on sectors like health and education should have 
lasted for the whole decade (not only for infrastructure rehabilitation projects), given the age-
structure of Kosovo. 
Sound macroeconomic structure and institutional stability that were achieved in the 
first post-conflict decade in Kosovo seemed not to provide sufficient conditions for 
investment and job creation which would in turn support reduction of poverty rates. In this 
case, lack of success could be attributed to the persisting political risks that were related to the 
unresolved political status.  Due to the presence of an open-ended and intrusive UN mission, 
lack of a clear trajectory toward political status, which had severe consequences on the issue 
of property rights and trade relations, and persisting tensions between the K-Albanians and K-
Serbs, Kosovo seems to have missed the opportunity in attracting investments and hence 
unlock its export and growth potentials. As such, its economy remains dependent on external 
financing, notably aid and remittances.  
The task of raising income and reducing poverty in Kosovo should first of all involve 
efforts that will lead to a sustainable political solution for Kosovo, improving its investment 
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climate, invest in human capital, and bring in line its production factors, which have not been 
fully utilized so far.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135  
 
5. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This dissertation examined the role of foreign aid in the recovery process of post-conflict 
countries.  It particularly focused the determinants of post-conflict aid and the links between 
post-conflict aid, growth, and non-growth outcomes. The analysis is timely in the context of 
reevaluation of aid effectiveness and increasing concerns about fragile states, whereby post-
conflict countries are especially significant as they are less likely to meet MDGs, but at the 
same time have to compete for the same pool of aid funding (with other  non-conflict 
countries).  
The contribution of this analysis to the debate about foreign aid effectiveness is 
threefold. First, to trace temporal patterns of post-conflict aid inflows and potential impact on 
recovery outcomes, I relied on both strands of aid literature: aid allocation and aid 
effectiveness. Second, under the same framework, I examined aid effectiveness through 
different recovery outcomes, such as growth, infant mortality, and good policy environments. 
Lastly, I combined both modes of analysis: cross-country analysis and a country case study.  
These relationships are examined in three interlinked chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). 
Chapter 2 identified the determinants of post-conflict aid, the nature of allocated aid, and their 
possible relationship to aid effectiveness. The preferred starting point was Kang and Meernik 
(2004), which employ an event study methodology, through which the calendar time is 
transformed into ‗event time‘; that is, the time when conflict ended. Thereby, donor responses 
to conflict affected countries can be analyzed and compared in pre-conflict as well as post-
conflict years.  
Chapter 3 examined the impact of aid on the process of post-conflict recovery. First, I 
revisited the existing evidence about aid and growth in post-conflict contexts, emphasizing the 
timeframe of aid and growth recovery in the first post-conflict decade. The growth regressions 
are then followed by the introduction of new variables, such as infant mortality rates, into the 
 136  
 
post-conflict framework. Lastly, I tested the effect of aid in improving countries‘ policies and 
institutions by using the ICRGE index. These relationships are tested in a sample of 40 
countries recovering from large civil conflicts.  
The fourth Chapter examined the role played by the donor community in Kosovo 
during the first post-conflict decade (1999-2009). It specifically evaluated the effectiveness of 
aid in the recovery process of post-conflict Kosovo, by looking at the time and sectoral 
composition of aid flows in terms of emergency needs, security issues, and reconstruction 
efforts. This chapter sharpened understanding of issues related to post-conflict aid and its 
effectiveness in a particular post-conflict environment.  
The fundamental findings of this analysis are that aid disbursed after attainment of 
peace is effective in reducing physical miseries such as infant mortality, and this may have 
favorable long-term effects on growth. In the short-term, there is some evidence that post-
conflict aid supports higher growth attainment in the second post-conflict period but the 
results are not completely robust. Aid also supports the adoption of sound policies and this 
effect is positively correlated with the presence of peacekeeping missions.  
Further, the econometric results on foreign aid allocation confirm concerns about 
donor fatigue and impact of donor interests in giving aid. Aid flows are not significantly 
different from aid to non-conflict countries beyond the fifth post-conflict year, and more of 
bilateral aid tends to flow to countries of geostrategical and political interests. The peak of aid 
inflows is recorded around the first post-conflict years (from the second to fifth years), 
although the results are not entirely robust and fixed effects estimates exhibit a marginal 
significance level.  
The cross country evidence is supported by the case study of Kosovo. During its first 
post-conflict decade (1999-2008), Kosovo absorbed 2.3 billion euro in financial and technical 
assistance, where more than 50 percent or 300 euro per capita was spent in the first two years. 
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Further,  Kosovo experienced an aid-driven growth decade, but with limited and ambiguous 
effects on employment and income poverty. At the same time, aid in Kosovo seems to have 
been more effective in improving non-income dimensions of poverty such as education, better 
housing conditions, and access to safe drinking water—all of them having positive effects in 
improving the quality of life. The Kosovo case highlights tensions between overarching goals 
in post-conflict environments, where different types of aid have had a different impact on 
goals such as peace recovery, poverty reduction, and institution building. 
The findings of this analysis unravel the heterogeneous impact of post-conflict aid on 
different recovery outcomes. Although the effects of post-conflict aid on growth seem more 
ambiguous, in post-conflict settings, aid is more effective in saving lives, reconstructing 
physical and institutional infrastructure, and adopting good policies. This supports the view 
that aid does offset negative effects of conflict on recipient societies. These findings suggest 
the importance of generous aid flows during the early years after the conflict, since better 
absorptive capacities of aid in later periods may not be attained if a country fails to build its 
institutions and reconstruct its social capital.  Consequently, the time-sequencing of aid 
should be governed by multiple goals, if it is to attain an immediate peace dividend.    
Based on the main conclusions drawn, I would summarize three important points that 
can have policy implications for post-conflict aid. First, although controversial, aid remains an 
important tool for countries recovering from conflict. As such, aid is important for the 
development of countries, in particular for those recovering from conflict. This is supported 
by the empirical evidence provided in this dissertation.  
Second, conclusions about the proper sequencing of aid flows must be drawn with 
caution since growth effects of interactions between aid and post-conflict dummies depend on 
the country-local capacities. Based on the empirical evidence, it should be seen with cautious 
as to when the supra normal growth occurs, since different countries have different 
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characteristics and thus a clear growth pattern in the post-conflict period cannot be taken for 
granted. Hence, in a post-conflict environment, for aid allocation and its sequencing, growth 
is important, yet not the ultimate goal of post-conflict aid. 
Lastly, donors need to pay a special attention to the country characteristics and the 
history of the conflict in order to be able to frame a clear path towards reconciliation and 
development. Accordingly, recovery of the conflict affected countries should be treated in a 
broader context and not just as development as usual.  This could be illustrated by the Kosovo 
case.  Although the country reached sound macroeconomic indicators—stable inflation rates 
and budget surpluses—high rates of unemployment and poverty remain persistent. Lack of 
success could be related to persisting political risks and the structural weaknesses of the 
economy rooted back to its pre-conflict history. If the thorniest issues are not properly 
addressed, the post-conflict recovery process will fail to produce positive effects on peace 
during and beyond the first post-conflict period.   
 
Aspects for future research 
The aid effectiveness literature has experienced methodological advances in dealing with the 
identification of causality from aid to outcome variables and estimations in dynamic panel 
models. Hence, my future steps entail further research on other (new) external instruments to 
be able to derive robust casual conclusions from observational data.  
The study on aid-growth nexus, framed in terms of Rubin Casual Model (Arndt et al., 
2009), provides a strong motivation to expand the existing framework by including post-
conflict variables and hence testing the robustness of the results under the counterfactual 
framework. However, a small sample of post-conflict countries and gaps in the data leave the 
researcher with a very small number of observations, after the matching between the 
treatment and control groups has taken place. This is an inherent problem in small samples, 
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whereby trade-offs between efficiency and bias prevail; this entails challenges in finding 
plausible matching algorithms among the group of propensity score matching estimators.   
 Denoting the mere presence of peacekeeping mission in conflict countries could 
not provide enough information about their effectiveness as some missions involve state 
building and transitional administrations and are expected to have a direct impact on post-
conflict economies (e.g., Timor Leste, Kosovo). My future research will address this issue 
by distinguishing between different types of UN missions (e.g., facilitative and 
transformational) as done by Sambanis (2008) and interact them with aid variables to 
examine their impact on post-conflict societies.   
 Kosovo case study demonstrates the mechanisms by which post-conflict 
reconstruction takes place in an environment which experiences heavy presence of 
international community and large-scale economic assistance. However, individual post-
conflict recoveries involve different trajectories and to be able to compare and contrast these 
recovery processes investigation of other country cases is warranted. By doing so, I will 
examine the role of aid in terms of the severity of post-conflict environments (type and 
duration of conflict, casualties etc.,); the presence and type of peacekeeping missions; and 
the level of local involvement in the recovery processes. This is a future research agenda.    
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APPENDIX A 
 
Extended dataset based on Kang and Meernik (2004); conflict/country characteristics 
 
Conflict Year/conflict 
episodes 
Intensity of 
Violence 
Type of conflict External 
military 
intervention 
by OECD 
country/ies 
GDP per capita 
(when conflict started) 
Political regime 
(when conflict 
started) 
Iran (Kurdistan) 1979; 1990; 1993; 
1996 
High Intrastate (civil)  $1747; $1292; $1422; 
$1485 
 
Philippines 1997 High Intrastate (civil)  $970 Democracy 
India vs. Pakistan 1984; 1987; 1989 High Interstate  India: $251; $272; $305 
Pakistan: $378; 422; $453 
Democracy (for 
Pakistan, beyond 
1987) 
Paraguay 1989 High Intrastate (civil)  $1404  
Myanmar (Karen)  1995 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Myanmar (Karen) 1992; 1996 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Myanmar  1990; 1994 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Myanmar (Arakan) 1991; 1994 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Myanmar (Mon) 1990; 1996 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
India 1990 High Intrastate (civil)  $317 Democracy 
Yemen, AR 1980 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Thailand 1974 High Intrastate (civil)  $600  
Argentina 1974 Low Intrastate (civil)  $9116 Democracy 
Argentina 1976 High Intrastate (civil)  $6838  
India (Nagaland) 1992; 2000 High Intrastate (civil)  $324; $452 Democracy 
 
Iraq 
1982; 1987 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Iraq 1991 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Lebanon 1975; 1982; Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Lebanon 1985; 1989 High Intrastate (civil) Yes n/a; $2441  
Malaysia 1974; 1981 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1399  
Myanmar (Shan) 1994 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Ethiopia 1972 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Somalia vs. Ethiopia 1973; 1983; 1987 Low  Interstate  Somalia: $493; $195; $198 
Ethiopia: n/a; $140; $134 
 
 
Iraq (Kurdistan) 1973; 1995 High  Intrastate (civil)    
Venezuela 1992 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $5366 Democracy 
Congo, DR (Zaire) 1977 High  Intrastate (civil)  $283  
Burundi 1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $156  
Chad  1976; 1986; 1989; 
1997 
High Intrastate (civil) Yes $206; $180; $195; $175;   
Indonesia (West Papua) 1976 High  Intrastate (civil)  $313  
Peru 1981 High  Intrastate (civil)  $2359 Democracy 
Cambodia vs. Thailand 1977 Low  Interstate  Cambodia: n/a 
Thailand: $703 
 
Ghana 1981; 1983 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $218; $180  
Syria 1979 Low Intrastate (civil)  $932  
Syria 1982 High Intrastate (civil)  $1044  
Cambodia 1978 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Egypt vs. Israel 
(Suez/Sinai) 
1973 High  Interstate Yes Egypt: $573 
Israel: $10842 
Israel: democracy 
Israel vs. Syria (Golan 
heights) 
1973 High  Interstate Yes Syria: $625  
Guinea 2000 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $369  
Sudan 1976 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $327  
Sri Lanka 1989 High  Intrastate (civil)  $548 Democracy 
Uganda 1974; 1978 Low Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
El Salvador 1979 Low Intrastate (civil)  $2184  
El Salvador 1981; 1991 High Intrastate (civil)  $1299; $1051  
DR, Yemen, PR 
Yemen, AR Yemen 
(common border) 
 
1978 Low Interstate  n/a  
Chile  1973 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $2147  
Bangladesh  1975 Low Intrastate (civil)  $227  
Bangladesh 1988 High Intrastate (civil)  $272  
Cyprus vs. Turkey 1974 High  Interstate  Cyprus: n/a Cyprus: 
Democracy 
Iran vs. Iraq 1974 Low  Interstate  Iran: $1943 
Iraq: n/a 
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Iran vs. Iraq 1980 High  Interstate  Iran: $1464 
Iraq: n/a 
 
Pakistan (Baluchistan) 1974; 1975 High  Interstate  $279; $282 Democracy 
Eritrea 1997; 1999 Low Intrastate (civil)  $212  
Angola 1975; 1998 High  Intrastate (civil)  n/a; $650  
Cambodia vs. DR of 
Vietnam (common 
border) 
1975 Low  Interstate   n/a  
Ethiopia (Ogaden) 1976; 1996; 1998 High  Intrastate (civil)  n/a; $120; $114  
Indonesia (East Timor) 1975; 1992; 1997 High  Intrastate (civil)  $303; $691; $906  
Morocco (Western 
Sahara) 
1975 High  Intrastate (civil)  $825  
Mozambique 1977 Low Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Mozambique 1981 High Intrastate (civil)  $191  
Afghanistan 1978 High  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
China vs. Vietnam 1978 Low Interstate  China: $164 
Vietnam: n/a  
 
China vs. Vietnam 1983; 1986 High  Interstate  China: $227; $310 
Vietnam: n/a; $202 
 
India (Tripura) 1978; 1992; 1995  Low  Intrastate (civil)  $231; $324; $372 Democracy 
Nicaragua 1978; 1981 High  Intrastate (civil)  $1457; 1078  
Somalia 1978; 1982  Low  Intrastate (civil)  $208; $206  
Somalia 1986; 2001 High  Intrastate (civil)  $210; n/a  
Equatorial Guinea 1979 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Iran  1986; 1991; 1997; 
1999 
High  Intrastate (civil)  $1291; $1431; $1511; 
$1535 
 
Iran (Arabistan) 1979 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1747  
Saudi Arabia 1979 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $15941  
Liberia  1980; 1989 Low Intrastate (civil)  $744; $409  
Liberia 1991 High Intrastate (civil)  $176  
Tunisia 1980 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1350  
Gambia, The 1981 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $327 Democracy 
South Africa 1981 High Intrastate (civil)  $3561 Democracy 
South Africa 1982; 1985 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $3459; $3262 Democracy 
Argentina vs. UK 
(Malvinas/Falkland) 
1982 Low  Interstate Yes $6565  
India (Manipur) 1982; 1992 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $235; $324 Democracy 
Kenya  1982 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $424  
Chad vs. Nigeria 1983 Low  Interstate  Chad: $164 
Nigeria: $347 
Nigeria: 
Democracy 
Grenada vs. US 1983 Low Interstate  $2029  
India (Punjabi) 1983 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $246 Democracy 
India (Punjabi) 1987 High Intrastate (civil)  $272 Democracy 
Sri-Lanka (Eealam) 1984 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $506 Democracy 
Sri-Lanka (Eealam) 1985; 2001 High  Intrastate (civil)  $523; $858 Democracy in 
1985 (not after 
2000) 
Cameroon  1984 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $936  
Burkina Faso vs. Mali 1985 Low  Interstate  Burkina Faso: $208 
Mali: $172 
 
Laos vs. Thailand 1986 Low  Interstate  Laos: $215 
Thailand: $997 
 
Surinam 1986 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $2044  
Togo 1986; 1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $276; 467  
Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, People's 
Republic of Yemen 
1986 High  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Burkina Faso 1987 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $211  
Chad vs. Libya 1987 High  Interstate   Chad: $171 
Libya: $2053 
 
Comoros  1989 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $405  
Ethiopia (Afar) 1975; 1989; 1996 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a; $123; $120  
India (Kashmir 
insurgents) 
1989; 1990 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $305; $371 Democracy 
Indonesia (Aceh) 1990 High  Intrastate (civil)  $612 Democracy 
Panama 1989 Low Intrastate (civil)  $2777 Democracy 
Panama vs. USA 1989 Low Interstate Yes $2777  
Papua New Guinea 1989; 1992 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $562; $630 Democracy  
Iraq vs. Kuwait 1990 Low Interstate Yes Iraq: n/a 
Kuwait: n/a 
 
Mali (Azawad) 1990; 1994 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $183; $179 Democracy after 
1992 
Niger (Air and Azawad) 1992; 1994 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $160; $158 Democracy 
Rwanda 1990; 1997 High  Intrastate (civil)  $251; $236  
Senegal (Casamance) 1990; 1992; 1995; 
1997 
Low  Intrastate (civil)  $411; $396; $387; $400  
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Senegal (Casamance) 1999 High Intrastate (civil)  $421  
Trinidad and Tobago 1990 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $4918 Democracy 
Djibouti 1991; 1999 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1099; $791  
Georgia 1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1188  
Haiti  1989; 1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $639; 641  
Sierra Leone 1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $253  
Sierra Leone 1994 High Intrastate (civil) Yes $204  
Turkey 1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $2471 Democracy 
Algeria  1991 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1767  
Angola (Cabinda) 1991; 1994; 1996; 
2002 
Low Intrastate (civil)  $770; $508; $591; $737  
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-
Karabakh) 
1995 High  Intrastate (civil)  $487  
Bosna (Rep. Srpska) 1992 High  Intrastate (civil) Yes n/a  
Croatia (Serbian 
irregulars, Serbian 
Republic of Krajina) 
1992; 1995 Low  Intrastate (civil) Yes $3350; $3336  
Egypt 1993 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1206  
Georgia (Abkhazia) 1992 High  Intrastate (civil)  $664  
Georgia (South Ossetia) 1992 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $664  
Tajikistan 1992; 1998 High  Intrastate (civil)  $307; 145  
Azerbaijan 1993; 1995 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $706; $487  
Bosnia (Bihaca Krajina; 
Croatian irregulars) 
1993 Low  Intrastate (civil) Yes n/a  
Mexico 1994; 1996 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $5309; $5063  
Yemen, AR (South 
Yemen) 
1994 High  Intrastate (civil)  $443  
Ecuador vs. Peru 
(Cordillera del Condor) 
1995 Low  Interstate Yes Ecuador: $1334 
Peru: $1977 
Ecuador: 
Democracy 
Pakistan 1990; 1995 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $461; $510 Democracy 
Cameroon vs. Nigeria 
(Bakassi) 
1996 Low Interstate   Cameroon: $615 
Nigeria: $386 
 
Ethiopia (Somali) 1996; 1999 Low  Interstate (civil)  $120; $118  
Niger (Eastern Niger) 1996 Low  Interstate (civil)  $157  
Comoros (Anjouan) 1997 Low  Interstate (civil)  $380 Democracy 
Congo, the Republic 1993 Low  Interstate (civil)  $1052  
Congo, the Republic 1997; 2002 High  Interstate (civil)  $949; $955  
Eritrea vs. Ethiopia  1998 High  Interstate  Eritrea: $220 
Ethiopia: $220 
 
Guinea Bissau 1998 High  Intrastate (civil)  $143  
Lesotho 1998 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $481  
Yugoslavia/Serbia 
(Kosovo) 
1998 High  Intrastate (civil) Yes $940  
Ethiopia (Oromiya) 1977 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Ethiopia (Oromiya) 1980; 1983; 1988 High Intrastate (civil)  n/a; $140; $130  
Uzbekistan 2000 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $558  
Central African 
Republic 
2001 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $252  
Macedonia 2001 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $1698 Democracy 
India (Bodoland) 1989 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $305 Democracy 
Myanmar (Wa) 1997 Low  Intrastate (civil)  n/a  
Israel (South. Lebanon) 1990 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $14505 Democracy 
Tanzania vs. Uganda 1978 Low  Interstate  n/a  
Mauritania (Western 
Sahara) 
1975 Low  Intrastate  (civil) Yes $423  
Turkey (Kurdistan) 1984 Low  Intrastate (civil)  $2091 Democracy 
Source: Gleditsch et al., 2002 ; WDI, 2008; Polity IV, 2008 
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List of Civil Wars (different sources) 
 
CIVIL WARS Singer and Small, 1994 (COW)  Fearon and Laitin, 2001 
Gleditsch et al., 2002 
UCDP/PRIO 
Afghanistan 1978-ongoing 1978-1992, 1992- 1978-01, 2005-2007 
Algeria 1962-63 1962-1963, 1992- 1993-01 
Angola 1975-91, 1992 1975-, 1992- 1975-1995, 1998-02 
Argentina 1955 1955, 1973-1977  
Azerbaijan   1992-1994 1992-93 
Bolivia 1952   1946 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbian 
rebellion) 
1992  1992-1995 1992-93 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bihacka 
Krajina) 
    1993 
Burundi 1972, 1988, 1991- 1993- 1998, 2000-2002 
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 
1970-75, 1979-91 1970-1975, 1978-1992 1967, 1989, 1970-75, 1978 
Chad 
1980-88 1965-, 1994-1998 
1978-79, 1980, 1987, 1990, 
2006 
China 
1946-50, 1947, 1967-68 
1946-50, 1950-1951, 1956-1959, 
1991- 
1946-49, 1956, 1959 
Colombia 1948, 1949-62, 1984-   1948-1962, 1963- 2001-02, 2004-05 
Costa Rica 1948   1948 
Cuba 1958-59 1958-1959 1958 
Dominican Republic 
1965     
Congo   1998- 1997 
DR, Congo (Zaire) 
1960-65 1960-65, 1977-78, 1996-97, 1998- 1964-65, 1997-98 
El Salvador 1979-92 1979-1992 1981-90 
Ethiopia 
  1974-1992 
1975-79, 1976, 1977-78, 
1980-91, 1982-85, 1987-90, 
1981 
Georgia 1991 1992-1994 1993 
Greece`123 1944-49 1945-1949 1946-1949 
Guatemala 
1954, 1966-72, 1970-71, 1985- 1968-96   
Guinea Bissau   1992-1994 1988 
Hyberdad   na 1947-48 
India 
1985-ongoing 1952-, 1982-1993, 1989- 
1948-51, 1988-92, 1990-93, 
1999-05 
Indonesia 
1950, 1953, 1956-60 
1950, 1953, 1958-1960, 1965-, 1975-
1999, 1991- 
1950, 1953, 1958-59, 1961, 
1975-78, 1990  
Iran 1978-79, 1981-82 1978-1979, 1979-1993 1979-80, 1981-82 
Iraq 
1959, 1985- 1959, 1961-1974 
1961-63, 1965-66, 1969, 
1974-75, 1988, 1991, 2004-07 
Jordan 1970     
Laos 1960-62, 1963-73 1960-1973 1959, 1960-61, 1963-73 
Lebanon 1958, 1975-90 1958, 1975-1990 1958, 1976, 1984 
Liberia 1989-90, 1992- 1989-1996 1990-92, 2003 
Morocco   1975-88   
Mozambique 1979- 1976-95 1981-1992 
Myanmar (Burma) 
1948-51, 1968-80, 1983- 1948- 
1949-50, 1955, 1971, 1983-
84, 1992, 1948-53, 1968-80, 
1982, 1986, 1988, 1961-75, 
1984, 1964-70, 1994 
Nepal   1997- 2002-05 
Nicaragua 1978-79, 1982-90 1978-1979, 1981-1988 1978-79, 1983-88 
Nigeria 1967-70, 1980-81, 1984 1967-70 1967-70 
Pakistan 1971, 1973-77 1971, 1973-1977, 1993-1999 1971, 1974 
Paraguay 1947 na 1947 
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Peru 1982- 1981-95 1981-85, 1988-93 
Philippines 
1950-52, 1972- 1946-1952, 1968-, 1972-1994 
1946-54, 1978, 1981, 1982-
86, 1989, 1991-92, 2000 
Cameroon     1960 
Vietnam, Republic of 
1960-65 1960-75 1955-61, 1962-64, 
Republic of Korea   1949-50   
Russia (Soviet Union) 
1991 (Nagorno Karabakh) 
1946-1959, 1945-1947, 1945-1948, 
1994-1996, 1999- 
1946-47, 1946-48, 1995-96, 
1999-01, 2004 
Rwanda 1963-64, 1990 1962-1965, 1990- 1991-1992, 1998, 2001 
Romania 1989     
Sierra Leone   1991- 1998-99 
Somalia 1982- 1981-1991, 1991- 1988, 1990-92, 2007 
South Africa   1983-94 1980-83, 1986-88 
South Yemen 1986 1994   
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 
1971, 1987-89, 1983- 1971, 1983-, 1987-1989 
1971, 1987,1989, 1990-01, 
2006-07 
Sudan 
1963-72, 1983- 1963-1972, 1983-, 1987-1989 
1963-72, 1983-92, 1995-04, 
2006 
Syria   na 1982 
Tajikistan 1992- 1992-97 1992-93 
Turkey 1991- 1977-1980, 1984-1999 1992-1997 
Uganda 
1966, 1980-88 1981-1987, 1993 1979, 1981-89, 1991, 2004 
Yemen AR 
1948, 1962-69 1948, 1962-1994 1948, 1963-64, 1966-67, 1994  
Yugoslavia (Serbia) 1991-92 1991 1991, 1998-99 
Zimbabwe 1976-79 1972-1979, 1983-1987 1976-79 
Source: Singer and Small 1994; Fearon and Laitin 2001; Gleditsch et al., 2002  
 
Countries included in the second dataset 
 
Conflict countries: Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia,Georgia, Guatemala, 
Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, South 
Africa, Sri-Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste. 
 
Non-conflict countries: Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cape 
Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Fiji, the Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Seychelles, 
the Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad  and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Zambia 
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (within and between variations) 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
aidpc2   overall |  29.83529   53.70861   .0012963   747.9403 |     N =    2599 
         between |             49.40249      .0404    494.225 |     n =     251 
         within  |             31.17973   -188.103   434.7304 | T-bar = 10.3546 
                 |                                            | 
gdpconpc overall |  1227.111    2240.46   59.45317   19048.42 |     N =    2192 
         between |             2308.309   108.2114    15602.6 |     n =     224 
         within  |             348.3234   -2974.54   6063.863 | T-bar = 9.78571 
                 |                                            | 
tradegdp overall |  54.10771   36.21916   .4187321   196.2162 |     N =    2334 
         between |             34.63115   2.604407   158.0854 |     n =     234 
         within  |               13.389  -29.42187    141.532 | T-bar = 9.97436 
                 |                                            | 
popula~n overall |  9.47e+07   2.37e+08      89000   1.18e+09 |     N =    2768 
         between |             2.35e+08   90281.98   1.08e+09 |     n =     253 
         within  |             2.13e+07  -5.15e+07   2.62e+08 | T-bar = 10.9407 
                 |                                            | 
imr      overall |  90.05901   43.89588        7.3     284.78 |     N =    2555 
         between |             42.95807   8.981111   201.1873 |     n =     252 
         within  |             12.96163   14.82264   207.0276 | T-bar = 10.1389 
                 |                                            | 
postcris overall |  .4157384   .4929374          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .1288696          0   .5454545 |     n =     253 
         within  |             .4758594  -.1297161   .9990717 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
postcw   overall |  .4725117   .4993335          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .3842514          0          1 |     n =     253 
         within  |             .3197117  -.4365792   1.381603 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
incompab overall |  1.450593   .4976424          1          2 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .4985392          1          2 |     n =     253 
         within  |                    0   1.450593   1.450593 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
democ3   overall |  .2112828   .4082919          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .3523419          0          1 |     n =     253 
         within  |             .2073734   -.606899   1.120374 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
war2     overall |  .4189723   .4934795          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .4943688          0          1 |     n =     253 
         within  |                    0   .4189723   .4189723 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
interv3  overall |  .0923464   .2895663          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .2881599          0          1 |     n =     253 
         within  |             .0333322  -.1803809   1.001437 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
unopp    overall |  .1200144   .3250367          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .2690387          0          1 |     n =     253 
         within  |             .1831044  -.7890765   1.029105 | T-bar =      11 
                 |                                            | 
transit  overall |  .0945023   .2925789          0          1 |     N =    2783 
         between |             .1899015          0          1 |     n =     253 
         within  |             .2228664  -.6327704   1.011169 | T-bar =      11 
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Table 2: Variance Inflation Factor Test  
 
Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       lnpop |      2.12    0.471283 
    gdpconpc |      1.95    0.511898 
    tradegdp |      1.89    0.530058 
       lnimr |      1.64    0.611195 
       time3 |      1.57    0.638893 
       time2 |      1.56    0.639357 
       time4 |      1.55    0.645342 
       time5 |      1.54    0.648387 
      israel |      1.44    0.694862 
      democ3 |      1.43    0.699819 
   oilgasexp |      1.40    0.711960 
       unopp |      1.37    0.732493 
     interv3 |      1.33    0.750217 
    incompab |      1.32    0.758195 
      postcw |      1.24    0.808435 
        war2 |      1.22    0.818684 
     transit |      1.21    0.824385 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.52 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156  
 
 APPENDIX C: SCATTER PLOTS for EACH POST-CONFLICT YEAR 
 
 
Source: OECD International Development Statistics, 2009 
 
 
Source: OECD International Development Statistics, 2009 
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Figure 2: Second post-conflict year
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Source: OECD International Development Statistics, 2009 
 
 
Source: OECD International Development Statistics,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Third post-conflict year
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Figure 4: Fourth post-conflict year
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Source: OECD International Development Statistics, 200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Fifth post-conflict year
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APPENDIX D 
 
Figure 1.  Emergency versus Reconstruction Aid (post-conflict years) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Credit Reporting System, OECD 2009  
Note: amounts are in USD million  
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Figure 3.  Selected Countries: Infant Mortality Rate in the first five post-conflict years 
 
 
 
  Source: WDI, CD ROM (2010) 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E  Outliers and Influential Points 
 
 
  Leverage plot for growth variable 
 
 
Source: WDI, CD ROM (2010) 
Note: Country codes: 30= Azerbaijan and 15= Liberia 
El Salvador
Mozambique
Liberia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Nicaragua
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
Post-Conflict Infant Mortality Rates 
1
22 2 333
3
3
7 7
7 77
9
9
9
910
1010 10
10 111111111
11
4
15
161661
6
17
17
17
17
177
18 18
8818
20
20
202020
21212121
23
233 4424
26
26
777
88
2828
28
9
29929
29
31
3
33
3333
33
343434
34
35
5535 35
383 8
399
93994040 4040 4
4
41414141
454545
454545
46464646 464 4647 47
47
47
49949
4 95555 55151
535353535344
5
5555
56
56
5
57
7
57
58
5
58
5888 599
60
6 6161
1
6 1612
62
6662
64 644
64
65 656
5
65
0 70707070
70
7171
7 72
7 72747
775
75
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
L
e
ve
ra
g
e
0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
Normalized residual squared
 161  
 
 
 
 
Leverage plot for infant mortality variable  
 
 
  
Source: WDI, CD ROM (2010) 
Note: Country codes: 36=Ethiopia, 35=Eritrea, 70=Trinidad and Tobago 
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Appendix F. Donor Pledges: First Donor’s Conference for Kosovo 
 
DONORS     Total Amount in 
millions of EURO 
Total Amount in millions 
of USD 
COUNTRIES     1,482.782 1,536.756 
Australia AUD 48.494 50.260 
Austria ATS 36.336 37.659 
Denmark USD 71.401 74.000 
Finland EUR 18.200 18.862 
France EUR 51.000 52.856 
Germany DEM 166.170 172.218 
Ireland IRL 4.444 4.606 
Italy USD 4.535 4.700 
Japan USD 154.381 160.000 
Norway NOK 48.664 50.435 
Slovakia USD 0.034 0.035 
Spain USD 10.035 10.400 
Sweden SEK 41.636 43.151 
Switzerland CHF 71.821 74.435 
The Netherlands USD 42.455 44.000 
Turkey USD 38.595 40.000 
United Kingdom UKL 137.531 142.537 
United States USD 537.051 556.600 
ORGANIZATIONS     608.663 630.819 
European Community EUR 515.000 533.746 
World Bank USD 57.893 60.000 
CE Social Development Fund EUR 2.000 2.073 
UNDP USD 4.824 5.000 
UNICEF USD 28.946 30.000 
Total EC + 15 Member States     1,098.742 1,138.736 
Grand Total     2,091.446 2,167.574 
Source: European Commission, 1999; available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/calendar/1999/events/kdc/pledges.htm 
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Appendix G. Sectoral Composition of Aid Inflows (spent 1999-2008) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Housing  15.15 25.78 15.38 7.73 5.67 3.66 4.90 4.60 0.05   
Humanitarian/Emergency  57.67 4.02 0.00      0.00   
CFA/MEF 1.72 1.22 4.84 5.76 7.64 4.47 7.15 8.18 0.00   
Democratic Governance 
and Civil Society 0.55 1.69 3.59 12.83 6.85 13.20 12.22 16.08 11.20 6.09 
Ed&Sc 3.17 6.69 4.49 3.41 2.28 6.54 4.44 9.09 8.29 5.03 
Health 0.75 3.36 4.76 1.54 3.07 4.82 4.02 7.26 5.06 2.68 
KPS 1.22 4.56 0.91 8.02 2.33 1.28 5.38 0.35 1.51 0.15 
Loc. Admin. 0.09 1.08 2.09 2.08 7.37 1.14 3.16 1.71 0.00   
Mine clearance/mine action 
coordination 9.67 1.75 1.76 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00   
PTK 0.02 0.41 0.89 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00   
Public Utilities 9.49 21.02 32.57 30.87 29.40 37.32 12.23 5.62 10.53 19.11 
Trade&Industry 0.07 9.31 7.12 8.50 11.35 11.54 7.93 9.00 5.23 8.67 
Transport& Infrastructure 0.10 7.85 7.25 4.35 4.57 1.41 2.56 3.18 1.88 1.86 
Agriculture 0.07 2.92 5.80 4.13 5.76 2.52 5.27 6.48 12.35 4.41 
Civil security&emergency  0.00 2.18 1.38 2.03 0.00 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.27   
Justice 0.00 1.36 2.12 3.56 3.82 6.29 6.73 7.16 9.82 9.46 
Minority rights&returns 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.89 7.07 5.28 3.05 
Public Administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.99 10.75 
Public Financial 
Management 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.79 1.39 
Others  0.26 4.78 5.06 5.19 9.50 5.54 14.65 14.20 11.77 27.35 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: RIMS database, 2010. Note: figures are in percentages. 
 
Appendix H.  
Table 1. Damage on housing stock 
 No of damaged houses % 
Category I (5-20%) 
23062 
19,29584 
Category II (20-40%) 
18003 
15,063 
Category III (40-60%) 
31855 
26,65289 
Category IV (more 60%) 
46598 
38,98827 
Total 
119518 
100 
Source: Author‘s compilation from the IMG (EC damage assessment, July 1999) 
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Table 2. Damage on Health Facilities 
 Units of damaged health facilities  % 
Category I (5-20%) 116 48,333 
Category II (20-40%) 41 17,083 
Category III (40-60%) 32 13,333 
Category IV (more 60%) 
51 21,25 
Total 240 100 
Source: Author‘s compilation from the IMG (EC damage assessment, July 1999) 
 
Table 3. Damage on Education facilities 
 Units of damaged educ. facilities  % 
Category I (5-20%) 257 48,12734 
Category II (20-40%) 88 16,4794 
Category III (40-60%) 88 16,4794 
Category IV (more 60%) 101 18,91386 
Total 534 100 
Source: Author‘s compilation from the IMG (EC damage assessment, July 1999) 
 
Table 4. Damage on Electricity Local Distribution Network 
 Units damaged  % 
Size I 257 41,653 
Size II 154 24,959 
Size III 138 22,366 
Size IV 68 11,021 
Total 617 100 
 
Table 5. Damage on Water Local Distribution Network 
 Units damaged  % 
Size I 140 31,81818 
Size II 134 30,45455 
Size III 96 21,81818 
Size IV 70 15,90909 
Total 440 100 
Source: Author‘s compilation from the IMG (EC damage assessment, July 1999) 
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Appendix I.  
 
Table 1. Some selected outcome indicators of reconstructed and repaired infrastructure  
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Km. of 
repaired road 
 487 926 36 26 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1475 
No. of rehab. 
and constr. 
Schools 
81 89 111 100 80 n/a n/a n/a n/a 461 
No of rehab. 
and const. 
health centers 
and hospitals 
11 38 62 37 130 n/a n/a n/a n/a 278 
Electricity 
cons. Gwh 
n/a n/a n/a 1950.4 2041.1 2139.3 2109.4 2154.9 2391.6 2941.0 
Gross prod.  of 
energy Gwh 
n/a n/a n/a 3151.7 3221.1 3481.1 3999.5 3970.5 4309.5 4505.8 
 
No of flights 
Pristina Airport 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 910796 930620 882731 990952 1130639 
 
No of 
passengers 
flying from KS 
n/a  232.1 403408 441305 383836 470907  478258 483330 506962 578649 
Source: Donor Coordination Unit, MFE (2004a); Enti i Statistikës së Kosovës, ESK (2009) 
 
Figure 1. Improvements made in access to water and enrollment rates 
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Figure 2.  HDI: Kosovo and the region  
 
 
 
Source: UNDP 2006 
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APPENDIX K. Description and Sources of Variables Used  
  
First dataset (extension of Kang and Meernik, 2004) 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Aid  Aid commitments in USD millions 
(per capita, adjusted for inflation); 
annual data  
OECD-DAC  
Online source (2009) 
Democratic state Presence of democracy using Polity IV 
democracy index  
0-10 scale: 0 being least democratic to 
10 most democratic countries. 
Countries with values from 6-10 on 
the Polity IV scale are considered 
democracies. Dummy variable: one if 
greater than 6, zero otherwise.  
Marshall and Jaggers (2009) 
Polity in Transition Countries whose authorities underwent 
transition, interruption, and/or 
interregnum periods (coded as ‗-66‘, ‗-
77‘, and ‗-88‘). Dummy variable 
Marshall and Jaggers (2009) 
Openness  Total trade/GDP 
(annual data) 
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2008) 
Per capita GDP Per capita GDP (in constant PPP 
prices); annual data 
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2008) 
Population Log of total population; annual data   WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2008) 
Infant Mortality Rate Log of Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births); annual data 
Abouharb and Kimbal (2007) 
Openness Total trade/GDP 
(annual data) 
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2008) 
OECD Military Intervention Whether there has been an 
involvement in conflict by OECD 
countries with troops  to support side 
A and/or B (sideA2nd and Sideb2nd in 
PRIO database). . Dummy variable. 
Gleditsch et al., 2002 
UN Peacekeeping Was there a UN peace operation? 
Dummy variable 
 
Author‘s construction using 
Doyle&Sambanis (2000); the Blue 
Helmets (1998); United Nations 
Peace-keeping website  
Level of Violence  Whether the conflict since the onset 
has exceeded 1000 battle related 
deaths. Dummy variable 
Author‘s construction based on 
Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
Conflict over Governance Governance versus territorial conflicts. 
Dummy variable 
Author‘s construction based on 
Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
Post cold war period Before and after 1989. Dummy 
variable  
As per Kang and Meernik (2004) 
Oil/gas exporting countries An oil/gas export dummy is set to one 
in cases where the recipients‘ country 
exports comprise more than 10 percent 
of oil and gas 
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2008) 
Post-conflict Period  The first five years after the conflict 
episode ended are coded as post-
conflict period. Dummy variable.  
As per Kang and Meernik (2004) 
Post-conflict years  Individual years in post-conflict 
period: year1, year2, year3, year4, and 
year5. Dummy variable.  
As per Kang and Meernik (2004) 
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Second dataset: Chapter 2 (Tables 6 -7) and Chapter 3  (Tables 8-11) 
  
Variable Definition Source 
Aid ODA, total net disbursements in 
current prices (USD millions).; four- 
year averages.  
OECD-DAC  
Online source (2010) 
GDP Log of Gross Domestic Product in 
current US dollars at the beginning of 
the four-year periods 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Per capita GDP Per capita GDP (in constant PPP 
prices) at the beginning of the four-
year period 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Growth  GDP growth, annual %; four-year 
averages 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Government Consumption General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of GDP); 
four-year averages 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Polity IV Presence of democracy using Polity IV 
democracy index on a 0-10 scale: 
four-year averages. 
Marshall and Jaggers (2009) 
 
ICRGE The Economic Risk Rating Index 
(four-year averages) 
The PRS Group, 2010 
Education Log of primary school completion 
rate, total 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Infant Mortality Rate Log of Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births) at the beginning of 
the panel period 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Log of Fertility  Log of fertility rate, total (births per 
woman) at the beginning of the panel 
period 
WB-WDI 
Online source (2010) 
Log of water  Log of improved water source (% of 
population with access) at the 
beginning of the panel period 
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2010) 
Log of sanitation  Log of improved sanitation facilities 
(% of population with access) at the 
beginning of the panel period 
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2010) 
Peacekeeping operations Was there a UN peace operation? 
Dummy variable 
 
Author‘s construction using 
Doyle&Sambanis (2000); the Blue 
Helmets (1998); United Nations 
Peace-keeping website  
Population Log of total population at the 
beginning of the four-year period  
WDI, CD ROM  
WB (2010) 
Post-conflict dummies  
 
Peace onset: the year the conflict 
ended and one year after the conflict 
(years 0 and 1). Post-conflict1: years 
2-5; post-conflict2: years 6-9;  
Prepeace years (time 0): four years 
before the end of conflict (-4 to-1) 
Dummy variable 
 
Author‘s construction using conflict 
dataset from UCDP/PRIO (2009); as 
per Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
Colony dummies Dummies for British, French, 
Portuguese, and Spanish Colony 
Author‘s construction as per Rose 
(2004) 
SSA, CENTAM, EUROPE and 
EASIA 
Regional dummies  Author‘s construction, as per 
Roodman‘s dataset (2008) 
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Reconstruction Aid Aid commitments (per capita, adjusted 
for inflation)=Real sector investments 
in transportation (including roads), 
communications, energy, banking, 
agriculture, industry, commodity and 
general program assistance, money 
spent on policy formulation is 
subtracted (e.g., transportation policy 
and administrative management; 
money spent on post-conflict peace 
building, demobilization and land 
mine clearance 
 
Source: Credit Reporting System, 
OECD 2009 (online source); 
classification as per Clemens et al. 
(2006) 
Emergency Aid Aid commitment flows (per capita, 
adjusted for inflation): Food Aid/Food 
Security Assistance, Emergency Food 
Aid, Emergency/Distress Relief, Aid 
to refugees (in donor country), Aid to 
refugees (in recipient country) 
Source: Credit Reporting System, 
OECD 2009 (online source); 
classification as per Clemens et al. 
(2006) 
 
 
 
